

## The Causes of Terrorism

Dennis J.D. Sandole

### Introduction

In the film, "Seven," with Morgan Freeman, Brad Pitt, Kevin Spacey, and Gwyneth Paltrow, Kevin Spacey plays a serial murderer who, when asked by detective Brad Pitt why he has committed a series of ghastly murders, replies, "Sometimes you have to hit people on the side of the head with a sledge hammer to get their attention!"

Clearly, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 constitute such a hit on the head for Americans.

For a country that contributed significantly to ending the Holocaust, launched the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II, prides itself on occupying the "moral high ground" in international affairs and which Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) proclaimed the victor in the ideological clash between democracy and communism, it was a double shock, on top of the traumatizing collapse of the World Trade Center, that the 19 men who overtook the four airlines with box cutters to turn them into cruise missiles, could have hated the U.S. that much.

How could that be? What could the U.S. have possibly done to incur such wrath, leading to the deaths of thousands and a pervasive sense of insecurity among Americans the likes of which have not been seen since the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963?

Asking the questions is easy. The hard part is in recognizing that, in our outrage and anger, grieving and mourning, and in general, shock, the last thing that many of us want to hear is "analysis." However, if we want to *win* the "War on Terrorism," then I am afraid that *analysis* is where we must begin.

### **A Comprehensive Response to Terrorism: The Use of Force as Part of a "Big Picture" Strategic Framework**

As a former U.S. Marine and police officer, I still find it a compelling proposition that whenever we face a threat to our security, we respond accordingly. For instance, in retrospect, had I been an armed air marshal on board any of the four hijacked airliners on 11 September 2001, I would like to believe that I would have taken appropriate action to stop the hijacking in progress.

As a social scientist and conflict resolution professional, however, I also believe that, to the extent possible, the use of force must take place in the context of a comprehensive framework and strategy, where force is used to achieve and maintain *negative peace* -- the absence and/or cessation of hostilities -- as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the achievement and maintenance of *positive peace*: a significant reduction in, if not (ideally) total elimination of the underlying deep-rooted causes and conditions of a violent conflict (see Galtung, 1969).

To put this all into the stark reality of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, if I were armed and sitting with my son and wife in a cafe in Jerusalem and knew that someone in our proximity was about to blow herself and us up, I would like to think, again, that I would be able to take the appropriate preventive action. But equally, if I were at home with my family in the besieged Jenin refugee camp under attack by soldiers of one of the world's best-equipped armies, I would like to think that I would act appropriately in that setting as well.

### **Conflict-as-Startup Conditions vs. Conflict-as-Process**

Here we have the gist of a problem created often by the sole use of force: what conflict resolution pioneer Anatol Rapoport (1960) referred to

years ago as "bite and counter-bite," or what I call *conflict-as-process* (Sandole, 1999). Responding to conflict-as-process is what the military and police do, and indeed, in the appropriate circumstances, *need* to do. We need them when the situation calls for it (e.g., in Rwanda in mid-April 1994). However, as even law enforcement hostage negotiators have acknowledged, "We are not problemsolvers" (de Filippo, 2002); i.e., dealing only with "conflict-as-process," or its *symptoms*, does not do anything for the underlying *conflict-as-startup conditions*, except, possibly through the escalating use of force, exacerbate those underlying factors.

According to the logic (or "psycho-logic") of escalation, the progressive use of force by Palestinian suicide bombers in cafes, discotheques, restaurants, supermarkets, hotel dining rooms, snooker halls, bus stations, and busses in Israel and by Israeli defence forces in Palestinian refugee camps and townships is *part of the problem and not of the solution*. Moreover, for the international community to characterize one party to this conflict as "terrorist" while the other party, as a *State* -- which the other party is not -- is "merely" exercising its right to self-defence, also is part of the problem and not of the solution. All this does is privilege one side at the frustrating expense of the other, which is not an effective role for the international community to play.

In other words, returning to my earlier scenarios, if I were to "shoot dead" the teenager who is about to blow my family up or the soldier who is attacking my home, none of these acts, by themselves, would change the "objective" strategic relationship between Israelis and Palestinians: that one side is creating, maintaining, and expanding a State at the expense of the indigenous population which is surrounded, held captive, isolated, militarily occupied and humiliated, even during periods of *normal*, "negative peace."

Again, not only does violence *not* address the underlying causes and conditions, but often exacerbates them, throwing the conflict into the hands of extremists on both sides ("peace spoilers") who, should they prevail, especially among members of the stronger party, can move the conflict toward a genocidal "final solution."

Not only is it unethical for the international community to stand by, as it did in Rwanda in April 1994, and let such action take place (see Power, 2001, 2002; Dallaire, 2002), but it is also impractical. Given the compelling attraction and incidence of the use of force and violence, especially among *males* (see van Creveld, 1991; Gilligan, 1996; Wrangham and Peterson, 1996; Garbarino, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Barash, 2002), plus the "mimicking" nature of *Homo sapiens*, the use of force and violence in one part of the world is likely to encourage its use elsewhere through what I call *multiplier-effect systemic contagion* (see Sandole, 1999, pp. 148-150).

For instance, it seems fairly clear that Serbian genocidal assaults on Croats and Bosniaks without too much effective international resistance probably encouraged then Russian President Boris Yeltsin to launch his war on Chechnya in December 1994, a mere week or so after the conclusion of the Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): if the West did not respond effectively to genocidal violence 45 minutes flying time from Vienna, then why would it do so in response to the Russian total destruction of the Chechen capital Grozny and countless human rights violations, hundreds of miles further from the Balkans?

So, yes, by all means, in the tactical short term, we should *reactively* defend ourselves against terrorism, through forceful means if necessary, but in the strategic long term, we must *proactively* deal effectively with the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of the problems that result in terrorism. Otherwise we will have a never-ending supply of recruits for martyrdom or "national defence," until either one side or the other

capitulates or is genocidally removed from the planet, as the Nazi Third Reich nearly did to European Jewry during World War 2. Neither option is a "solution" that deals effectively with the "conflict-as-startup-conditions" -- a lesson apparently well understood by the new Prime Minister of Sri Lanka (WP, 2002c):

For years Sri Lanka's government tried and failed to stamp out the terrorism of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam with brute military force. Sixty thousand people died in the fighting, and a host of senior politicians, including a prime minister of India, were killed by some 200 suicide attacks. Now Ranil Wickremasinghe, who won election as prime minister last December on a pro-peace platform, is getting some results by addressing the *root causes* of the violence -- deprivation in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern regions and the aspiration of the ethnic Tamil minority there to rule itself. There is no evidence that al Qaeda or other international terrorist groups have links to Sri Lanka; nevertheless, Mr. Wickremasinghe, who visited Washington [in late July 2002], has a chance to achieve a major success in the global struggle against terrorism (emphasis added).

Accordingly, terrorism clearly needs to be stopped and prevented in the long- as well as short run. While there seems to be a plethora of short-term military and law enforcement responses to terrorism, there does not seem to be much in the way of long-term "conflict transformation" or "peacebuilding" (see Cohen, 2002; Wright, 2002; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Lederach, 1997). Quite simply, this means that the "War on Terror" as presently waged is not only *not* likely to succeed, but is likely to "self-fulfillingly" exacerbate the problems it is meant to address. Hence, the comments by Udo Steinbach (2002, p. 48), director of the German Orient Institute in Hamburg, that:

The fight against terrorism, especially as it is currently being waged by the US administration, will in all likelihood radicalize increasing numbers of people in the Muslim world and heighten their approval of the use of violence in fighting the West and all those associated with it in Islamic societies. In the arc from North Africa to Indonesia the resort to terrorism is rooted in a series of complex, decades-old crises -- over regional conflicts, internal ethnic problems, or, more broadly, democratic deficits. *It is therefore impossible to solve the problem of terrorism without simultaneously addressing the underlying political problems.*

This is especially true for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Equating al Qaeda terrorism with Palestinian terrorism as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon does is fatal; the Israeli army's fight against this terrorism by *exclusively military means* has led to further radicalization of Palestinians and to an escalation of violence. Washington's inability to counter this strategy with prospects for political solutions has further exacerbated the hatred of the US far beyond the Palestinian territories; it has increased bin Laden's popularity and called into question the US fight against terrorism in much of the Islamic world. *This pours oil on the fire of Islamic fundamentalists* (emphasis added).

Implicit here is a growing sense of the complex nature of the task facing those of us involved in this book: In addition to the *research* problem of exploring the underlying causes and conditions of terrorism, there is the *practical* problem of how to get policymakers to think outside the *Realpolitik-only* box to deal more effectively with them (see Sandole, 1999, p. 1). In this regard, T. Irene Sanders (2002) tells us that:

The war on terrorism has heightened the need for a new way of thinking about defense. ... In general terms, the challenge before us is to move from an emphasis on simple [linear] cause-and-effect relationships to a focus on more intuitive, [nonlinear] associative forms of pattern recognition.

Again, this does not mean that we forget *Realpolitik* in the short run because in mid-April 1994 in Rwanda or July 1995 in Srebrenica (Bosnia), we could have used a rapid deployment of international forces to prevent genocidal actions. What it does mean, however, is that, in the first instance, we locate *Realpolitik* perspectives and corresponding behaviors in a larger, more comprehensive framework that includes other options as well; e.g., *Idealpolitik* and what I call "*non-Marxist radical thought*" (see Sandole, 1993; 1999, pp. 110-113). Then we can deal with the question of how to communicate more effectively with policymakers (see Sandole, 1999, pp. 189-192): one of the objectives of this book.

But first, we have to deal with the *research problem* and explore the underlying causes and conditions of terrorism. Where to begin?

### **Investigating the Etiology of Terrorism: Analytical Frameworks**

As a visual person and former artist of sorts, I like to make use of "pictures" to get my ideas across. One diagram that I use when discussing underlying causes and conditions of deep-rooted conflicts -- including those that are expressed through acts of terrorism -- is the following "3 levels of conflict reality":

**Figure 1:  
3 Levels of Conflict Reality**

- |                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [1] <b>Conflict-as-Symptoms:</b>           | Discrete acts of violence, investments in defense, and/or deaths ("body count") <i>within</i> an existing conflict-as-process. In general, any observable <i>indicator</i> of underlying conflict processes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| [2] <b>Conflict-as-Process:</b>            | Fights, arms buildups/races, wars, arguments, divorce litigations, and/or mediated negotiations characterized by a "bite and counter-bite" (action-reaction) exchange over time.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| [3] <b>Conflict-as-Startup Conditions:</b> | Initial and/or successive acts of violence, trauma, brutality, victimization which seem to demand a response from the targeted person, group, organization, state. When "mythologized" as part of the history, traditions and <i>identity</i> of the targeted actor, and passed from person to person, generation to generation, such " <i>chosen trauma</i> " (Volkan, 1997) can generate and help to sustain conflict-as-process. |

Among these levels, the international community seems to be paying attention primarily to symptoms. This is where the media are (the "CNN factor") as well as the motion picture industry ("Black Hawk Down," "Hart's War," "We Were Soldiers," "Behind Enemy Lines," "Windtalkers"), popular and academic literatures (e.g., spy novels, works on terrorism), with policymakers responding to the symptoms or the processes giving rise to them, only or

primarily through *Realpolitik*-based interventions to prevent, manage, or stop them. Hence, T. Irene Sanders' (2002) concern that:

The question that lingers in my mind is whether the attacks [of 11 September 2001] provided enough of a wake-up call to revolutionize our approach to our own security.

Why there is not too much attention paid to conflict-as-startup conditions -- underlying causes and conditions -- may require another book to answer (see Warfield, 1993; Sandole, 1999, pp. 189-192). One possibility, however, is that, over time, in *complex* conflict systems, *conflict-as-startup conditions* may be overwhelmed and overtaken by *conflict-as-processes*, such that conflict becomes *self-stimulating and self-perpetuating* (see Sandole, 1999). In other words, beyond a certain critical threshold, a dynamic conflict may become *self-driven* so that the *process* is the most palpable thing that intervenors feel compelled to deal with. Hence, our initial response to a fire is not to try to figure it out, but to stop it! The problem is, however, once the fire is put out, the original combustible materials may still be present, which means that, under certain conditions, there could be another fire.

Accordingly, my purpose in this chapter is to identify some of those underlying "combustibles" -- the causes and conditions of terrorism -- as something that policymakers will have to address and deal with if they really want to *win* the "War on Terror."

As I think about that goal, another "picture" comes to mind: my "3 pillar" comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution (see Sandole, 1998; forthcoming).

Figure 2:  
3 Pillar Comprehensive Mapping of  
Conflict and Conflict Resolution

<u>Pillar 2</u> <b>Conflict Causes and Conditions</b>	<u>Pillar 1</u> <b>Conflict (Latent [Pre-MCP] MCP/AMCP)</b>	<u>Pillar 3</u> <b>Conflict Intervention</b>
		<u>3rd Party Objectives</u>
Individual	Parties	Conflict Prevention [=Preventive Diplomacy]
Societal	Issues	Conflict Management [=Peacekeeping]
International	Objectives	Conflict Settlement [=Peacemaking (coercive)]
Global/Ecological	Means	Conflict Resolution [=Peacemaking (noncoercive)]
	Conflict- handling Orientations	Conflict Transformation [=Peacebuilding]
	Conflict Environments	
		<u>3rd-Party Approaches</u>
		Competitive and/or Cooperative Processes
		Negative and/or Positive Peace Orientations
		Track-1 and/or Track-2 Actors and Processes

Using the three pillar framework to explore the etiology of terrorism, we might find that, initially, under **pillar 1**, we would be observing violent *symptoms* of perhaps a *manifest conflict process* (MCP) that has escalated to an *aggressive manifest conflict process* (AMCP) (see Sandole, 1998, p. 1; 1999, pp. 16-17). We could then attempt to identify the *parties* involved in the conflict process; the *issues* about which they are in conflict; the long-term *objectives* they hope to achieve by waging conflict over those issues; the *means* they are using to achieve those objectives; their "normal" *conflict-handling orientations* (despite the means they are actually using at any point in time); and the nature of the *environments* -- cultural, historical, political, economic, social -- within which their conflict is occurring.

Then, under **pillar 2** -- with which this chapter is primarily concerned -- we could explore the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict that has escalated to an AMCP, with acts of terrorism as symptoms.

Finally, under **pillar 3** -- the primary focus of chapters 6-7 and major concern of policymakers -- we could explore what could be done in the long term (e.g., implement policies undergirded by *Idealpolitik* and/or *non-Marxist radical perspectives*) as well as short term (implement policies based on *Realpolitik*) (see Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6).

The major assumption underlying use of the 3 pillar framework is that potential third parties at any level -- interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, interstate -- must first identify all the distinguishing characteristics of a particular conflict (*pillar 1*) and understand what drives the conflict (*pillar 2*) before, given their objectives and available means for achieving them, they can design and implement an effective response to the conflict (*pillar 3*).

What is useful about the 3 pillar framework is that it can be employed as a basis for "mapping" the (1) elements, (2) causes and conditions, and (3) potential 3rd party responses to conflict or terrorism in general, or to any particular conflict or act of terrorism.

Accordingly, what can pillars 1 and 2 of the framework tell us about terrorism in general as well as the particular terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 ("911") that might be useful to policymakers at pillar 3?

### **A Pillar 1 Analysis**

First of all, under pillar 1, we would examine the *parties* to a conflict, for which terrorism has become a symptom. In general, terrorism is the choice of minority, often nonstate actors (e.g., racial, ethnic, religious, national, class groups) lacking the resources of majority groups or those who, through ethnic, political, religious or other *identification*, assume the role of spokespersons for those groups. In either case, generally "outrageous" acts are committed in order to get the minority voices heard, which is usually guaranteed and amplified by media coverage (the "CNN effect").

With particular regard to 911, the majority, "target" actor appears to be the U.S., or "Western Civilization" with the U.S. as primary "mediagenic" representative, as defined by some Muslims (e.g., Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda) who have elected to represent the interests of other Muslims (e.g., Bosniaks, Chechens, Kosovar Albanians, Palestinians, Saudis, Iraqis) whose identities, cultures, religions, traditions, and lands are perceived to have been, or are under assault by the West.

The next item under pillar 1, *issues*, could be concerned with, in general, a perceived negative impact of the majority on a minority (e.g., the nature of the governance by the majority of a minority) residing in a given territory. For Osama bin Laden, the apparent architect of, or inspiration for the 911 attacks, the issues are, among others, the continued presence, since the Gulf War, of some 5000 U.S. troops in his native Saudi Arabia, site of two of the holiest shrines in Islam (Mecca, where The Prophet was born and Medina, where The Prophet established the first Islamic state); the one-sided U.S. response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the fact that the West allowed Serbs to slaughter Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) for three years before intervening to stop the carnage.

Apropos this latter issue, not only did the West prevent the lifting of the UN arms embargo on the Bosniaks to "at least ... allow them to defend themselves, even if no international military force [came] to their aid" (Fuller, 1994), but it even accepted Bosnian Serb rejection of the offer by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) "to send more than 17,000 soldiers [under the UN flag] to help defend security zones for civilians in Bosnia" (IHT, 1993), at precisely the same time that the UN was having difficulty recruiting more peacekeepers to defend the newly created "safe havens" (Preston, 1993), including Srebrenica.

Given that the "The Serbs have frequently raised the specter of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Bosnia as justification for their war [and indeed the] Bosnian head of state, Alija Izetbegovic, is a Muslim" (IHT,

1993), it seems clear that, as former senior CIA forecaster Graham Fuller (1994) put it:

... many statesmen in Europe and the United States [apparently accepted the Serb argument as they] had private doubts about the wisdom of creating a Bosnian Muslim state in the Balkans, precisely because that state could be seen as a foot in the door for Muslim power in Europe, or even, as some might allege, a potential base for radical Islam to play a destabilizing role in Europe. Better to choke off the prospect for such a state now, the rationale goes. (Also see Sandole, 2001.)

Fuller then goes on to say, with profound implications for the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict (*ibid.*):

Yet, the very *one-sided and disproportionate suffering of the Bosnian Muslims* -- in what is not a simple, black-and-white situation -- may be the issue that will in fact guarantee the existence of rich soil for Muslim radicalism in the Balkans in the future (emphasis added).

Under these circumstances, it is easy to imagine bin Laden assuming that a "Clash of Civilizations" (Huntington, 1993, 1996) was certainly underway in the Balkans, ending only with the genocide perpetrated by Serb forces at the UN "safe area," Srebrenica, in July 1995, when 8,000-10,000 Muslim males were massacred. It is also not difficult to imagine how such a perception on the part of radicalized Muslims could draw sustenance from the original Western-Islamic civilizational conflict of a thousand years ago, the Crusades, and later when Serbs in the Krajina defended Western/Christian civilization against the Ottoman Empire. And at least up until Srebrenica, the West could be viewed as having repaid the Serbs for their steadfast loyalty by ensuring that the Serb definition of the conflict in former Yugoslavia was the "politically correct" one.

Indeed, when, in summer 1993, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) offered troops from Muslim countries to join the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia at exactly the same time that the UN needed more troops to guarantee security of the "safe areas" (again, including Srebrenica), not only was the offer rejected by the West -- allegedly because the Muslim troops would have needed "additional training for the mission, as well as transportation equipment and other supplies that the [UN would] have to get from the stocks of other countries" -- but UNPROFOR was kept so small that then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that a force of such limited size could operate effectively only with "the consent and cooperation of the parties" in Bosnia" (Preston, 1993). This had the effect, intentional or otherwise, of ensuring the dominance not only of the Serb definition of the conflict, but also its veto over the OIC proposal.

The third item under pillar 1, *objectives*, can be subdivided into majority actors who want to maintain a certain status quo and minorities (or their spokespersons) who want to change it. Clearly, for 911, the U.S. wants to maintain its presence and policies in the world, including its military forces in the Arab/Muslim world; to continue sanctions against Iraq and supporting Israel and "Western Civilization" in general, including *globalization*. By contrast, Osama bin Laden and others wish to change all that and, lacking the traditional resources associated with the superpower, have elected to use terrorism to undo the U.S. and its influence throughout the world, especially in the Arab/Muslim world.

The *means* one elects to employ in a conflict are generally confrontational or collaborative, lethal or nonlethal (or a combination thereof). Clearly, terrorism involves the use of extremely confrontational,

lethal, "outrageous" means; e.g., with regard to 911, hijacking commercial airliners packed with passengers and transforming them into cruise missiles to destroy the World Trade Center and sections of the Pentagon.

Although an actor may employ confrontational, lethal means, he or she may feel that they were driven to that point of desperation by the "Other." Hence, by including in one's pillar 1 analysis, actors' preferred conflict-handling orientations -- i.e., whether for cultural, religious, or other reasons, actors would prefer to be doing something else (e.g., conflict *avoiding, accommodating, compromising, or collaborating*) -- the analyst can explore how much "distance" there is between the preferred and the actual; in effect, how much ground has to be negotiated to move the actors from confrontation to dialogue.

Ultimately, once the "fire" has been suppressed, the parties have to somehow find a way to live with each other -- in close territorial proximity or just in terms of inhabiting the same planet -- and the means for achieving that must be explored through dialogue (see Steinbach, 2002). With regard to 911, in order to avoid what some observers have termed the "ultimate trap" -- the development of an *actual* "Clash of Civilizations" -- the U.S.-led "War on Terror" must include more than bombing and special forces' forays into Afghanistan and other countries (e.g., Philippines and Georgia). The U.S. must also consider removing its forces from Saudi Arabia, developing a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, easing (if not ceasing) sanctions against Iraq, and in general, making its presence and policies in the world, including globalization, at least appear to be less destructive of traditional cultures.

Finally under pillar 1, the analyst would pay attention to the *conflict environments*, or "spaces", within which the conflict is occurring: the milieu into which a third party under pillar 3 may ultimately intervene. Environments, like structures, are generally invisible to the eye, save for their symptoms, but they exist nevertheless, exerting an impact on all of us. For example, when NATO-led peacekeepers entered Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, what they could clearly see were destroyed villages, dead bodies, hungry, wounded, sick, and angry survivors: the physical environment. What they may not have been able to see clearly were the cultural, religious, historical, economic, and/or political environments.

Accordingly, to *not* be sensitive and not pay attention to these less obvious manifestations of "environment" is probably to doom one's intervention to frustrating failure. In the context of 911, it is interesting to observe the rapid rise in the U.S. and West in general of an interest in Islam, the Arab world, studying Arabic, and the like (see Cooperman, 2002), in addition to the more palpable "War on Terror" which is intimately linked primarily to the physical environment. As the U.S. learned so painfully in its war in Vietnam 30 years ago, we, *the majority*, do not "win hearts and minds" of minorities by destroying them and their physical resources and environment *only*, but also by paying attention to their needs: their identities, their participation in decisions that affect their welfare, and their security. In order to do that, we must know something about who "these people" are: culturally, religiously, politically, economically, and the like, especially who they are in a way that may not be compatible with U.S. interests and/or the forces of globalization.

It would be useful, for example, for Americans to know something about the religious beliefs associated with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the 19 young men who conducted the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001: *Wahabism* is a Saudi-based approach to Islam "whose most famous adherent is Osama bin Laden [and which] should be taken seriously. *While the West has little reason to feel threatened by traditional Islam*, the events of Sept. 11 demonstrate that we have much to fear from Wahabism" (emphasis added) (O'Leary, 2002).

Wahabism is associated with "the religious leader Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahab," who in 1745 "forged an alliance with Mohammad Ibn Saud, the principal tribal leader of a large portion of the Arabian peninsula" (Ibrahim, 2002):

Ibn Abdul Wahab wanted to propagatate his brand of Islamic orthodoxy. Ibn Saud wanted to unite tribes and secure political command, becoming the founder of the Al Saud dynasty that still rules what is now known as Saudi Arabia. ... (p. B1)

... the links between Saudi rulers and Wahabi followers have been real and durable. The pact of mutual convenience made more than 250 years ago continues. The Saudi minister of religion is always a member of the Al Sheikh family, descendants of Ibn Abdul Wahab. Moreover links between Ibn Abdul Wahab and the house of Saud have been sealed with multiple marriages. The Wahabis' sway over mosques has ebbed and flowed, but they possess their own notorious religious police and have extended their reach via networks or schools throughout the Muslim world (p. B5). ...

[Wahabism is] extremely austere and rigid. It tolerates little dialogue and less interpretation. It frowns on idolatry, tombstones or the veneration of statues and artworks. Wahabis forbid smoking, shaving of beards, abusive language, rosaries and many rights for women. They expect their followers to pray five times a day and they regard all those who don't practice their form of Islam, including other Muslims, as heathens and enemies (ibid.).

It is well known that the U.S. had a hand in creating and arming the Wahabi-influenced *Mujahideen* who fought the Soviets in the 1980s when the latter invaded and occupied Afghanistan, thereby inadvertently helping to create and arm the Taliban against whom the U.S. later went to war. What may be less well known, however -- as another example of the long-term self-defeating nature of U.S. policies which seem to make sense in the short term - is the more direct role of the U.S. in spreading Wahabism (O'Leary):

Wahabism gained a foothold in the Muslim world in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, as the Saudis, tacitly encouraged by the United States and its allies, used their enormous financial resources to ensure that [the] radical Shia Islam [of revolutionary Iran] did not spread to the Sunni Muslim world [of, among others, Saudi Arabia]. In order to check Iranian influence in Pakistan [through which Western aid for the *Mujahideen* passed into Afghanistan], for example, the Saudis financed the establishment of Wahabi madrassas, or Islamic schools. As many Americans learned in the aftermath of 9/11, it was in those Pakistani madrassas that the Taliban movement was born.

### A Pillar 2 Analysis

Under pillar 2, I find it compelling to start by reflecting on a potent comment attributed to Frantz Fanon by Morton Deutsch (2002), that "Violence is the expression of impotence grown unbearable." This suggests to me that something "in" us (*endosomatic*) can be *violated* by something "outside" us (*extrasomatic*). In other words, it is highly likely that there is an "interaction-effect" between "nature" and "nurture" that sets us off (see Sandole, 1984, p. 40). How does pillar 2 help us to understand this?

In earlier efforts to spell out pillar 2 (Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6), I grouped together a number of interrelated concepts under the *individual level*, each of which involves a breakdown between a preferred and an actual state of

affairs, or *dissonance*, as articulated by Leon Festinger (1962) in his classic work on "cognitive dissonance" theory. These concepts are:

- *structural violence* (Galtung, 1969, 1996);
- *relative deprivation* (Gurr, 1970);
- *rank disequilibrium* (Galtung, 1964);
- *frustration-aggression* (Dollard, et al., 1939); and
- *basic human needs* [BHNs] (Burton, 1979, 1990, 1997).

*Structural violence*, the brainchild of peace research pioneer Johan Galtung (1969, 1996), is the pivotal, umbrella term here, under which all the other "dissonance" items are subsumed. Structural violence refers to the distance between actors' *actual* and potential (*preferred*) bodily and psychological need fulfillment. Generally, minorities, with respect to majorities, are recipients of structural violence, whether perceived or not by either group. In such cases, members of various ethnic, religious, racial, class and other groups tend to be denied access to political, economic, social, and other resources typically enjoyed and presided over by majorities, not because of what the minorities have done, but because of who they are, because of their "involuntary" membership in those groups. The greater the distance between the *actual* and potential (*preferred*) need fulfillment, the greater the structural violence.

When structural (as well as physical) violence is legitimated in religion, language, ideology, literature, music, civil ceremonies, motion pictures, the media, and the like, then we also have *cultural violence* (see Galtung, 1996, pp. 196-210). Whether culturally celebrated or not, however, the perception of structural violence by minorities can be characterized as either:

(a) *Relative deprivation* (Gurr, 1970), which refers to a perceived breakdown between "value expectations" (resources to which one feels entitled: "wants"), and "value capabilities" (resources one thinks one is likely to obtain and hold on to: "gots"). The greater the distance between the *preferred* (value expectations) and the *actual* (value capabilities), the greater the *perceived* structural violence and the greater the likelihood that the deprived actor will respond aggressively to the perceived source of the relative deprivation. And/or

(b) *Rank disequilibrium* (Galtung, 1964), which refers to a lack of consistency between an actor's rankings on various barometers of socio-economic measurement: a breakdown between a *preferred* state of affairs (e.g., high rankings on educational, employment, income, job, and security status) and an *actual* state of affairs (e.g., high on educational status, but low on employment, job, income, and security status). The greater the *status inconsistency*, the greater the *perceived* structural violence, and the greater the likelihood that the "consistency-deprived" actor will respond aggressively to the perceived source of the inconsistency, especially if other, less lethal means have been tried to alleviate the inconsistency, but without success, and if there is a "culture of violence" in the actor's "conflict environment."

When structural violence has been experienced as either relative deprivation or rank disequilibrium (or both!), the actor *feels* the breakdown between the preferred and actual states of affairs. Feeling implies *emotion*, which is energy mobilized to do something; e.g., to flee the "field" or to attack the Self or Others.

Where does this emotional energy come from? According to the classical studies of the link between *frustration* and *aggression* conducted some 60 years ago by John Dollard and his colleagues at Yale University (Dollard, et al., 1939), frustration generates the emotion that makes an attack likely against the perceived source of the frustration. Frustration is an interruption in

the processes initiated by an actor to get what she or he wants at a particular point in time. It mobilizes energy to attack the perceived source of the frustration (which may be either the Self or Others) depending upon the following factors:

- (a) The importance of the blocked (frustrated) goal;
- (b) The intensity of the blocking (frustration); and
- (c) The frequency of the blocking.

So, conceivably, the more important the frustrated goal that the actor wants to achieve (e.g., freedom for his or her people), the more intense the blocking of that goal (e.g., a majority group's use of military force to prevent minority-group goal achievement), and the greater the frequency of the blocking (frequent attacks by the majority on the minority), the more likely an attack by the *frustrated* minority against the *frustrating* majority. But Dollard and his colleagues entered one additional, complicating factor into their frustration-aggression calculus:

- (d) The frustrated actor's anticipation of punishment for attacking the perceived source[s] of frustration.

Here is where we get into the *societal* and *international* levels of influence under pillar 2, into national and international regimes of governance: Do an actor's domestic and international, political, economic, and/or social environments *alleviate* factors [a]-[c] above (as would be expected by regimes associated with *Idealpolitik* or *non-Marxist radical* paradigms) or *exacerbate* them by enhancing factor [d] (as might be expected by a *Realpolitik*-based regime)? Just imagine the Israeli-Palestinian or Indo-Pakistani conflicts against the background of these factors, and it becomes clear that in many conflicts throughout the world, frustration builds upon frustration to continue escalating conflicts into confrontational, lethal, self-defeating AMCPs that appear impervious to conflict resolution and transformation.

The final component in the dissonance subcategory of *individual*-level factors that may make violent conflict more rather than less likely is *basic human needs* (BHNs): the phenomena that seem to be what ultimately get frustrated. BHNs, according to conflict resolution pioneer John Burton (1979, 1990, 1997), are endosomatic imperatives that all humans have. Hence, they are part and parcel of the "nature" component in the "nature-nurture" debate.

However, while all humans may have needs for, say, *identity*, *recognition*, and *security* (Burton, 1997), their experience of fulfillment or violation of these needs may be different from one person to the next, depending on the cultural, religious, political, social, economic, and other "identity groups" to which they belong -- all examples of the "nurture" component in the debate.

Burton tells us that actors will endeavor to fulfill their needs for identity, recognition, and security, *no matter what*, even at the expense of their own lives. If they cannot fulfill their needs within status quo settings, they will endeavor to do so within parallel structures that they create for that purpose, and in the process, may attempt to damage, destroy, or otherwise undermine the status quo.

Applying the "dissonance set" of interrelated factors to terrorism, it seems fairly clear that minorities in general -- the dispossessed, desperate, "wretched of the earth" (Fanon, 1968) who have been colonized, exploited, and marginalized -- are recipients of felt structural violence: a great sense of distance between where they want to be and where they actually are, in terms of access to resources (*relative deprivation*) and status (*rank disequilibrium*). The greater this distance, the greater the *frustration*, with the minority targets of structural violence and their spokespersons perceiving their national or international environments to be enhancing rather than

alleviating the factors making for frustration of certain BHNs (e.g., *identity*). What may then follow is a mobilization of emotional energy for attacks -- terrorist attacks -- against the perceived sources of the frustration: the U.S., the West in General, Israel, authoritarian regimes in the Arab world (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia) (see Hudson, et al., 1999, pp. 27, 29, 32, 52, 53, 65-66).

Accordingly, to summarize our pillar 2 discussion, we can say that in the eyes of some of the educated, but unemployed males of the developing world, Islam is under assault by "Western Civilization," especially by the leader of the West, the U.S (see Hudson, et al., 1999, pp. 62-66). Not only are Israelis using U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter jets and Apache helicopter gunships and tanks to destroy Palestinian infrastructure (and arguably, culture) as part of the "War on Terror," but Russians are killing Chechens, and Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic's defense at his trial for war crimes at The Hague rests in part on his claim that he was "merely" doing in Kosovo what everyone else is now doing: combatting terrorists. In addition, the U.S. and its European allies permitted Serb genocidal attacks on Bosniaks to occur for three years before the massacres at Srebrenica in July 1995 undermined UN and NATO (and arguably U.S.) credibility. *In all these cases, Muslims were and continue to be the victims.*

Add to this that the superpower supporter of Israel and architect of globalization has military forces in oil-rich Saudi Arabia, site of two of the holiest shrines in Islam (Mecca and Medina), while the U.S.-backed Israelis control the third holiest site, the al-Aqsa Mosque, and we have *casus belli* for war -- for terrorism -- perpetrated by some (especially *Wahabi*) representatives of the Islamic World against the persons, symbols, and structures of the Judaic-Christian World.

Here, we have another complication: the difference between those directly affected by perceived structural violence, its primary victims (e.g., Palestinians), and those who are disturbed by the existence of oppression suffered by others (e.g., the 19 hijackers of 11 September 2001). Apropos the latter, the following comments, offered by an "American terrorist" of the 1960s (Lerner, 2002), provide some generic insight:

I didn't grow up hungry, seething with inherited hurt in some refugee camp or ghetto -- but well-fed in Chevy Chase [Maryland], in a big loving family in a house full of books. My grandparents were struggling immigrants, but my parents were solidly middle-class, and when I approached adulthood in the mid-'60s, all the richness of this country was there for me. I could have been anything.

Like many children of affluence, I was horrified by racism and poverty, and filled with idealism. The impulse was simple and honorable: Everybody should have opportunities like mine. I became an activist in the civil rights movement, and renewed my desire to perfect the world in response to Vietnam. Yet by the end of that decade I had become warped enough to help found the Weathermen, a cult of leftist cynicism and violence. We were contemptuous of others, convinced we had the answers, and willing to impose them by violence. In other words, we were political terrorists (Lerner, 2002, p. 24).

... I felt the politics, and didn't disagree. Still, I joined SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] then, and the Weathermen later, mostly for psychological, not ideological, reasons.

This is how it is in organizations that have the

characteristics of cults, and maybe in any group of activists. You get a role that fills some hole in you. The hijacker Mohammed Atta, like me, came from a middle-class family and received a good education. He also happened to have ... an overbearing father who derided him for being timid and girlish and challenged him to be as successful as his older sisters, a professor and a physician. I don't doubt the fierceness of Atta's Islamic passion. But perhaps he also had something to say to his dad.

In my experience, the glue that bound groups together was not so much ideology as a collective *identity* based on feeling different -- superior, that is -- continually reinforced by our state of escalating battle (emphasis added) (Lerner, 2002, p. 28. Also see Hudson, et al., 1999, pp. 19, 36, 48-49, 56-57, 63).

Add to this Mohammed Atta's sense of Arab and Muslim identity with Palestinians who are downtrodden, militarily occupied and attacked by U.S.-supported Israel -- an example of the "civilizational rallying" that plays a role in the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis (Huntington, 1993, 1996) -- and we may have a combustible recipe for "elite terrorism."

Apropos the "civilizational rallying" potential for elites regarding their less well-off, oppressed brethren, no less a figure than the Saudi Ambassador to Britain, Ghazi Algosaibi, has written poetry commemorating and applauding Palestinian suicide bombers:

"The Martyrs"

God is witness that you are martyrs  
 The prophets are witness ... and the Holy men  
 You died to honor my God's word  
 In lands where the dearest are prisoners ...  
 You committed suicide?  
 We are the ones who committed suicide by living like the  
 dead (Reid, 2002).

**Revealing the Etiology of Violent Conflict Through Other Means: An Experiment in "Triangulation"**

The above findings are insightful, but it is always worthwhile to attempt to generate findings on the same phenomenon through the use of other research methodologies and data (*triangulation*) to explore the possibility of overlap and enhanced validity of findings (see Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000, pp. 189-190).

Such an opportunity came my way when, in March 2002, I attended a conference of conflict resolution professionals at John Jay College in New York City. All participants, recipients of Hewlett Foundation funding, were invited to submit papers stimulated by the conference, which have been collected and published online (<<http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/dispute>> and <<http://web.gmu.edu/departments/icar>>).

In my contribution (Sandole, 2002a), I attempted to distill from all the presentations -- given by law enforcement hostage negotiators, people of faith (Jews and Christians, African- and European-Americans, women and men), diplomats, academic and NGO researchers, theorists, and practitioners -- a sense of "generic theory" both with regard to third party intervention (pillar 3) as well as the etiology of violent conflict (pillar 2).

On the etiology of violent conflict, I discerned in the various presentations and discussions the following common themes:

**Figure 3:  
Common Themes on the Etiology of Violent Conflict**

(1) An absence of proactive problem-solving mechanisms (e.g., effective training in communication skills, monitoring and early warning processes).

(2) Dominance of male gender (and patriarchy).

(3) Dominance of *Realpolitik* thinking and behavior.

(4) Negative perceptions (stereotypes).

(5) Fractured relationships.

(6) Class and other *identity* group-based economic and other disparities (absence of justice).

(7) Absence of conflict empowerment options (perceived or actual) for those experiencing disparities and injustice; and consequently,

(8) Felt structural violence (relative deprivation and/or rank disequilibrium) and frustration-based anger.

A cursory examination of the relationship between "Western Civilization" (the North) and the Islamic world (the South) in terms of these eight common themes, against the background of the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, reveals the following:

[1] There *is* an absence of effective problem-solving mechanisms to deal with North-South issues, although some might feel that the UN, World Bank and IMF already fulfill this need. Given the massive protests that confront meetings of these international organizations, however, it is clear that improvements can be made in this area. For example, there are no positive relationship-building (*peacebuilding*) mechanisms to deal with Islamic-Western "civilizational" or Israeli-Palestinian concerns. Perhaps as a consequence, hijacked airliners have careened into skyscrapers and Palestinian teenagers have blown themselves up in order to get their voices heard.

[2] The dominance of male gender and patriarchy is significant as, more and more, it is clear that, worldwide, most acts of violence are committed by males 15-29 years of age: a demographic group that is increasing in the South (see Gilligan, 1996; Wrangham and Peterson, 1996; Hudson, et al., 1999, p. 81; Garbarino, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Barash, 2002). All 19 of the hijackers who took over the four aircraft on 11 September 2001 were male, as are most (but not all) Palestinian suicide bombers. As indicated by Lerner's (2002) article, cited above, one of the hijackers, Mohammed Atta, apparently was not "male enough" in the eyes of his father (also see Kimmel, 2002), which may have contributed to his participation in what for him and others was undoubtedly an act of great sacrifice and heroism.

[3] The dominance of *Realpolitik* thinking and behavior is as clear in the actions of the 19 hijackers of 11 September 2001 as it is in the post-911 actions of the Bush administration. It is also as clear in the actions of Palestinian suicide bombers as it is in Israeli responses. In other words, at various levels, we are witnessing an escalation in confrontational, lethal, "bite-and-counterbite" behaviors where, at the end of the day, everyone is worse off than they were at the beginning: *conflict-as-process* has come to overwhelm and overtake *conflict-as-startup conditions*, so that, at any point in time, it does not matter "who threw the first punch," because the process itself, more than the deep-rooted causes and conditions, drive the conflict. The conflict has become *self-stimulating and self-perpetuating* (see Sandole,

1999). Hence, the conclusion that John Vasquez (1993) has drawn from his comprehensive assessment of scientific studies of war, that *Realpolitik* makes war (and by implication, terrorism) *more*, rather than less, likely!

[4] There are clearly negative stereotypes at work in the relationships between North and South, "Western Civilization" and Islamic Civilization, Israelis and Palestinians. "Racial profiling" has taken on new meaning in post-9/11 America, where hate-crimes and detentions without trial have been recorded, or are feared, at new levels (see Pierre, 2002). Profiling has also been occurring in normally liberal, humanistic Western European countries, where far-right, anti-immigrant politicians have recently been scoring impressive electoral gains (see Applebaum, 2002). In the Russian Federation, in addition to the war in Chechnya, white supremacist groups are attacking anyone of "dark" complexion: among others, Chechen, Azerbaijani, and Tajik Muslims; but also Jews, Indians, Africans, and even fellow Christian Armenians (see Baker, 2002).

Not only has the global "War on Terror" succeeded in replacing the post-Cold War development of a multipolar system with a new bipolar system -- terrorists vs. the rest of us -- but it has also created a new bipolar ethnic/religious/racial system -- Arabs vs. non-Arabs, Muslims vs. non-Muslims -- which enhances the more traditional bipolar economic divide between "haves-nots" and "haves," and indeed, the ultimate trap: the development of a "Clash of Civilizations"!

[5] Given the above, fractured relationships clearly exist between the North and the South, Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, in one variant of the Muslim/non-Muslim relationship, Pakistan and India have been threatening to go to war over Kashmir in a way that includes use of nuclear weapons:

Although the current South Asian crisis seems to have ebbed, the underlying dynamic remains. The next flare-up will be even more dangerous if the region's nuclear confrontation develops in the same direction as the U.S.-Russian standoff -- with nuclear missiles on alert, aimed at each other and ready to launch on warning (Mian, Rajaraman and von Hipel, 2002).

[6] As is commonly heard in the popular culture use of American English, one does not have to be a "rocket scientist" to realize that there are profound, identity group-based economic and other disparities, and an overall lack of justice, in the fractured relationships between North and South, non-Muslims and Muslims, non-Arabs and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, as was reported over 20 years ago by the first Brandt Commission Report (1980), "one fourth of the world's population (the North) has four-fifths of the world's income, while three-fourths of the world's population (the South) has one fifth of the world's income" (cited in Sandole, 1999, p. 126):

In the North, the average person can expect to live for more than seventy years; he or she will rarely be hungry, and will be educated at least up to secondary level. In the countries of the South the great majority of people have a life expectancy of closer to fifty years; in the poorest countries one out of every four children dies before the age of five; one fifth or more of all the people in the South suffer from hunger and malnutrition; fifty percent have no chance to become literate (Brand Commission Report, 1980, p. 32; cited in Sandole, 1999, pp. 126-127).

Willy Brandt (1980, p. 7) basically concluded that these *objective conditions of structural violence on a grand scale* constitute the "great social challenge of our time. [Hence,] the two decades ahead of us may be

fateful for mankind" (cited in Sandole, 1999, p. 127). It seems that, with 911, we have clearly arrived at that fateful point for Humankind!

[7] Most importantly, there is an absence of constructive empowerment mechanisms for minorities worldwide, for the South, for Palestinians, and others. And here, we may have the single most powerful explanation for, and predictor of terrorism: The absence of viable, "*peaceful*" alternatives to having to continue contending with humiliation, degradation and structural, cultural, and physical violence. Indeed, who ensures that the "occupied" Palestinian voice gets heard? Yasser Arafat or the suicide bomber? As Mao Tse-tung said years ago, "Power flows from the barrel of a gun." Sad, but true, especially within the setting of the dominant political paradigm, *Realpolitik*.

Finally, against the background and interactive accumulation of the above factors:

[8] Perceived structural violence (relative deprivation, rank disequilibrium), felt frustration and anger (*rage*), contribute further to the tendency for "Violence [to be] the expression of impotence grown unbearable":

Using Erikson's theory of identity formation, particularly his concept of negative identity, the late political scientist Jeanne N. Knutson (1981) suggests that the political terrorist consciously assumes a *negative identity*. ... In Knutson's view, terrorists engage in terrorism as a result of feelings of *rage* and helplessness over the *lack of alternatives*. Her political science-oriented viewpoint seems to coincide with the *frustration-aggression* hypothesis.

Knutson (1984) ... carried out an extensive international research project on the psychology of political terrorism. The basic premise of terrorists whom she evaluated in depth was "that their violent acts stem from feelings of *rage* and hopelessness engendered by the belief that *society permits no other access to information-dissemination and policy-formation processes*" (emphasis added) (Hudson, et al., pp. 30, 34-35).

Quite simply, *triangulated* factors 1-8 -- which overlap significantly with, but also add to the results of the 3 pillar-based analysis -- make terrorism more rather than less likely.

#### **Applying the Overall Findings to the Middle East Conflict: A Major Source of Terrorism**

There is a photograph of Yasser Arafat on the front page of the *Washington Post* (2002a) after the Israelis lifted their one-month siege of his headquarters in Ramallah in spring 2002, that is revealing of intense *rage*. Held captive and hostage, isolated and occupied militarily -- in effect, marginalized not just by Israel but by the international community for half a century -- plus Ariel Sharon's assaults on refugee camps and townships: these and other aspects of Palestinian life experiences might make Arafat or any Palestinian feel that "Death is a way of life" (see Leiby, 2002).

What else might this *rage* lead to? For expressing one's frustration, suicide bombings might be considered an option, albeit a grim, indiscriminate one, especially for Palestinians who lack the trappings of state power possessed by Israel and used against them: F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopter gunships and tanks, not to mention the ever-present, home-destroying bulldozers. So, dispossessed, disempowered, desperate Palestinians could likely blow themselves up, killing Israelis (including children) in the process, as they have been doing, as their way to communicate their *rage*, to

be "heard" by their occupiers and the international community at large.

In other settings, frustration-based rage has been a factor in explaining violent behaviors. And then, as expressed, for example, in the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* -- the Kerner Commission Report (1968) on urban riots in the U.S. -- long-term structural (*Idealpolitik/non-Marxist radical*) as well as short-term security (*Realpolitik*) measures are advanced to deal with that rage, so that the horribly violent behaviors do not have to repeat themselves.

But what do we see in the Middle East? Under the cover of the U.S.-led "War on Terror," Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has been reducing to rubble Palestinian residential areas already under Israeli siege or domination, preventing a UN mission from investigating possible war crimes in the Jenin refugee camp, and in the process, probably creating legions of future suicide bombers among the youth televised and photographed by the international media for all to see, digging through the rubble of their homes looking for loved ones and personal possessions. And yet both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives endorsed, overwhelmingly, Israel's military campaign to "dismantle the terrorist infrastructure" (*Washington Post*, 2002b) despite evidence of probable violations of human rights in Jenin.

As long as the deep-rooted causes of Palestinian rage are not addressed, Israel, with one of the world's most powerful armed forces, will continue to pulverize the already vanquished who have nothing to lose -- why else would a young Palestinian girl blow herself to bits? -- enhancing rather than decimating the "terrorist infrastructure" among the Palestinians.

In the meantime, Ariel Sharon and Hamas, among others, will continue to provide the world with a negative conflict model, showing the absurd levels to which violent conflict can descend, where each day that the conflict lingers, the conflicting parties are worse off than they were the day before.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, the Middle East will continue to resemble the Balkans, with Israelis in the role of Serbs and Palestinians in the role of Bosniaks. Although each side will continue to slaughter the other, according to any "objective" standard, *the dominant victims will continue to be Muslims* -- not a very useful image to go forward in the post-911 world!

## **Conclusion**

As Elie Wiesel (2002), the Nobel Peace Prize laureate (and concentration camp survivor), noted about the perpetrators of 911, "To Defeat Them, First We Must Understand Them." In this chapter, we have taken some steps in that direction by focusing primarily on the *research problem*: exploring causes and conditions of terrorism relevant to better understanding and dealing with the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001. Clearly, however, much more needs to be done, especially with regard to pillar 3, and -- reflective of our *practical problem* -- finding ways to get policymakers to think outside the simplistic *Realpolitik-only* box to capture the complexity of contemporary global issues affecting our security.

In the short to middle term, we must endeavor to prevent acts of terrorism, in part, by preventing violent conflicts that give rise to terrorism. Failing that, we must "manage" the conflicts that do give rise to terrorism, if not actually stop them altogether.

In addition to enhancing airport and aircraft security, and making appropriate use of military and law enforcement resources, actions in the short to middle term should include improved coordination between security and intelligence-gathering organizations within as well as between states and

international organizations, plus increased numbers and competencies of conflict/terrorist analysts, including those who can discern the similarities as well as differences among various conflicts as continuations or shifts in global conflict trends, plus linguists for dealing with foreign language information and potential early warnings (see Bamford, 2002; Hiro, 2002).

Bridging the operational divide between short/middle-term conflict *prevention, management, and settlement* mechanisms and long-term conflict *resolution and transformation* measures, former Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force Antonia Chayes (2002) has put forward some interesting ideas for achieving peace in the Middle East, including: "An international peacekeeping force -- made up of NATO troops with U.S. participation," which would provide security plus the necessary separation of the parties to allow for a cooling-off period to encourage dialogue between the parties.

Given the thrust of this chapter, such a dialogue should deal with the underlying causes and conditions and not just the symptoms of conflict -- suicide bombings, destruction of refugee camps, targeted assassinations -- because dealing only with symptoms in the absence of dealing with the deep-rooted causes helps keep the conflict alive.

That was what the Kerner Commission Report (1968) suggested some 30 years ago, with implications for rage-based conflicts elsewhere. Why reinvent the wheel? Why wait any longer for further suicide bombings and Jenins to exacerbate what is already, according to Antonia Chayes, "a threat to international peace"?

Accordingly, we must build upon the short- to middle-term measures, striving to help the parties resolve the conflicts that give rise to terrorism, working with them over time to deal with their long-term relationships in less confrontational, less lethal ways, so that next time they have a problem, they do not have to "burn down the house."

Otherwise, according to former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (2002):

the Middle East problem will never be settled, Israel will never be secure, no Palestinian leader will be able to contain the fury of his despairing people, the region will remain a powderkeg and no anti-terrorist coalition will last. All the people who want the clash of civilizations -- who are counting on it -- will have the future they want.

A clear, simple message, but will it take hold with policymakers who are accustomed to seeing and responding to the world, including threats to security, in terms of linear, *Realpolitik-only* lenses, fighting fire *only* with fire?

T. Irene Sanders (2002), who advocates "a new way of thinking about defense," based on *complexity science* (see Sanders, 1998; Waldrop, 1992), has some doubts in this regard:

Complexity science may be able to help those of us in the Western world understand a perspective that has been part of Eastern and Middle Eastern cultures for centuries. I recently reviewed a dissertation proposal on organizational management by an employee of the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia, in which he described the Islamic worldview as "fundamentally holistic and systemic -- one that integrates rather than divides; one that concerns itself with complex patterns rather than simple single events."

Our inability to see and understand the interconnected nonlinear nature of the world made us vulnerable to the malevolent intentions of those who could. The enemy we face is a loose coalition of semi-independent terrorist cells, each with a well-defined mission and a high degree of adaptability and flexibility in carrying out that mission. Al Qaeda does not rely on immediate direction from a central authority yet still maintains effective coordination -- a model similar to the one used by organized crime syndicates -- and hence has been far less susceptible to intrusion or destruction. It adapts its methods to accomplish its goals. This is in direct contrast to the defense and intelligence-gathering organizations in the United States, which are still large and centralized bureaucratic operations, characterized by hierarchical command-and-control structures.

[U.S. Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld has recognized and is already acting upon this challenge. As he writes in the May/June [2002] issue of *Foreign Affairs* magazine, "Preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking, and the development of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances. The ability to adapt will be critical in a world defined by surprise and uncertainty." But just how receptive are other people in positions of leadership to such a radical change of emphasis? People I have spoken with on Capitol Hill seemed resistant to the idea. "I'd hate to admit that there's *anything* we can learn from the al Qaeda network," one senator said to me when I suggested that there was a lot to be understood from the thinking and organizational structure of the terrorists.

The price tag for this type of arrogance is high. Despite our overwhelming trillion-dollar military and economic superiority, we were caught offguard by a terrorist network that put out an expenditure of about \$400,000. What's to stop that from happening again? Very little, it seems.

At present, the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill "finds itself besieged in federal court and across the airwaves by Christian evangelists and other conservatives" for asking its "3500 incoming freshmen to read a book about Islam": Michael A. Sells' *Approaching the Qur'an: The Early Revelations* (1999) (Cooperman, 2002, p. A1). Hence, despite the fact that the "demand for lectures and courses on Islam [since 11 September 2002] is higher than ever," resistance to "thinking outside the box" may be more pervasive than just within leadership circles in Washington, DC.

Shifting people from one belief-value system to another is not easy, but it can be done (see Sandole, 2002b). The authors of this book have endeavored to contribute to that process. And it would seem clear from the discussion thus far, that the security of all of us depends upon it -- a view further encouraged by the author of "Approaching the Qur'an," Michael Sells (2002):

The Koran has been extremely difficult for most Americans to approach; the written "translations" in the bookstore are not what most Muslims consider to be the word of God or what they experience in their worship. "Approaching the Qur'an" explains why that is the case and offers an entry into the religion's core literary features and ideas. Reading it can only strengthen any subsequent discussion of Islam and terrorism.

In the meantime, the "Clash of Civilizations" that Hubert Vedrine warns of may already be upon us, as suggested by Clyde Prestowitz (2002, p. B1), former U.S. trade negotiator during the Reagan administration:

"The way things are going, it will soon be the United States against the world."

That comment, by a top political leader in Kuala Lumpur [Malaysia], was just one of hundreds of expressions of a new and disturbing alienation from America that I heard during a recent swing through 14 Asian, European and Latin American capitals.

What a contrast to the supportive attitudes abroad immediately after Sept. 11. Then, the sometimes anti-American French journal *Le Monde* captured the world's sentiment with a headline proclaiming: "We are all Americans." Ten months later, sympathy for the victims of the terror attacks remains. But the American image is increasingly perceived as ugly, and support abroad for U.S. policies is plummeting -- in response to such U.S. actions as the threat ... to withdraw its peacekeepers from Bosnia unless Americans are exempted from jurisdiction of the new International Criminal Court.

Of course, anti-Americanism is not new, but what I found disturbing after 35 years of visiting these cities was that *the foreign leaders who have been longtime friends of the United States are the ones voicing dismay* (emphasis added).

The German Orient Institute's Udo Steinbach (2002, p. 49) provides further insight in this regard:

The fear that further military steps in the fight against terror could lead to the West's being viewed as *neo-crusaders* is not entirely unfounded. From Rabat to Jakarta there is agreement that in order to achieve the common goal of rooting out terror, it is far more important finally to foster a just agreement between Israelis and Palestinians than to remove Saddam Hussein from power. *Hatred of the US has grown greatly since President Bush left unchallenged the statement by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon that Arafat is to Israel what bin Laden is to the United States. The suspicion is widespread that Bush supports Sharon's politics of delegitimizing the Palestinian right to an independent Palestinian state with the same status as Israel. When a higher priority in the fight against terrorism is accorded to toppling Saddam Hussein than to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this appears to many Muslims to be another example of the kind of Western arbitrariness and arrogance that stoked the fires of hatred in the past and the atrocities of September 11.*

There can be agreement on terrorism between Islam and the West only if the fight against it is understood to be a collective task based on principles that all agree on, with account taken of the sensibilities of all those involved. Only then will it be possible to enlist the Islamic world in the fight against terrorism (emphasis added).

Implicit in these comments is a sense of an unacceptably high price that we Americans and others are paying for policymakers continuing to force a complex, "messy" world into narrow, simplistic boxes, a practice which often results in counter-productive, self-defeating policies. On top of the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, what will it take for them and the public at large to move with the times, shift paradigms, and capture the complexity of contemporary and future events? Hopefully, not a "cultural world war," with weapons of mass destruction, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still at the core.

## References

- Applebaum, Anne (2002). "Europe, Not Sure What to Make of Itself." *The Washington Post*, 5 May, pp. B1 and B5.
- Baker, Peter (2002). "Attacks on Foreigners Rising in Russia: Frequency of Violence, Recruiting By Fascist Groups Alarm Kremlin." *The Washington Post*, 11 August, pp. A1 and A21.
- Bamford, James (2002). "Too Much, Not Enough: The Biggest Intelligence Agency Ought to Know Better." *The Washington Post*, 2 June, pp. B1 and B4.
- Barash, David P. (2002). "Evolution, Males, and Violence." *The Chronicle of Higher Education, The Chronicle Review*, 24 May (<http://chronicle.com/weekly/v48/i37/37b00701.htm>).
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992). New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information.
- Brandt Commission Report (1980). *North-South: A Programme for Survival* (Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt). London: Pan.
- Brandt, Willy (1980). "A Plea for Change: Peace, Justice, Jobs -- An Introduction." In *North-South: A Programme for Survival* (Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt). London: Pan.
- Brewer, John and Albert Hunter (1989). *Multimethod Research: A Synthesis of Styles* (Sage Library of Social Research 175). Newbury Park (California) and London: Sage Publications.
- Burton, John W. (1979). *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*. New York: St. Martin's Press and Oxford (England): Martin Robertson.
- Burton, John W. (1990). *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*. London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Burton, John W. (1997). *Violence Explained*. Manchester (England): Manchester University Press.
- Chayes, Antonia (2002). "Intervene When Mediation Fails." *The Washington Post*, 28 April, p. B3.
- Cohen, Richard (2002). "Where Is the White House Peace Plan?" *The Washington Post*, 7 March, p. A21.
- Cooperman, Alan (2002). "A Timely Subject -- and a Sore One: UNC Draws Fire, Lawsuit for Assigning Book on Islam," *The Washington Post*, 7 August, pp. A1 and A6.
- Dallaire, Romeo (2002). "A Good Man in Hell: General Romeo Dallaire and the Rwanda Genocide." Interviewed by Ted Koppel, U.S. Holocaust Museum, Washington, DC, 12 June.
- de Filippo, Richard (2002). Comments made during session on "Negotiation Under Extreme Pressure" at the Hewlett Theory Centers 2002 Meeting

- on "Framing New Directions for Theory From Practitioners' Experience," at John Jay College, City University of New York, 21-23 March.
- Deutsch, Morton (2002). Comments made during session on "After 911: What Questions are Emerging?" at the Hewlett Theory Centers 2002 Meeting on "Framing New Directions for Theory From Practitioners' Experience," at John Jay College, City University of New York, 21-23 March.
- Dollard, J., L.W. Doob, N.E. Miller, O.H. Mowrer, and R.R. Sears (1939). *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fanon, Frantz (1968). *The Wretched of the Earth* (translated by Constance Farrington). New York: Grove Press.
- Festinger, Leon (1962). *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Frankfort-Nachmias, Chava and David Nachmias (2000). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. Sixth Edition. New York: Worth Publishers and St. Martin's Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989). "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer, pp. 3-18.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.
- Fuller, Graham E. (1994). "Iran's Coup in Europe." *The Washington Post*, 15 May, p. C7.
- Galtung, Johan (1964). "A Structural Theory of Aggression." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 1, pp. 95-119.
- Galtung, Johan (1969). "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 167-191.
- Galtung, Johan (1996). *Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). London and Thousand Oaks (California): SAGE Publications.
- Garbarino, James (2000). *Lost Boys: Why Our Sons Turn Violent and How We Can Save Them*. New York: Anchor Books (Random House).
- Gilligan, James (1996). *Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic*. New York: Vintage Books (Random House).
- Gurr, Ted Robert (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hiro, Dilip (2002). "The Kashmiri Crisis Is a Defining Moment...." *The Washington Post*, 2 June, p. B2.
- Hudson, Rex A. and the Staff of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress (1999). *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists*. Guilford (Connecticut): The Lyons Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer, pp. 22-49.

- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ibrahim, Youssef M. (2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define." *The Washington Post*, 11 August, pp. B1 and B5.
- IHT (1993). "Bosnian Serbs Reject Offer To Deploy Muslim UN Troops." *International Herald Tribune*, 16 July, p. 2.
- Kaplan, Robert D. (2001). "A Sense of the Tragic: Developmental Dangers in the Twenty-first Century." *Jerome E. Levy Occasional Papers No. 2*. Newport (Rhode island): U.S. Naval War College.
- Kerner Commission Report (1968). *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Kimmel, Michael (2002). "Gender, Class, and Terrorism." *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, vol. XLVIII, no. 22, 8 February, Section 2, pp. B11-B12.
- Knutson, Jeanne N. (1981). "Social and Psychodynamic Pressures Toward a Negative Identity." In *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.). New York: Pergamon Press.
- Knutson, Jeanne N. (1984). "Toward a United States Policy on Terrorism." *Political Psychology*, vol. 5, no. 2, June, pp. 287-294.
- Lederach, John P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
- Leiby, Richard (2002). "Where Rage Resides: For the Ordinary People of Gaza City, Death Is a Way of Life." *The Washington Post*, 24 April, pp. C1 and C8.
- Lerner, Jonathan (2002). "I Was a Terrorist." *The Washington Post Magazine*, 24 February, pp. 24, 26-28, 38-40.
- Mian, Zia, R. Rajaraman, and Frank von Hipel (2002). "Nuclear Role Models." *The Washington Post*, 6 August, p. A15.
- O'Leary, Carole (2002). "Extremists in a Moderate Land." *The Washington Post*, 11 August, p. B5.
- Pierre, Robert E. (2002). "Fear and Anxiety Permeate Arab Enclave Near Detroit." *The Washington Post*, 4 August, p. A3.
- Power, Samantha (2001). "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen." *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 288, no. 2, September, pp. 84-108.
- Power, Samantha (2002). *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books.
- Preston, Julia (1993). "No Troops Soon for Bosnia 'Havens': Having Trouble Raising Forces, UN Sees 3-Month Delay." *International Herald Tribune*, 17 June, p. 5.
- Prestowitz, Clyde (2002). "America the Arrogant: Why Don't We Listen Anymore?" *The Washington Post*, 7 July, pp. B1 and B5

- Rapoport, Anatol (1960). *Fights, Games, and Debates*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Reid, T.R. (2002). "Saudi Ambassador to Britain Praises Suicide Bombers in Verse." *International Herald Tribune*, 20-21 April, p. 5.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. (2002). "Transforming the Military." *Foreign Affairs*, May/June.
- Sanders, T. Irene (1998). *Strategic Thinking and the New Science: Planning in the Midst of Chaos, Complexity and Change*. New York: The Free Press.
- Sanders, T. Irene (2002). "To Fight Terror, We Can't Think Straight." *The Washington Post*, 5 May, p. B2.
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (1984). "The Subjectivity of Theories and Actions in World Society." In *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations*, Michael Banks (ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press and Brighton, Sussex (England): Wheatsheaf.
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (1993). "Paradigms, Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence or Confusion?" In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.). Manchester: Manchester University Press and New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (1998). "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach." *Peace and Conflict Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, December, pp. 1-30.
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (1999). *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era*. London and New York: Pinter/Cassell (Continuum International).
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2001). "'Clashes of Civilization' and Other Possible Influences on Ethnic Warfare in Former Yugoslavia: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997." Paper presented at the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), Chicago, Illinois, 20-24 February.
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2002a). "Exquisite Synergy: A Meeting of the Minds Across Levels of Analysis." Published proceedings of the Hewlett Theory Centers 2002 Meeting, John Jay College, New York City, 21-23 March (<<http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/dispute>> and <<http://web.gmu.edu/departments/icar>>).
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2002b). "Virulent Ethnocentrism: A Major Challenge for Transformational Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, vol. 1, no. 4, June, pp. 4-27 (<<http://www.ethnopolitics.org/archive/volume I/issue 4/sandole.pdf>>).
- Sandole, Dennis J.D. (forthcoming). "Types of Conflict." In *Human Conflict: From Analysis to Action*, Sandra Cheldelin, Daniel Druckman, and Larissa Fast (eds.). London and New York: Continuum International.
- Sells, Michael A. (1999). *Approaching the Qur'an: The Early Revelations*. Ashland (Oregon): White Cloud Press.

- Sells, Michael A. (2002). "Understanding, Not Indoctrination." *The Washington Post*, 8 August, p. A17.
- Steinbach, Udo (2002). "Cultural Dialog and the Muslim World." *Internationale Politik* (Transatlantic edition). vol. 3, no. 2, Summer, pp. 45-50.
- van Creveld, Martin (1991). *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press.
- Vasquez, John A. (1993). *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 27). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Vedrine, Hubert (2002). "Only the U.S. Can Bring About Peace in the Middle East." *The Washington Post*, 17 June, p. A17.
- Volkan, Vamik (1997). *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*. Boulder (Colorado): Westview Press.
- Waldrop, M. Mitchell (1992). *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos*. New York and London: Simon and Schuster.
- Warfield, John N. (1993). "Complexity and Cognitive Equilibrium: Experimental Results and their Implications." In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.). Manchester: Manchester University Press and New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Wiesel, Elie (2002). "How Can We Understand Their Hatred?" *Parade Magazine*, 7 April, pp. 4-5.
- WP (2002a). Photograph of Yasser Arafat. *The Washington Post*, 2 May, P. A1.
- WP (2002b). U.S. Congress Votes in Support of Sharon's Military Action. *The Washington Post*, 3 May, p. A18.
- WP (2002c). "Sri Lanka's Peace Process." *The Washington Post*, 27 July, p. A20.
- Wrangham, Richard and Dale Peterson (1996). *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence*. Boston and New York: Mariner Books (Houghton Mifflin).
- Wright, Robin (2002). "Don't Just Fund the War, Shell Out for Peace." *The Washington Post*, 10 March, p. 5.

### Biographical Sketch of Author

Dennis J.D. Sandole received his Ph.D from the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland in 1979. He is Professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University. A founding member of ICAR, his research and practice in conflict resolution deal with the violent ethnic conflicts of post-Cold War Europe, and the role of the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe* (OSCE) in dealing with these. He has served on the U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in Vienna. He has also been a NATO Research Fellow, Fulbright Scholar and OSCE "Researcher in Residence" as part of his long-term OSCE project. His most recent book is *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era* (1979). He serves as faculty liaison for ICAR's War, Violence, and Terrorism Working Group whose active members produced this book.

### Annotated Bibliography

- Burton, John W. (1997). *Violence Explained*. Manchester (England): Manchester University Press. This is Burton's most recent book-length work on the link between basic human needs (BHNs) and violent conflict. It features his current typology of BHNs -- for identity, recognition, and security -- whose violation seems to be a dominant characteristic of people who become terrorists (as well as gang members and other "deviants").
- Galtung, Johan (1996). *Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). London and Thousand Oaks (California): SAGE Publications. One of Galtung's most recent efforts to systematize his thinking on the causes of violence at all levels. It features "cultural violence" as a complement to his work on "structural violence" as a societal-level characteristic of people whose needs are violated within (and by) particular social, economic and political structures.
- Gurr, Ted Robert (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gurr's award-winning treatment on the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence which, along with structural/cultural violence and BHNs, plays a role in the etiology of acts of terrorism.
- Hudson, Rex A. and the Staff of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress (1999). *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists*. Guilford (Connecticut): The Lyons Press. A very readable, albeit somewhat brief, commercial publication of a survey of sociological and psychological literature published over the last 30 years, dealing with the "types of individuals and groups that are prone to terrorism in an effort to help improve U.S. counterterrorist methods and policies." Since it was prepared by the Library of Congress Federal Research Division two years before 11 September 2001, one wonders: if it had been more widely read by policymakers when it was first released, would it have "made a difference"?
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster. Huntington's book-length treatment of his controversial thesis that the conflicts of the post-Cold War era will be characterized by contests between different "civilizations" instead of states. He identifies, among others, the Islamic world as a likely major enemy of the West.

Kerner Commission Report (1968). *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. A classic, U.S. government-mandated analysis of the causes of violent, race-based conflicts in American cities during the 1960s, with recommendations on how to deal with the long-term underlying causes and conditions as well as short-term law-and-order issues.

Waldrop, M. Mitchell (1992). *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos*. New York and London: Simon and Schuster. Mitchell does for complexity theory what Gleick did for chaos theory: Provides a reader-friendly introduction to a trend in thinking designed to capture the complexity of "real-world" problems. Although initiated in the biological, physical, and mathematical sciences, complexity theory has spilled-over into the social sciences and humanities, including international relations, strategic studies and conflict analysis and resolution.

Wrangham, Richard and Dale Peterson (1996). *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence*. Boston and New York: Mariner Books (Houghton Mifflin). A compelling research-based work on the powerful link between male gender and violence among the "great apes," including *Homo sapiens*.