

**Institute for Conflict Analysis  
and Resolution**

**Occasional Paper 9**

**Negotiation Theory  
Through the Looking Glass of Gender**

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## About the Author

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Her teaching and professional practice focus on negotiation and conflict resolution in the management of organizations. Professor Kolb is the coauthor and editor of *Making Talk Work* (Jossey-Bass, 1994), author of *The Mediators* (MIT Press, 1983), an in-depth study of labor mediation and coeditor of *Hidden Conflict in Organizations: Uncovering Behind-The-Scenes Disputes* (Sage, 1992), a collection of field studies about how conflicts are handled in a variety of business and not-for-profit organizations.

Deborah Kolb received her Ph.D. from MIT's Sloan School of Management, where her dissertation won the Zannetos Prize for outstanding doctoral scholarship. She has a B.A. from Vassar College and an M.B.A. from the University of Colorado.

## About the Institute

The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University has as its principal mission to advance the understanding and resolution of significant and persistent human conflicts among individuals, groups, communities, identity groups, and nations. To fulfill this mission, the Institute works in four areas: academic programs, consisting of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) and a Master of Science (M.S.) in Conflict Analysis and Resolution; research and publication; a clinical and consultancy service offered through the Applied Practice and Theory Program and by individual Institute faculty and senior associates; and public education.

The Applied Practice and Theory (APT) Program draws on faculty, practitioners, and students to form teams to analyze and help resolve broad areas of conflict. These three-to-five-year projects currently address such topics as crime and conflict, jurisdictional conflicts within governments, conflict resolution in deeply divided communities (Northern Ireland, South Africa, Beirut), and conflict in school systems.

Associated with the Institute are a number of organizations that promote and apply conflict resolution principles. These include the Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED), a networking organization; the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), offering a biannual conference for conflict resolution practitioners; Northern Virginia Mediation Service (NVMS), offering mediation services to Northern Virginia residents involved in civil or minor criminal disputes; and Starting Small, teaching conflict resolution and problem-solving skills to children.

Major research interests include the study of deep-rooted conflict and its resolution; the exploration of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in a range of community, national, and international settings.

Outreach to the community is accomplished through the publication of books and articles, public lectures, conferences, and special briefings on the theory and practice of conflict resolution. As part of this effort, the Institute's Working and Occasional Papers offer both the public at large and professionals in the field access to critical thinking flowing from faculty, staff, and students at the Institute.

These papers are presented to stimulate critical consideration of important questions in the study of human conflict.

## Foreword

In April 1994 the Institute achieved a notable "first" by having Dr. Deborah Kolb of the Harvard Program on Negotiation deliver the annual Lynch Lecture before an audience of GMU faculty, students, and visitors. It was a noteworthy occasion for a number of reasons.

First, it was the very first occasion on which we had persuaded a speaker from the Harvard Program on Negotiation to give a public lecture at ICAR—a curiously late linkage given the fact that the two programs had grown and developed side by side in the eighties and shared both an interest in methods of ending conflict and a number of personal connections. For example, Professor Roger Fisher, a leader of the Harvard project, had been involved in one of the very first conflict resolution workshops conducted by Dr. John Burton in London in the early sixties and had also played a major role in establishing the Conflict Clinic Inc. when it was first set up in Cambridge.

Second, the occasion was noteworthy for Dr. Kolb's presence at the lectern. In a way, this symbolized once again the eclectic nature of our field. Although both Dr. Kolb's own intellectual background and practical experience arose from management studies and an analysis of negotiation within and between organizations, it was clearly the case that her work and ideas spoke directly to many of the problems and opportunities that had arisen in other arenas of conflict in which ICAR's own faculty and students worked and studied. Our hope in inviting Dr. Kolb was that her talk would, yet again, underscore the fact that there is a coherent discipline of "conflict analysis and resolution," which can throw light on conflicts at all social levels. And, in this hope we were not disappointed.

Finally, Dr. Kolb's lecture dealt directly with an issue that had increasingly come to the forefront in recent years, both in the field itself and in work and discussions at the Institute. This is the question of gender-based differences in views about the nature, causes, and remedies for conflict; about the manner in which it is differently conducted; and about appropriate ways for dealing with it. We had asked Dr. Kolb to draw upon her recent research and writing to review and update us on this complex set of issues, and she responded with a magisterial survey of recent work in the field, and its implications for the way we think (or fail to think deeply enough) about negotiation practices and—by implication—other means of managing or resolving conflict. It is a pleasure to make Dr. Kolb's survey more widely available in this latest ICAR Occasional Paper.

*C.R. Mitchell*  
*The Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*

Seventh Annual Vernon M. and Minnie I. Lynch Lecture  
on Conflict Resolution

Address by  
Deborah M. Kolb  
for the  
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**Negotiation Theory  
Through the Looking Glass of Gender**

The White Queen offers Alice a biscuit to quench her thirst, but tells her she cannot have any jam. "I don't care for jam," Alice says. "That's good," the White Queen responds, "because the rule is jam tomorrow and jam yesterday but never jam today." "It must sometimes be jam today," says Alice. "No, it's jam every other day and today isn't every other day," concludes the Queen.

**Introduction**

Not so long ago, negotiation was viewed as a rather sordid affair, associated with haggling, dickering, bartering, niggling, swapping, and back-room deal making. It is now recognized as a widespread, serious social activity for solving problems on a grand and modest scale (Adler, 1993). As negotiation has permeated and even been equated with most social interactions (Strauss, 1978), interest and research on the topic has exploded.

A mere 25 years ago, scholarly work was primarily confined to economists interested in game theory and its applications (Schelling, 1960; Nash, 1950), collective bargaining in labor relations (Walton and McKersie, 1965), international diplomacy (Zartman and Berman, 1982; Young, 1989) and social psychology (Rubin and Brown, 1975). Scholarly interest has not only grown exponentially, but has extended into fields such as communications, cognitive psychology, law, management, and anthropology, among others. Despite the apparent diversity in approaches such growth might signal, much of the current work coalesces around certain core ideas and themes (Sebenius, 1992; Bazerman and Neale, 1991; Mnookin, 1993).

Influenced significantly by the work of Howard Raiffa, recent models embrace the goal of asymmetric prescription/description (Lax

and Sebenius, 1986; Neale and Bazerman, 1991). These works purport to offer advice to the single negotiator based on empirical research that seeks to describe likely and possible behaviors of the other party. Underlying this body of knowledge is a taken-for-granted construction of negotiators who have interests (as distinct from positions) that they seek to advance. The goal of negotiation is to improve upon available alternatives to agreement and to do so in ways that push toward efficient, *pie-expanding* deals. Abilities to achieve these goals are marred by behavioral dilemmas around communication (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Walton and McKersie, 1965) deviations from rationality (Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), social and identity concerns (Kramer et al., 1993b; Thompson and Hastie, 1990) structural barriers (Mnookin, 1993) and tendencies for conflicts to escalate (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1993). While research is carried out in disparate fields, an interdisciplinary consensus, a dominant discourse (Weedon, 1987), has begun to take hold.<sup>1</sup>

What would happen if we viewed this discourse through the looking glass of gender (Peterson and Runyan, 1993)? There are a number of ways to investigate gender in the context of negotiations. Many have looked at similarities and differences between men and women when they negotiate (See Kolb and Coolidge, 1991; Lewicki, Minton, and Saunders, 1994). The intent here is different. Following contemporary feminist critique in the social sciences and humanities generally, and the organizational field specifically, we consider how emerging theory of negotiation analysis and the psychology of bargaining, seemingly neutral and natural, is gendered (Calas and Smircich, 1990; Martin, 1990; Mumby and Putnam, 1992).

We will argue that negotiation analysis is gendered in that it sustains and reinforces dichotomous thinking in which masculine attributes dominate those associated with the feminine (Flax, 1990), because it also fails to consider how the material conditions of different negotiators shape their understandings of negotiation and abilities to participate (Ferguson, 1984), and because its dominance closes out other potential ways of conceptualizing and acting in negotiation.

Our argument takes the following form. First, we identify three assumptions inherent in the dominant discourse that have gender implications. These are existing conceptions of negotiator agency, bargaining power as a function of alternatives to an agreement, and a split between rational and emotional processes. Second, we suggest that negotiators who are different along these dimensions come to be seen, and/or experience themselves as different and often disadvantaged.

Third, both from a theoretical and practical perspective, the discourse has the effect of rendering invisible and unimportant a wider set of strategic practices than are generally considered in the negotiation analysis framework. Looking at negotiation through a lens of gender helps us recover and revise negotiator agency as a performative activity, empowerment as an ongoing process, and a formulation of emotion as basic to intersubjective meaning construction.

#### A Dominant Discourse in Negotiation?

One of the most remarkable developments in the social sciences in the last decade or so has been the emergence of negotiation as a field of interdisciplinary research. It has become commonplace to distinguish among works in the field that are normative and those that are descriptive (Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 1990). Normative theory is traditionally associated with economics and game theory. As Raiffa (1982) has put it, they “examine what ultrasmart, impeccably rational, superpeople should do in competitive, interactive situations” (21). But normative theory has also been given a boost by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1992) who offer prescriptive advice accessible to the ordinary negotiator. That advice covers ways to *overcome distributive* tendencies in negotiation in favor of the more desirable *integrative* or mutual gains bargaining. If normative theory describes what we should do, then descriptive theory elaborates on what we actually do. It is in this domain of description that empirical research has exploded in recent years.

The linkage between the prescriptive rigor of game theory, the normative valuation of integrative bargaining, and the descriptive depiction of deviations from the ideal is best captured in the framework proposed by Raiffa (1982). Labelled asymmetric prescriptive/descriptive theory, it provides a critical transition between earlier economic game theory and the current explosion of empirical, interdisciplinary work. Sebenius (1992) has described the work in this emerging field as “negotiation analysis” to highlight the rigor it seeks. While not all the researchers cited above would naturally identify themselves as negotiation analysts, a common set of assumptions underlies their work. In this way interdisciplinary negotiation analysis has to dominate the discourse in the field.<sup>2</sup>

Interdisciplinary negotiation analysis takes as a major problem the search for integrative solutions. It builds from game theory, which makes a number of challengeable assumptions about the “game”: full rationality on the part of the players who are able to evaluate the attractiveness of all conceivable outcomes; clearly spelled out rules of play that determine what moves are permissible and who can

communicate with whom; and a set of all possible agreement outcomes (Young, 1991; Sebenius, 1992).

Common sense suggests that game theory with its assumptions about rationality, information, and behavioral dynamics does not generally fit the real life experiences of most negotiators. Maintaining the desire to be rigorous and at the same time recognizing practical negotiating realities, "negotiation analysts" (Sebenius, 1992) seek to "generate prescriptive advice given a (probabilistic) description of how others will behave" (20). In addition to this orientation, there are a number of other themes that characterize this perspective (Sebenius, 1992; Bazerman and Neale).

In the place of the rational actor, we have one who is an intelligent, goal-seeking person capable of learning. This actor has interests, goals, and aspirations that she or he seeks to advance in negotiation. Who this actor is and how she might behave has spawned the extensive research enterprise among psychologists. They have focused on individual differences (Rubin and Brown, 1976; Gilkey and Greenhalgh, 1986; Lewicki et al., 1994), the influence of goals and aspirations (Pruitt, 1981; Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1993), and cognitive barriers and limitations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Thompson and Hastie, 1990). In considering the negotiator, gender tends to be treated as one of many individual differences (see Thompson, 1990; Lewicki et al., 1994).

Negotiation analysts are less concerned with predicting equilibrium outcomes than with understanding how negotiators fix themselves on a zone of agreement and then manage and respond to others perceptions of it. Thus, assessing one's BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) and that of the other party is an important analytic task because the more attractive is one's BATNA, the more demanding one can be in negotiations (Sebenius, 1992). BATNA, therefore, is a major determinant of bargaining power. Thus a variety of methods are advanced to make these determinations even though parties do not always act based on these assessments (White and Neale, 1991).

Efficiency of agreements is not assumed. Rather, negotiation analysts take as problematic the task of finding Pareto optimal outcomes. That has led scholars to explore a number of issues. Tactics to expand the pie or foster problem solving are major preoccupations both empirically and practically (Pruitt, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Barriers to achieving these ends are also well studied (Ross and Stillinger, 1991; Mnookin, 1993). Especially important in this regard are the limited abilities of negotiators to act rationally (Bazerman and

Neale, 1991; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). There are problems of reactive devaluation (Ross and Stillinger, 1991), misconstrual (Robinson et al., in press), traps, and escalation (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1993).

Others consider the mixed-motive quality of negotiation. In a rejection of the normative stance of game and mutual-gains theory, empirical researchers explore patterns of distributive and integrative bargaining or the processes of creating value and then claiming one's share (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Putnam, 1990).

Perhaps, because significant portions of this work take place in professional schools, the lure of prescription is strong. Despite the emphasis on descriptive empirical research, the pull of the practitioner audience is evident. Thus, there is an accumulated body of work that covers what to do. Given the focus of the work, that advice is asymmetric, offered to a negotiator about how to deal with others.

Where is gender in all of this?

#### **Gender in the Dominant Discourse**

We live in a dimorphic world, and so our beliefs in gender difference run deep (Gerson and Preiss, 1985). The major empirical question that has engaged researchers in the negotiation field is whether and to what degree men and women negotiate similarly and/or differently. Embedded in this research question is a view of gender as a stable individual characteristic that explains bargaining behavior and performance (Thompson, 1990).

There are several reasons why this particular take on gender has been so dominant. First, sex differences are relatively easy to measure (Rubin and Brown, 1975). Second, as more women take their place in business and political and legal negotiations, inevitable questions about gender and difference arise. And finally, new approaches to negotiation that emphasize mutual gains and collaborative problem solving are seen as somehow more natural for women than for men. The reasoning behind a focus on difference is also not difficult to detect. Their biology, development, socialization, and roles they play in society presumably lead boys and girls and then men and women to deal with conflict differently (Sheldon, 1993; Kolb and Coolidge, 1991; Miller, 1976).

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The search for difference has dominated research. For several decades social psychologists have attempted to link particular behaviors or outcomes with difference. Some see difference as statements of rather neutral fact (see Rubin and Brown, 1975; Thompson, 1990). Others see difference and wonder whether there are deficiencies to be corrected. In some recent work, for example, on salary negotiations, findings suggest that women (generally M.B.A.s) in comparable situations do poorly relative to men (Gerhart and Rynes, 1991; Stevens et al., 1993; Renard, 1992). While many possible explanations are advanced (e.g., lack of interest solely in money and more interest in relationships), some of these explanations (e.g., lack of self confidence, inability to adapt to changing strategies, limited strategic repertoire, and poor self-image) suggest that remedial help might be required if women are to become better negotiators.

More recently, gender differences have been valorized. With the dual influence of mutual gains or integrative bargaining and the work of people like Carol Gilligan (1982), Jean Baker Miller (1976), and in the popular domain, Judith Rosener (1990) and Sally Heigelson (1990), the notion that women may be more collaborative, empowering, and focused on relationships is read as behaviors and attitudes that are worthy of widespread emulation (Kolb and Coolidge, 1991; Stamato, 1992; Menkel-Meadow, 1985; Burton et al., 1991). Thus, findings by Pinkley and Northcraft (1989) and Greenhalgh and Gilkey (1984) that women and men frame negotiation tasks differently are interpreted, not as deficiencies, but as desirable traits.<sup>3</sup>

The picture is even more complicated and inconclusive.<sup>4</sup> Power, status, and social role frequently turn out to provide more compelling explanations for difference than gender. This is not surprising. After all, the argument made for gender difference is only partially rooted in biology and social development. Catherine MacKinnon (1982), among others, argues that because women have tended to occupy lesser positions of power and influence, they have had to learn alternative ways of thinking about the world, ways that place a premium on deference, social skills, and maintaining good relationships. Thus, what are labelled as differences based on gender may have more to do with power and social position.

Recent empirical research in negotiation bears this out. In her recent review, Carol Watson (1994) concludes that gender differences in negotiation are an artifact of power and status differences between men and women.<sup>5</sup> Further, the kinds of social roles to which people are

assigned also provide better explanations than gender (Putnam and Jones, 1982) in accounting for bargaining behavior and performance.

There is much to applaud in this more sophisticated and structural perspective on gender. However, it is still too narrowly conceived. First, what it does is graft women onto existing structures and practices (Gray, 1993). Whether differences are to be valorized or bemoaned, or are the result of personal choice or situation, they are understood almost entirely in the context of the existing discourse. In that discourse such differences that may exist tend to get incorporated into existing understandings in ways that denigrate or distort them. Northrup (1994), for example, suggests that when a woman's concern for relationships is incorporated into the dominant discourse, it is transformed from an expressive interest to one that is instrumental.

But the situation may be even more problematic. As difference gets played out in negotiation analysis discourse, gender gets constructed in ways that reinforce existing practice. Those who may be different can be exploited or made to appear naive. An overriding concern for feelings in a relationship, for example, can mean that a negotiator sacrifices her own interests and needs (Grillo, 1991). Fletcher (1993) puts it well when she suggests that certain actions get "disappeared" or rendered invisible when viewed in the context of a dominant discourse about work.

Recent feminist scholarship extends its reach beyond gender as an individual variable to a much broader project of gender relations (Flax, 1990). Gender relations creates two types of persons: man and woman. Its study entails looking at gender both as a thought construct or category that helps us to make sense of particular social worlds, and as a social relation that enters into and partially constitutes all other social relations and activities.

Bem (1992) uses the term androcentrism to describe the hierarchical relationship where the definition of male experience and behavior is taken as the norm and the feminine is seen as different. Indeed, by rendering male as the normal and taken for granted and woman as the other (Flax, 1987; Weedon, 1987), gender relations are ones of dominance and inequality. These relations of dominance are sustained through opposition or gender polarization (Bem, 1992) that permeate language, such as male-female, mind-body, nature-culture. In each polarity that element associated with the masculine is seen to dominate that attributed to the feminine.

Feminist scholars reveal how these meanings are sustained in scientific knowledge production that renders some forms as true and unquestioned while others are suppressed (Calas and Smircich, 1990;

Martin, 1990; Mumby and Putnam, 1992). By questioning what is named and normal, feminist scholars seek to expose what is taken for granted, neutral, and objective. Starting from the material positions where women operate, and their experiences in different situated contexts as outsiders, scholars reveal the partiality of existing discourse and how it serves to create dilemmas and paradox of gender (Alcoff, 1988; Hare-Mustin and Mazarek, 1988). In so doing, the status quo no longer seems natural and inevitable but is revealed instead as a reflection of choices made and choices that can be remade (Fletcher, 1993).<sup>6</sup> In this way, new insights about practice are revealed and the potential for developing more inclusive and equitable practices become possible.

### **Negotiation Analysis Through the Looking Glass**

Negotiation analysis is the body of knowledge we consider. Traditionally, gender has entered theory and practice as individual variables. The intent here is to investigate the ways in which certain tenets of negotiation theory and practice are gendered. We will examine three core assumptions: the model of the negotiator as an autonomous individual with interests to achieve, the concept of bargaining zones that are shaped by alternatives to agreement as a significant determinant of power, and the dominance of rationality (and deviations from it) as core competencies for negotiators. We will analyze each of these assumptions through a lens of gender by 1) looking at the ways in which it privileges certain positions and ways of being and denigrates others, 2) ignores the socially constructed nature of processes as performances, 3) minimizes real dilemmas that negotiators from different positions experience, and 4) therefore neglects the kinds of empirical description and practical prescription that might assist all negotiators.

#### *A. An Agentic Negotiator*

In a recent workshop for female professionals in the developing world, one of the attendees wondered in response to the dictum, *focus on interests, not positions*, whether she could have interests too. Such an experience suggests how much we take for granted the model of a self-interested negotiator with *agency*.

Bakan (1966) defines agency as a stance that values individualism and personal achievement. It is distinguished from a communitarian perspective where one's identity is bound up with, and not independent from, particular relationships. The concept of agency is also used to characterize an active and deliberate role for participants in a discourse. Harre (1984) suggests that when individuals have agency, they conceive of themselves as having the power to decide, to act independently, and to

account for their actions. To have agency means that one speaks and acts from a legitimate position that is prior and separable from the particular discourse of interest. What these managers from the developing world suggested was that they did not see themselves so situated. Rather, they saw their identities as intimately tied and subservient to those of others.

One does not have to read very far in the negotiation literature to observe how deeply embedded an agency model of self-interest is—it is absolutely assumed. Just consider the now-famous Fisher and Ury dicta, *focus on interests not positions, or separate the person from the problem*. But it is also embedded in the research. The dominance of laboratory methods and the ubiquitous role play builds into its structure an agency model of negotiations. Role players are provided with legitimate interests as a preliminary to their efforts to negotiate their differences. Generally, they are on their own and connected to any institutional setting in only the most tangential ways (Kolb, 1994).

There are several ways in which this model of negotiator agency can be analyzed. First, we might note as some feminist standpoint theorists have, that the focus on self to the exclusion of relationship is in itself gendered. Best associated with the work of scholars like Carol Gilligan (1982), Nancy Chodorow (1978), and Jean Baker Miller and her colleagues at the Stone Center (Jordan et al., 1992), the argument is made that masculine and feminine identities develop differently. The masculine is associated with individuation and autonomy and the feminine with connection and relation.

From this perspective, we could argue that their development and the gendered structure of social relations “predisposes females to reject any way of being or behaving that treats females as people whose needs, desires, abilities, and interests are to be taken seriously” (Bem, 1992, 158). Without a legitimate sense of self-interest, the feminine negotiator might not do very well. Indeed, deficiencies are often found in the literature.

Research on salary negotiation is instructive because much of it finds deficiency. Women seem to realize lower returns to their salary negotiation efforts (Gerhart and Rynes, 1991). Perhaps it is because they lack confidence in their negotiating abilities (Stevens et al., 1993). Or maybe they devalue their contributions and, therefore, seek less pay (Major et al., 1984) because they communicate lower pay expectations, they are offered less. So not surprisingly we find in salary negotiation research that women use fewer self-promotion tactics and, hence, come away with lower pay, are less persistent (Renard, 1993), and set lower

salary goals. In an interesting twist, when men and women are given goals, deficiency disappears (Stevens et al., 1993).

This line of research suggests that women, for a host of reasons, may occupy rather different subject positions in negotiation (Fairclough, 1989). Ongoing narrative research contain stories<sup>7</sup> and commentary that support these “nonagency” feelings—how difficult it is to negotiate for oneself when one’s feelings of competence and worth are on the line. The former mayor of a large eastern city told how she had skillfully managed to negotiate a major environmental initiative, followed by saying that she was hopeless when she had to negotiate on her own behalf. For her, she had agency as a political representative but not when she had to negotiate on her own behalf.

Negotiations are also the site for a range of subjective interpretations about people’s positions in the discourse (Weedon, 1987). Gender becomes salient in the ways that action is differentially interpreted. That is, others actions are interpreted according to normative conceptions about attitudes and activities that are considered culturally appropriate to gender. Bem (1992) labels this gender polarization. In social interactions, differential places are created for men and women that are not natural, essential, or biological but have the effect of being seen as if they are (West and Zimmerman, 1987).

From this perspective, gender can get reproduced in negotiation and dispute resolution in a number of ways that position women differently, and often disadvantageously, from men in the ensuing discourse. Consider the research on salary negotiations. A woman’s job performance is less likely to be highly rated, which can lead to self-doubts and lower aspirations in ensuing negotiations (Rhode, 1991). Buyers, other than white males for example, are constructed as less-informed and gullible; they don’t get to bargain on the same range as white men (Ayres et al., 1992). In mediation, women are expected to put aside their interests and to sacrifice their ambitions for the sake of others. When they do not, they are made to feel selfish (Grillo, 1991). Thus, there are differences in the degree to which negotiators are seen as having agency and legitimately entitled to negotiate for their own interests.

These perceptions are not stable characteristics that describe either individuals or situations. Agency is not something you either have or do not have. Rather, to be a self-interested agentic negotiator is to act like one and to do so that others are persuaded (Goffman, 1959). This performative dimension of gender has us inquire into the language and repetitive actions negotiators take to manage this impression of

themselves (Butler, 1990). Indeed, one might argue that when the notion of the negotiator’s identity is problematized, it has us focus on the actions taken to establish and re-establish this identity throughout. It is this aspect of negotiation—how negotiators find agency in the discourse of negotiation and establish their legitimacy as an ongoing accomplishment—that the model of the negotiator with agency has rendered invisible (Harre, 1984; Fletcher, 1993).

The assumption of the negotiator with agency obscures the support systems and social networks that authorize negotiators and lend them legitimacy and “disappears”<sup>8</sup> the ways that negotiators act out legitimacy as a performative undertaking. There are a number of ways that negotiators convey impressions of agency. One is to prepare and then make that preparation visible during the negotiations. This is an example of using information, knowledge, and expertise as a means to enhance one’s standing (French and Raven, 1968). It is important to note that conveying impressions of agency means believing in it yourself. Thus, negotiators report that they prepare as a way to build up their confidence so that they can convince others of their place. According to a senior partner in a major accounting firm:

I prepare, even overprepare. I like to be supported by knowledge and facts. Maybe it is to compensate...it makes me more comfortable to have better command of the facts than anybody else even though I know that a negotiation will never follow a set path, and I will have to dance at some point.

Establishing presence at the negotiating table may also be accomplished by taking control of the agenda and conveying the impression that one knows how negotiations are conducted. According to a young labor negotiator:

I found that I had to act as if I were in charge. There are particular ways that women negotiators can show that they know the ropes and establish their credibility. When I negotiate with someone new (which I usually do) I use that opportunity to say, “I’d like to review the ground rules I prefer to use.” I then go over my list—all agreements are tentative until the final agreement is ratified by the members. “We’ll work off our draft for our proposal and you do the same for yours.” Although I do not do this when I know the other person, it is a way to take charge of the table and to show your experience. I would say things like, “I usually do x, or I never do x,” which showed that I had been through it before.

Agency has so far been associated with impressions of authority and control. But there are also situations when negotiators feel that other impressions might serve their needs better. These impressions may be of comfort and friendliness as the places from which to speak.

To establish place, negotiators sometimes find that they need to make people comfortable with them. Negotiators engage in rites of trust establishment (Forester, 1994). Often at the outset of a bargaining session, negotiators will engage in sports talk, small talk, and joke telling. Negotiators here are trying to convey impressions of common ground and conviviality even in the face of potentially difficult problems. Although these rites of trust establishment are common, they may play an especially important role for outsiders, who are trying to establish that they are credible and trustworthy people to do business with.

Making people comfortable in negotiations is another gambit of managing impressions of agency, an agent who has your interests at heart. Although we know it is common for negotiators to set the stage to their own advantage—so-called dirty tricks—there are often other impressions that people want to convey (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1992). Two examples suggest how these impressions of the caring negotiator might be conveyed.

A vice president of strategy at a hospital, said:

As a black woman I've learned that things will go much smoother for me when people feel comfortable and not challenged in a negotiation. I have learned how to make other negotiators comfortable with me. I pay attention to how they dress, to the kinds of letters they write, to how formal or relaxed they are. I decide where I'll hold a meeting, how formal I'll be in my presentation, who else will be there, and what kind of style I'll use. I try to make people feel my interest in them by cuing in on what's on their minds. Usually they want more money, but they also have personal and other kinds of issues. So I say, I understand your wife just had twins, that costs are going up, that your boss just left, etc. I acknowledge everything, and after that it almost doesn't matter what I say.

A senior vice president at a bank describes how she "courts" her negotiating partners:

I was renegotiating a joint venture with a client. The client had failed to live up to a part of the original agreement and was very difficult to deal with. My approach was to court him. He is uncomfortable with me. I try to be accessible and friendly, to be

available to help whenever he needs it. I've gone to hear him give a lecture. I flew across the country to have dinner with him. In the end, it didn't work, but it was the only choice I had. Eventually, we landed up with the lawyers.

Bringing people to the table, making them comfortable there, even helping them communicate better with each other are examples of invisible work in negotiation (see below). This stage setting seems to be part of the performative elements of establishing a place.

Impressions of agency can also be team performances (Goffman, 1959). All negotiators operate within the context of some social system. In negotiation research the relationship of social context to negotiation process and outcome is generally narrowed to discussions of how negotiators bring their clients or constituents along (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Mnookin, 1993). The support function is invisible. McEwen (1994) argues that in the rhetoric of mediation, decision makers are supposed to act autonomously, cut off from their attorneys and other support or institutional systems that sustain them. If the notion of agency is revised from an attribute to a performance and made problematic, then the ways that others help a negotiator find a place from which to speak needs to be brought into focus. Two short vignettes suggest how one is helped in conveying these impressions by others.

Diana Drew is an attorney who works in a firm founded by her father. She describes such a situation.

The case involved the teamsters in the area. I was representing a firm whose head was also a family friend. I practice in the same firm as my father. When I walked into the room the table was filled with enormous teamsters. I was alone in the room with them and found myself struggling to make an impression. I tried to lower my voice; I was very nervous. My client came over, and I got up to shake his hand. But he, being an old family friend, came over and kissed me. I thought, "That's it; it's all over. There is no way I'll be able to negotiate this contract."

My father, who is sort of an elfin character, had seen this interchange from out in the hall. He came into the room, and the first thing he did was go around and kiss each of the teamsters. He created a mood in which we were all friends and we were suddenly on a par with each other.

Doris Gergen is the chief financial officer for a utility and was representing her firm in the sale of a coal company. Although she sat on the board of the coal company, the CEO and other members of his team

continually challenged her—on whose authority did she speak? Gergen's boss was enlisted to reiterate that she was indeed authorized to speak, negotiate, and commit the utility.

For some negotiators, their place in the discourse is fragile and can be easily undercut. Although performances are sometimes solo, these examples suggest that conveying a sense of agency is sometimes a team performance (Goffman, 1959). Ensuring a smooth team performance requires preparation. A labor negotiator described it this way:

I always develop a system of working with my team members. We have rules about not contradicting one another in public, but instead passing a note to me if anyone wants a caucus. I also organize support from people for each point we want to make including specific examples and who would say them. Eventually this formality yielded to my team supporting me because they knew I was representing their issues correctly.

To recap, I began with the assumption that underlies research on negotiation: that negotiators speak from a legitimate subject position and, therefore, are presumed to have agency. A gender lens (that is based in part on the experiences of women) suggests that agency is not an attribute of an individual but rather of the situation. To be seen as having agency is to convince others you have it, and thus negotiators face the ongoing challenge of conveying it. Creating the impression of agency is not just a problem for women; it is an issue for all negotiators. We just have not discussed it much before.

### *B. Bargaining Power*

In the world of negotiation analysis, bargaining power is important and is primarily fixed by your BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). "The more favorably a negotiator portrays her best alternative course of action, the smaller is the need for negotiation and the higher standard of value a proposed agreement much reach" (Sebenius, 1992, p. 27). Moves away from the negotiating table to enhance your BATNA are important, therefore, because they empower the negotiator at the table.

What happens when we look at this issue through the lens of gender? BATNA is not a gender-neutral concept as long as social hierarchies are gendered (Peterson and Runyan, 1993). In government and public policy arenas, men hold greater than ninety percent of senior positions as senior ministers, heads of state, senior policy makers, and heads of unions. Women hold, relative to men, less than three percent of the world's property. In terms of hours of work, illiteracy rates, and

refugees status, women are represented in much greater proportions (Peterson and Runyan, 1993).

In the daily world of work, there is a gendered division of labor (Acker, 1990). Women are disproportionately represented at the bottom of their organizations, more likely to occupy clerical than managerial jobs and to be in lower paying professions such as nursing, secretarial work, and teaching. More recently, women have ascended in the managerial ranks (ranging from 10 to 25 percent in the United States and Western European countries). Yet even within these ranks, the actual number of managers may have been overestimated due to the ways such data are collected. Further, women only rarely occupy the position of CEO and member of the board.

All things being equal, it is much more likely that a woman comes to a negotiating table with a poorer BATNA and in a weaker position than a male colleague.<sup>9</sup> She is more likely to be negotiating with another who has more formal power and position. She is more likely to be in a small firm or solo practice negotiating with a larger company or organization. She is more likely to be up against individuals and institutions that have significantly more resources than she (or her organization) does.

Experience in low power positions in families, in communities, and at work, can have a number of consequences for negotiation. One's low position in a social hierarchy and a history of dependence on others can translate into psychological feelings of weakness and dependency (Miller, 1976). Although dependency and vulnerability are human conditions, in the individualistic contexts of negotiation, a person so situated can be disadvantaged. She may read weakness into her bargaining position when impartial analysis might reveal something else. Deviations from rational assessments of one's BATNA might come from a history of such experience (White and Neale, 1991).

Reading weakness into one's situation has a number of consequences. It can lead to a sense of hopelessness and low aspiration levels. Seeing oneself as weak can mean a person fails to exploit the possibilities of negotiation or even recognize that negotiation is a possibility. Akin to the issue of agency, existing theorizing about negotiating power can create a perception of women (and others) as deficient if they feel or express weakness or lack of control. What has been rendered largely invisible in the existing discourse of negotiation is how people in low power situations take control of these situations. They do so by reframing problems, using relational strategies, and mobilizing others on their behalf.

Conflicts are always subject to redefinition and reformulation. The issues in the dispute, the parties involved, and the structures within which negotiations are played out are not fixed, but are shaped by the very processes of negotiation and dispute resolution (Mather and Yngvesson, 1980-81). Negotiators in low power positions may attempt to reformulate a dispute from one that looks conventionally like a negotiation with winners and losers and trades among issues to a situation that resembles other forms of decision making. Aside from creating or inventing options, the processes by which negotiations are changed and transformed and the kinds of outcomes that result are invisible in existing research (Putnam, 1994).

The use of relational strategies are part of the power of the powerless in negotiation (Harstock, 1990; Scott, 1985; Baumgartner, 1988). Deference is common. Interviews with advocates for relatively powerless groups—children, victims of abuse, education, welfare—suggest that they adopt a deferential posture in order to get others who are more influential to help them with resources and legislation. As one advocate for a children's agency said, "Sometimes you have to weigh your sense of yourself against what you need to accomplish so you have to do certain things, flatter them, be sweet and grateful. You do it and then move on." Negotiators without power may be the experts in focusing on relationships to get what they want (Fisher and Brown, 1988). They find ways to position people positively in a discourse, to ensure that their stories are heard and acknowledged (Cobb, 1993). It may be the only avenue open to them in a negotiation.

What is underdeveloped in both theory and research (and which has implications for the prescriptive end of things) is how people without power empower themselves. It is here that the notion of BATNA is insufficient. We need to pay more attention to the various ways that negotiators cultivate support, get help, and engage in other activities to bolster their bargaining position.

Alice Bowen is a former Cabinet Secretary who talked about how she mobilized her power to negotiate for corporate child care:

When I was Secretary of Economic Affairs I discovered that I would sit around a table and I could give speeches, but people were likely to pay no attention. So I decided to try something different. Once every couple of weeks, I would have a CEO come in for a little "utilitarian lunch." I would say, "Well Tom (Dick or Harry), I don't really have an agenda here, I'd just like to know what's on your mind." Then he would talk about workman's comp and other problems for about 40 to 50

minutes. Then I would ask, "What are you doing about child care?" He would say, "Oh, we did a survey a couple of years ago and we don't need it." I'd say, "I think you should do another survey. From what I see things have changed, there seems to be a lot of need." A week later, Tom would call up and say, "We've done another survey, and you were right."

I did this over and over again, leaning on people around my one and only agenda. I didn't mention anything else. I had those guys walking out and trying to be responsive because they knew they were going to need me later on. So, by not prescribing, by not saying, "here's what I want," I got people gradually buying into providing corporate child care. And after a year and a half of eating my way through this issue, you could begin to see a whole program of corporate-sponsored child care. They knew how serious I was because of this eye-balling, up close, personal, direct jawboning. It had a kind of impact.

Bowen's story is part of a larger pattern of people using social relationships to empower themselves in negotiating situations that are stymied. To get things done may mean doing them unobtrusively and creating new channels of influence. Negotiators empower themselves and/or build support for their positions by getting help, by cultivating relationships away from the bargaining table. Maybe it is finding support from a social network. Or it can be enlisting the aid of others to speak on behalf of your position to the person you are negotiating with. It might involve building a coalition (Lax and Sebenius, 1986).

Most of the work on coalitions involves dynamics in large multiparty negotiations, such as the Law of the Sea (Sebenius, 1984) or GATT (Zartman, 1994). Here the focus is somewhat different. A negotiator involved in a bilateral negotiation enlists behind-the-scenes support and/or sequential influence strategies to enhance her bargaining position.

The role of social networks become more important in this regard (Granovetter, 1973; Ibarra, 1992). Heyman's (1987) concept of "backward mapping" is also relevant. In certain situations direct negotiation with the key decision maker is not immediately feasible. A negotiator builds support for her negotiation position by lining people up who can influence the key decisionmaker. Akin to research in other similar fields, we need to pay more attention to how negotiators (particularly those who are in weaker positions) work behind the scenes to manage and manipulate the negotiation context itself (Bacharach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974).

Negotiators can also empower themselves by altering their teams. The young president of a consulting company was having difficulty collecting fees owed her by a large university. What she did to improve her position is suggestive of the range of activities that weak negotiators use to empower themselves. Not only did she enlist people who might appeal to the university administration on her behalf, she also reconstituted her negotiating team. Part of what she learned was that there are limits to what she could do on her own. As a young woman, new to the business, she required other skills and voices on her bargaining team. So she had one of her board members, an experienced businesswoman, attend future negotiations about the fees.

Within the existing discourse of negotiation, people who lack power will obviously be disadvantaged, and this has clear gender implications. There are, however, other models of negotiations based on different assumptions. Handler's (1988) studies of doctors and patients, welfare groups, and bureaucracies suggest that under certain conditions *dialogic communities* form where trust significantly alters the imbalance of power. Under these circumstances, there are incentives on both sides for establishing a more equal footing for solving problems. Creative agreements emerge from these kinds of relationships (Mannix, 1993; Simons et al., 1993).

In the negotiation field, new research on friends, dating couples, and people who identify with each other suggest different dynamics in these relationships (Halpern, 1992; Smith et al., 1993; Kramer et al., 1993a). Under these circumstances, the goal is less on self-interest and more on finding fair and equitable outcomes, outcomes that maximize social utility (Loewenstein et al., 1989; Halpern, 1992).<sup>10</sup>

Negotiating power is an important issue to many negotiators—whether they are individuals, managers, agents, legislators, or diplomats. How one fares in negotiation is intimately related to one's power, and one's power is generally a function of the degree of dependence or the attractiveness of one's BATNA. Under such circumstances, it is more likely that women will find themselves in weaker positions in a negotiation, which has implications for their behavior over time and in any given negotiation. A gender lens suggests that we need to attend more to how people act in the face of low power and how they try to empower themselves. It also suggests that different forms of negotiation exist in which resource exchange and hierarchical relationships may be less salient. That such relationships are understood within the dominant discourse only serves to make them seem unrealistic and naive and so can serve to further disempower negotiators.

### *C. Rationality and Emotions*

Rationality runs through the negotiation literature. Although negotiation analysts reject the game theorists notion of ultrasmart, impeccably rational superpeople, rationality is still the end toward which negotiators should aspire. One of the most significant areas of scholarship has been the documentation of the varied ways in which negotiators deviate from rationality (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Ross and Stillinger, 1991). Psychological and cognitive biases such as framing, reactive devaluation, overconfidence, attributional errors, misconstrual, confirmatory evidence biases, among others, detract from negotiators' capabilities to reach mutually advantageous outcomes.

From the perspective of the negotiation analyst, understanding these biases and barriers can help negotiators overcome them and hence be more likely to reach optimal agreements. Success goes to the negotiator who is logical and rational in her thinking, does not confuse people with problems, can analyze the issues objectively, and manages the most difficult situations coolly and deliberately. Emotions and feelings, except as they give clues about the issues, are not a significant component of strategy.

The role of emotions in negotiation theory is underdeveloped. For some, they enter into the picture instrumentally as indicators of how people are feeling and thinking, obviously useful information to have (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1992).<sup>11</sup> For Ury (1991), being emotional is implicitly the mark of a difficult person. The advice it offers is in reality to act rationally in the face of emotionality in order to avoid getting caught up in the nonrational escalation of conflict (Rubin et al., 1993). More recently, researchers have begun to look at mood, the influence of positive feelings on the process and outcomes of negotiations (Kramer et al., 1993b). Most would agree that it is a topic in need of further study. Our concerns are somewhat different.

When the concept of rationality is viewed through a gender lens, it brings into focus the dual nature of reason and emotion (Putnam and Mumby, 1993; Bem, 1992; Flax, 1987). There are differential values attached to these attributes. Rationality is good, associated with higher-level activities—order maintenance, objectivity, cognition, and knowledge. Emotions are seen as negative—disruptive, chaotic, subjective, intuitive, and biased (Putnam and Mumby, 1993).

The concepts are also gendered. Rationality tends to be associated with the masculine and emotionality with feminine (Mumby and Putnam, 1992). Anthropologists tell us that there is a long-standing association of women with nature and emotion and men with the opposite, reason (Ortner, 1974). In functional theories of societies, men are seen as instrumental and women as expressive (Parsons and Bales, 1955). Some argue that the reason rationality is associated with the masculine is that men have traditionally been called on to account publicly for their actions, and all of us tend to give accounts that render us rational and reasonable (Harre, 1984; Lyman and Scott, 1970; Garfinkel, 1967).

When the dual relationship between rational and emotional is viewed through a gender lens, it is clear that the more highly valued attribute, rationality, is associated with the masculine, and emotionality, the less-valued characteristic, is connected to a feminine world view. This duality plays out in a number of interesting ways in negotiation.

First, akin to our discussion of agency and bargaining power, deficiency is more likely to be attributed to the more emotional person, the woman. Indeed, within the category of emotions, types are often gendered. A group of female students in a class on negotiations spoke about the problem of emotions. But the emotion they referred to was crying—a distinctly feminine problem. Anger, which tends to be associated more with the masculine, was not mentioned. This asymmetry with regard to emotion is interesting. Anger is seen as natural and even frightening when expressed by men but seen as unfeminine in women (Grillo, 1991). Indeed, we have language to depict the negative in women—shrew, harridan, castrator. Crying is devalued for both sexes: for women, they are hysterical; for men, they are categorized like a woman—sissy and wimp. Thus, the duality of rationality and emotionality serves to reinforce stereotypical perceptions of gender that work to the detriment of women. At the same time, it renders invisible how emotions serve creative functions in negotiations and the actions negotiators take to create a socioemotional context in which negotiations can occur.

Anger often serves strategic purposes in negotiation. Consider the notion of the bargainer's dilemma (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Being competitive and claiming value is frequently associated with toughness, anger and hostility, and threats (Schelling, 1960). What emotional state serves the creative side of the equation? The response to this question has been rather limited. Measuring affect and mood, laboratory studies suggest that being in a good mood

facilitates integrative bargaining (Kramer et al., 1993b). The problem is that mood is defined at the individual level and almost devoid of real feeling.

Putnam (1994) proposes that emotional expression can be the critical moments where the nature of a conflict shifts. This may be because of certain emotional or empathetic connections that are made between people. Empathy is a virtue often attributed to women. Miller (1976) suggests that through the integration of thought and feelings, the empathetic response is a means for others to partake in each others' experiences. Empathy is characterized by a mutuality of feeling and experience that can lead to new understandings and growth (Fletcher, 1994). Understood this way it means more than "walking a mile in another's shoes," the traditional instrumental value attached to empathy. Rather, empathy suggests connections and openness to others' that can lead to change on all parts.

Emotional expression can lead to transformation in other ways as well. Because emotions are chaotic and involve strong feelings, they can throw traditional patterns and arguments into disarray. Thus emotions may be upsetting to some and lead to breaks in the action, breaks that can result in new ways of thinking. Emotions can result in disjunctive thought processes that create spaces for new courses of action inspired as much by intuition and sensing as by logic (Putnam, 1994).

Creating a socioemotional context within which negotiations can take place and where people can productively talk to each other is part of the invisible work of negotiations. Hochschild (1983) observes that in our culture men and women have differential responsibilities when it comes to creating these kinds of conditions. Because women come from the category of mother, they are often expected to take care of others and to set the socioemotional climate of a negotiations.

There are many examples of this kind of invisible work, arranging the many details of negotiation that bring people to the table ready to work. It may mean informal meetings over meals to find out how people are feeling about the issues. It may mean rehearsing them and making sure they are prepared. It may mean trying to establish relationships on a more personal basis. It may mean trying to find ways to make people comfortable and at ease.

Negotiations are often highly emotional events, especially when they involve issues that matter significantly to those involved. To privilege rationality at the expense of emotions is to deny the role of feelings and experience in solving problems under situations of conflict. Negotiators often have problems understanding their feelings and dealing with those

of others; they are admonished to focus on the problem not the people. Advice not to take emotions personally, but to recognize them as tactics or the result of uncontrolled behavior, is to frame emotions as negative and disruptive. The purpose here is to suggest that valuing emotions is an integral part of negotiations, and that taking care of people's feelings is conducive to accomplishing the work. A gender lens helps us reclaim and integrate feeling with thinking in negotiation.

When we look at negotiation theory and practice through a gender lens, we do not search for, nor do we discover, gender differences. Rather it is an attempt to challenge some of what we take for granted in theory and practice. It is our hope that this effort helps us think more broadly about a research agenda to recover what has been invisible in our descriptions of negotiators and also to offer prescriptions that respond to groups who have not heretofore been privileged in the realms in which they negotiate.

Let's return to Alice again:

The Red Queen admonishes her to speak only when spoken to. Alice observes that if everybody obeyed the rule—only speak when spoken to—nobody would say anything. "Ridiculous," says the Queen.

## End Notes

1. There are significant exceptions. Critics argue that the exclusive focus on communication ignores the power relations that shape the communication (Nader, 1993), that there are consequences to reducing all disputes to interests (Silbey and Sarat, 1988), and that social and cultural contexts are crucial in accounting for the forms of disputes (Merry and Silbey, 1984).
2. In economic negotiation theory, negotiators become their preferences or utilities. The task is to find ways to accommodate those preferences. There are other ways to view the negotiation task, i.e., as the co-construction of meaning and the creation of narratives (see Cobb, 1993).
3. Feminist standpoint or difference theory is further limited in that it does not capture the experiences of all women. In effect it excludes some women from category woman. As Frug (1985) comments, "What are we to make of women who have succeeded in a male dominated world. Are they not women too?"
4. There are many reasons why gender differences do not seem to occur in empirical research—dominance of laboratory methods, homogeneity of the subjects, and nature of the tasks. Sandra Harding (1986) suggests that it is impossible to develop a feminist epistemology in the laboratory because tasks are structured such that women are forced to deny their femininity (see also Kimballa, 1993).
5. Carol Watson (1994) suggests that gender differences in the reactions and use of power is quite complicated. Power *per se* did not cause women to act more aggressively. External legitimation of their status and strong self-confidence did. When women feel legitimately powerful, they become more dominant than men. There are different reactions to powerlessness as well—generally low power people don't risk aggressive tactics.
6. Alcoff (1988) puts this well when she states that "...the concept of positionality includes two points: First that the concept of woman is a relational term identifiable only within a (constantly moving) context, but second that the position that women find themselves in can be actively utilized (rather than transcended) as a location for the construction of meaning, a place from where meaning is constructed rather than simply the place where a meaning is discovered." (324)

7. The stories and narratives reported in this paper come from several sources. Under a research grant from the Women's College Coalition, I, with the able assistance of Susan Eaton, have been exploring gender issues with graduate students at the Kennedy School of Government. Under the auspices of the Simmons Institute on Leadership and Change with Professor Pamela Bromberg and Cheryl Welch, I have been engaged in a study of women's narratives in negotiation.
8. The term "disappeared" is borrowed from Fletcher (1993). It suggests that certain activities are actively made invisible.
9. There has been recent research on negotiating power generally and BATNA more specifically (White and Neale, 1991). Conducted in the laboratory, BATNAs are given to people, hence obviating any possibility that we might understand how people's assessment of power relates to their positions in the world.
10. There are interesting differences between field studies and laboratory studies of these phenomena. In the field, the trusting relationship leads to a new form of interaction that is less hierarchical and more egalitarian (Handler, 1988). In the laboratory, the outcomes are designated "suboptimal" because negotiators press for equal, not integrative, outcomes (Kramer et al., 1993a). Thus, to have a different relationship, one that is more intimate and caring, leads, we find, to poorer agreements. Such assessments are not neutral or objective, but rather are embedded in the experimental design. Under such a system, if there is a tendency for negotiators to seek fair outcomes or press for the consideration of others, they will be labelled inferior.
11. In the dominant discourse, emotions are rarely mentioned. In such books as *The Manager as Negotiator* and *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, there is no entry for emotions in the index.

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