

**Peace and Security
in Post-Cold War Europe:
A “Community of Values”
in the CSCE/OSCE?**

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Foreword

Dr. Dennis Sandole has long been interested in questions of peace and security and has published a range of empirical and theoretically oriented studies on the subject. This current Working Paper represents a report on his most recent investigation into the role of international organizations in creating the structures for comprehensive common security.

His focus here is on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its predecessor, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This Working Paper analyzes data collected through interviews with heads of delegation to the organization conducted in 1993, 1997, and 1999. These successive surveys allow Sandole to explore changes of attitudes in the context of the momentous events of the 1990s, most notably the NATO intervention in Bosnia (1995) and the more contentious intervention in Kosovo (1999). Details of the surveys are included in the appendix of this paper.

Sandole concludes that his survey results indicate a complex coexistence of cooperation and conflict within the CSCE/OSCE. He suggests that the OSCE is moving toward a greater community of values and a culture that reflects a commitment to and understanding of conflict resolution over time. As the organization develops and as the OSCE community of values develops into a community of institutions, the prospects that it may serve as an institution capable of preventing “future Yugoslavias” become more likely.

We believe this work is important for several reasons. Regional organizations are becoming an increasingly important but far from perfect tool for preventing and resolving conflicts, as the OSCE experience in the Balkans amply demonstrates. As Sandole argues, a better understanding of the OSCE may help us better analyze and resolve conflicts within Europe. Such lessons, of course, are also applicable to other regional organizations. In addition, Sandole suggests that the concept of issue paradigm is a useful idea to capture the complexity of such evolving institutions. Finally, this Working Paper demonstrates the value of

successive surveys over time in order to construct a dynamic picture of an organization that has transformed itself over time.

The questions of peace and security analyzed by Dr. Sandole in this paper are core concerns of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. We believe that this paper will contribute to our understanding of these issues in the context of violence in the Balkans in particular, but globally as well.

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Introduction

This is the third published report on a project designed to explore the efficacy of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE)—formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)¹—as a basis for designing peace and security in post–Cold War Europe, such that the genocidal warfare that has come to characterize the Balkans and the former Soviet Union during the last 10 years might be averted in the future.²

The CSCE/OSCE was launched in the early 1970s as an attempt to stabilize East-West relations in Europe, leading initially to the Helsinki Final Act³ and, over time, to other negotiations and declarations, plus the development of human rights and confidence- and security-building cultures that helped bring about the end of the Cold War. During the last 10 years, the CSCE/OSCE has pioneered the development of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict rehabilitation mechanisms. It has also taken the lead in reconceptualizing security away from “zero-sum” national security, toward “positive-sum” common security: a comprehensive view inclusive of (a) political and military, (b) economic and environmental, and (c) humanitarian and human rights dimensions.

The CSCE/OSCE is also unique because it is the most comprehensive organization dedicated to maintaining peace and security in Europe, comprising all former enemies of the Cold War and the neutral and nonaligned. As a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, it is the primary organization for dealing with conflict in Europe. Consequently, a major task of CSCE/OSCE members has been to develop peace and security for post–Cold War Europe, such that “future Yugoslavias” can be prevented.⁴

Accordingly, getting at the views of these architects of post–Cold War peace and security—exploring with them, for instance, what went wrong in former Yugoslavia, how such conflicts could be prevented in the future, and so forth—would seem to be worthwhile for theoretical and practical reasons. After all, what people think or say about con-

flicts indicates how they perceive and respond to them.⁵ But other than the recent work of Terrence Hopmann,⁶ little has been done to solicit the views of CSCE/OSCE negotiators themselves concerning peace and security in post-Cold War Europe. This project does precisely that.

The specific objective in this article is to examine the responses of (primarily) heads of delegation to the CSCE/OSCE to 15 closed-ended questions during interviews conducted in Vienna at three points in time—1993, 1997, and 1999—paying attention to not just levels of agreement/disagreement with, but also the consensus among respondents on, each question. The working hypothesis here is that certain levels of agreement with, and consensus on, various issues are essential for the CSCE/OSCE to become what it, a consensus-based regional actor, often claims it already is (or is becoming): a “community of values”⁷: a collectivity whose members have a shared view of European peace and security, pressing concerns, and ways of dealing with them.

Research Design

During summer 1993, I interviewed 32 representatives from 29 of the (then) 53 CSCE participating states; in summer 1997, I interviewed 47 representatives from 46 of the 55 OSCE participating states; and during summer 1999, immediately following the end of the NATO bombing of Serbia over Kosovo, I interviewed 47 representatives from 47 of the 55 OSCE participating states.

For each survey, I conducted scheduled, structured interviews with convenience samples of (primarily) heads of CSCE/OSCE delegations, lasting between one and three hours. The interviews comprised 15 closed-ended questions and a number of open-ended questions.⁸ The majority of questions dealt with the return of genocidal warfare to Europe in the decade following the end of the Cold War. The 15 closed-ended questions were basically the same across the three time periods, with some changes due to fine-tuning and updating, thereby facilitating comparisons, not just among the five groupings of CSCE/OSCE members for each time period, but across the three time periods as well.⁹

The 1993 CSCE survey occurred two years after the onset of war in former Yugoslavia and two years before NATO and the Dayton Peace

Accords stopped the wars in Bosnia; the 1997 OSCE survey took place two years after NATO/Dayton stopped the wars in Bosnia, and two years before the conflict in Kosovo reached crisis levels, ushering in NATO intervention to stop the Serb-led genocidal campaign against the Kosovar ethnic Albanians. The 1999 OSCE survey occurred shortly after the end of the bombing campaign.

This “before-after” structure is similar to a “true” experimental design (but without a “control group”) where, given that basically the same questions were asked in 1993, 1997, and 1999, one objective of the CSCE/OSCE project has been to explore to what extent, if any, the NATO interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 may have influenced respondents’ views on peace and security in post-Cold War Europe. In this regard, the NATO interventions and return of negative peace (i.e., “cessation of hostilities”)¹⁰ to Bosnia and Kosovo could be viewed as natural or social experiments: “where [in each case] the changes [in a situation were] produced, not by the scientist’s intervention [in the laboratory], but by that of the policy maker or practitioner” (in the real world).¹¹

For this study, “before-after” comparisons were made between mean scores for the individual groupings and between “grand means” for the five groupings taken together, with higher scores on a 1 to 5 scale indicating levels of agreement with any particular question (and corresponding issue). As measures of central tendency or, for each grouping, “the most representative value of [a] distribution”¹² for a particular question, the mean scores reported in appendix B provide some sense of where each of the five groupings of CSCE/OSCE participating states was at any point in time with regard to the others, and over time with regard to itself. Grand means provide some sense of where all five groupings taken together were on each question at each point in time.

For each grand mean, the corresponding standard deviation is presented as a measure of the “extent of dispersion about the central value [the grand mean]”¹³ or, in our case, an indicator of homogeneity, unanimity, or consensus of agreement/disagreement. By providing some sense of the range or spread of individual means (for the five groupings) about the grand mean, we can interpret each standard deviation as follows: the smaller the standard deviation or spread, the closer the indi-

vidual means are to the grand mean, the more similar the individual means are and, therefore, the more reflective of consensus they are. The larger the standard deviation, on the other hand, the less consensus among the five groupings taken together on a particular question.

The Findings: A Community of Values?

What do the grand means (GMs) and standard deviations (SDs) presented in table 1 tell us?¹⁴ Do the data suggest certain levels of agreement with, and consensus on, certain issues, suggesting further that an “effective political system” might be developing, comprising “rules of the game [and] functional equivalents to war,”¹⁵ and therefore, an institutional response to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s proposition that “Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them?”¹⁶ Are there at least hints, 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, of “new practices and channels for the resolution of issues,”¹⁷ relevant to the prevention of “future Yugoslavias?” In other words, can we say that there appears to be—or appears to be developing—a community of values within the CSCE/OSCE?

Table 1
Grand Means and Standard Deviations for Questions 1–15
for 1993, 1997, 1999

Q	1993		1997		1999	
	GM	SD	GM	SD	GM	SD
1	4.75	.2326 [3]	4.08	.1527 [2]	4.23	.1450 [1]
2	3.98	.4724 [3]	4.28	.3067 [1]	4.19	.4408 [2]
3	3.73	.8871 [3]	4.01	.5693 [1]	3.75	.7645 [2]
4	4.17	.6598 [3]	4.16	.2853 [2]	4.11	.2294 [1]
5	3.42	.5765 [3]	3.62	.3301 [1]	3.46	.3372 [2]
6	3.80	.1706 [1]	3.42	.1792 [2]	2.96	.5209 [3]
7	—	—	3.54	.2771 [1]	3.68	.3264 [2]
8	4.56	.4015 [3]	4.57	.2507 [2]	4.65	.2393 [1]
9	4.36	.2334 [3]	4.20	.1253 [1]	4.16	.1710 [2]
10	3.89	.5645 [3]	4.06	.1650 [1]	4.42	.1696 [2]
11	3.72	.7365 [3]	4.00	.4499 [2]	3.84	.3180 [1]
12	4.24	.1445 [2]	3.87	.1184 [1]	3.98	.3128 [3]
13	—	—	2.45	.3308 [1]	2.48	.6869 [2]
14	3.87	.2160 [2]	3.35	.4220 [3]	3.51	.1716 [1]
15	2.35	.3537 [3]	2.55	.3022 [2]	2.34	.2842 [1]

NOTE: The **higher** the grand mean (GM), the **more** in agreement respondents were with a question, and the **lower** the standard deviation (SD), the **more** consensus there was among respondents on a question. *Italicized numbers in brackets* are rankings for the standard deviations: “[1]”: highest consensus; “[2]”: second highest; “[3]”: lowest consensus, for each of the 15 questions across the three time periods (read *horizontally* as rows). Questions no. 7 and 13 were asked only during the 1997 and 1999 surveys. Hence, the total number of closed-ended questions in the 1993 sample corresponding to those in the 1997 and 1999 surveys is 13 (instead of 15).

A "Static" Picture

Let's look first at the grand means in terms of their magnitudes:

Table 2
Magnitudes of Grand Means

Near, At or Above 4.00	3.00-3.80	Under 3.00
Q.1 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.2 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.3 (1997)	Q.3 (1993, 1999)	
Q.4 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
	Q.5 (1993, 1997, 1999)	
	Q.6 (1993, 1997, 1999)	
	Q.7 (1997, 1999)	
Q.8 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.9 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.10(1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.11(1997, 1999)	Q.11(1993)	
Q.12(1993, 1997, 1999)		
		Q.13 (1997, 1999)
Q.14(1993)	Q.14(1997, 1999)	
		Q.15(1993,1997,1999)

Given the data in table 2, CSCE/OSCE negotiators agreed (at least) fairly strongly across the three time periods that

- ethnic conflicts such as those in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union would continue to be among the major threats to international peace and security in the post-Cold War world (question no. 1);

- NATO could play an effective role in responding to some of these conflicts by providing peacekeeping forces (question no. 2);
- in dealing with these conflicts (as issues of common security), NATO should continue to consult with its former Cold War adversaries (question no. 4);
- there was a need to deal with the issues underlying violent conflicts such as those in former Yugoslavia (question no. 8);
- forceful NATO intervention *alone* would not be sufficient to result in "resolution" of those conflicts (question no. 9);
- there was a need for coordination and integration among all actors involved in peace operations (question no. 10); and, finally,
- the Cold War was over (question no. 12).

The CSCE/OSCE negotiators were *unsure* about whether

- NATO's mechanisms for reaching out to its former adversaries (North Atlantic Council [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council]/Partnership for Peace) could develop into a security system for all former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned (question no. 5);
- to the extent that such a security system did develop, it should do so within the context of the CSCE/OSCE (question no. 6); and
- the Stabilization Force (SFOR) withdrawal from Bosnia would lead to a resumption of warfare between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (question no. 7).

The respondents *clearly disagreed* that

- NATO enlargement would threaten the relationships developed between East and West in the post-Cold War period (question no. 13); and
- to the extent that a perception had developed in the Third World that the end of the Cold War meant only that East-West had been

replaced by North-South, the perception was valid (question no. 15).

Putting all this together, for the CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled in this study, the Cold War (“as we knew it”) was over and NATO expansion would not threaten that state of affairs. Instead, major threats to international peace and security in Europe would continue to emanate from Yugoslav-type conflicts (although respondents were unsure whether withdrawal of the NATO-led SFOR from Bosnia would lead to a resumption of hostilities). Hence, NATO should continue to respond to these conflicts with peacekeeping forces, continue to consult with its former Warsaw Pact adversaries, and to the extent possible, work in a coordinated, integrated fashion with conflict resolution and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in dealing with such conflicts. These other organizations were appropriate for dealing with the issues underlying the violent expression of conflicts, which should be pursued, as conflict “resolution” in these cases would not occur from forceful NATO intervention alone. In any case, as it goes about its post-Cold War business, NATO should not develop into a security system for all former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned, and certainly not within the context of the CSCE/OSCE. And no matter what NATO does or does not do, the end of the Cold War does not mean that East-West has been replaced by North-South as the dominant axis of international conflict, even though there may be a perception to that effect in the developing world.

This is not a “bad” picture of Europe in the post-Cold War period, but it is a static picture. What about a dynamic “moving picture”—involving shifts and trends in shifts—across the three time periods?

A Dynamic, “Moving Picture”

Table 3
Increases and Decreases in Grand Means across the Three Time Periods

<i>[NATO in Bosnia: 1995]</i>		<i>[NATO in Kosovo: 1999]</i>	
1993-1997		1997-1999	
Increases	Decreases	Increases	Decreases
	Q.1	Q.1	
Q.2			Q.2
Q.3			Q.3
	Q.4[=]		Q.4
Q.5			Q.5
	Q.6		Q.6
		Q.7	
Q.8[=]		Q.8	
	Q.9		Q.9
Q.10		Q.10	
Q.11			Q.11
	Q.12	Q.12	
		Q.13[=]	
	Q.14	Q.14	
Q.15			Q.15

NOTE: The symbol [=] means that the change observed was minimal, suggesting near equivalence between the grand means for the two time periods concerned.

According to the data presented in table 3, the only questions whose levels of agreement (grand means) increased across all three time periods were questions no. 8 and 10. Taken together with the observations that all of the grand means for question no. 8 were above 4.56, increasing to 4.65 for 1999, and that the level of agreement for question no. 10 increased from 3.89 for 1993 to 4.42 for 1999, these data suggest that an embryonic conflict resolution culture developed across the three time periods in the CSCE/OSCE, with progressive increases in a strong belief that, beyond the threatened or actual use of force to “keep the peace,” there was a need to deal with the issues underlying the violent expression of conflict in former Yugoslavia and that, in the overall response to Yugoslav-type conflicts, states and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) should, to the extent possible, work together with humanitarian and conflict resolution NGOs as part of an integrated whole.

Those questions whose levels of agreement increased between 1993 and 1997 (after NATO intervention in Bosnia), but then decreased between 1997 and 1999 (after NATO intervention in Kosovo), were: questions no. 2 (at or above 4.00), 3 (basically “mixed feelings”), 5 (“mixed feelings”), 11 (basically at 4.00) and 15 (under 3.00). Most of these questions dealt with the role of NATO in the post-Cold War world: whether NATO should intervene in Yugoslav-type conflicts; whether it should have intervened earlier in Croatia and Bosnia (and, for the 1999 survey, in Kosovo); whether it—or its creations (NACC [EAPC]/PfP)—should develop into a peace and security system for all former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned; and whether there was a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms to complement what NATO was doing.

After NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in 1995, there was an increase in agreement with NATO’s role along these dimensions, but after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, those levels of support had decreased. Basically, for CSCE/OSCE negotiators, NATO seems to have had a more positive image after its intervention in Bosnia than after its intervention in Kosovo.

The questions whose levels of agreement decreased between 1993 and 1997 (after NATO intervention in Bosnia) and then increased be-

tween 1997 and 1999 (after NATO intervention in Kosovo), were questions no. 1 (all above 4.00), 12 (all near, at, or above 4.00) and 14 (basically “mixed feelings”). These questions concerned the nature of threats to international peace and security in the post-Cold War world.

For instance, after NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in 1995, when CSCE/OSCE negotiators seem to have had a more positive image of NATO, decreases occurred in their level of agreement with the views that (a) Yugoslav-type conflicts would be among the major threats to international peace and security; (b) the Cold War was over; and (c) there was an image developing in the Third World that the end of the Cold War meant only that East-West had been replaced by North-South as the dominant axis of international conflict. By contrast, after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, when CSCE/OSCE negotiators seem to have had a less favorable image of NATO, increases occurred in their levels of agreement with those views.

What is interesting here is that inverse relationships are implied between the three views. When CSCE/OSCE negotiators felt good about NATO (after the Bosnia intervention), they believed that it was (a) less likely that Yugoslav-type conflicts would threaten their security (presumably because of the relative success of NATO’s intervention in Bosnia); (b) less likely that the Cold War was over (perhaps, in part, because of Russia’s war with Chechnya during 1994–1996); and, therefore, (c) less likely that there was a view developing in the Third World that East-West had been eclipsed by North-South as the dominant axis of international conflict.

Conversely, when CSCE/OSCE negotiators felt less good about NATO (after the Kosovo intervention), they believed that (a) Yugoslav-type threats were *more likely*; (b) the Cold War was *more likely* to be over; and, therefore, (c) it was *more likely* that a view was developing in the Third World that the end of the Cold War meant only that East-West had been replaced by North-South as the dominant axis of international conflict. Or, as I have mentioned elsewhere, “It has been almost as if a certain ‘conflict equilibrium’ must be maintained worldwide: when conflict at one level (i.e., *inter-state* [East-West] subsides, it picks up elsewhere” (*intra-state* [former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union] and *inter-state* [North-South]).¹⁸

The questions whose levels of agreement decreased across all three time periods were questions no. 4 (all above 4.00), 6 (“mixed feelings”) and 9 (all above 4.00). Although most of these decreases were minimal to moderate (particularly for questions no. 4 and 9), they seemed to progressively argue in favor of *NATO’s autonomy of action*—that in the “final analysis,” it was NATO and no other organization that finally took the initiative and stopped the clear slaughter of Bosniac Muslims in Bosnia and Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore, because only NATO did this, it should not be constrained in the future by it—or its offshoots (NACC [EAPC]/Pfp)—being subsumed within any other entity (i.e., the CSCE/OSCE) or by having to check first with others before taking action to stop genocide. Further, forceful NATO action just *might* lead to conflict “resolution,” even in the absence of attempts (e.g., by conflict resolution NGOs) to deal with underlying causes.

Levels of agreement for the two questions that were asked only during the 1997 and 1999 surveys, questions no. 7 (“mixed feelings”) and 13 (under 3.00), increased between 1997 and 1999. Hence, there was some increase in the belief that SFOR withdrawal from Bosnia would likely lead to a resumption of warfare between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, corresponding to increases for the same period in the belief that ethnic conflicts would continue to be threats to international peace and security. And, although all disagreed that the issue of NATO enlargement could put at risk the peace developed between East and West in the post-Cold War period, there was a minimal increase in the grand means between 1997 and 1999: perhaps a reaction to the crisis in East-West relations created by the Kosovo intervention.

So, what does the dynamic “moving picture” tell us? First of all, looking also at the breakdowns for each of the five groupings in appendix B for each of the 15 questions,¹⁹ it seems that different actors came down on different issues in different ways at different times. Nevertheless, four patterns emerged:

- (1) the development over time of a conflict resolution culture in the CSCE/OSCE (questions no. 8 and 10);
- (2) a mixed view about the role of NATO and its offshoots (NACC [EAPC]/Pfp) in the post-Cold War world, which was more posi-

tive following NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in 1995 but less so after its intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (questions no. 2, 3, 5, 11, and 15);

- (3) a mixed view about the locus of threats to international peace and security in the post-Cold War world: after NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in 1995, these threats were more likely to emanate from East-West than from Yugoslav-type conflicts and North-South, but after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, they were less likely to come from East-West than from Yugoslav-type conflicts and North-South (questions no. 1, 12, and 14); and
- (4) the development over time of an autonomy-of-NATO culture: a persistence of a realpolitik belief that, in the “final analysis,” forceful NATO intervention may be all that we have for responding to genocidal assaults to human rights in post-Cold War Europe (questions no. 4, 6, and 9).

There is an interesting complexity inherent in these four patterns: the simultaneous development of an idealpolitik-based conflict resolution culture and a realpolitik-based autonomous NATO culture, and between these, mixed feelings on the role of NATO and the locus of threats to international peace and security, with NATO’s interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 having clearly distinguishable impacts on the views of the CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled here.

Consensus and Dissensus

To what extent are the standard deviations (for the grand means), as indicators of consensus, compatible with the above findings? According to the SD data in table 1:

- (a) for 10 of 13 questions (77 percent: questions no. 1-5, 8-11, and 15), consensus was lowest for the 1993 grand means (and highest for only one of the 1993 grand means [question no. 6]);
- (b) for 8 of the 15 questions (53 percent: questions no. 2-3, 5, 7, 9-10, and 12-13), consensus was highest for the 1997 grand means

(and lowest for only one of the 1997 grand means [question no. 14]); and

- (c) for 6 of the 15 questions (40 percent: questions no. 1, 4, 8, 11, and 14-15), consensus was highest for the 1999 grand means (and lowest for four of the 1999 grand means [questions no. 6-7 and 12-13]).

In other words, the least amount of consensus—of community—was recorded for 1993, immediately following the ending of the Cold War; the *greatest amount of consensus* occurred in 1997, two years after NATO and the Dayton peace process brought “negative peace” to Bosnia-Herzegovina—a trend that was arrested somewhat in 1999, immediately following the end of the NATO air war against Serbia over Kosovo. Simply put, there was much more consensus (and therefore, “community”) in 1997 than in 1993, and somewhat more in 1997 than in 1999, which is compatible with our findings that NATO seems to have enjoyed a more positive image with CSCE/OSCE negotiators after its intervention in Bosnia than after its intervention in Kosovo.

One interpretation of these data is that consensus had been developing in a linear manner from 1993 to 1997 but, between 1997 and 1999, the divisiveness generated by the Kosovo conflict—and reactions to it—constituted a minor “blip” on the radar screen, resulting in a dip in consensus during that interval, which could be resolved in due course. This interpretation has been lent considerable weight by the statement by (then acting) Russian president Vladimir Putin, not too long after the NATO bombing campaign that so infuriated the Russians, that he could imagine the Russian Federation becoming a member of NATO:

In an unexpected gesture to the West, [Putin] suggested in a television interview [on 5 March 2000] that Russia would consider joining NATO if the Western alliance agreed to treat Russia as an equal partner. “Why not? Why not?” Putin said when asked by BBC interviewer [Sir] David Frost about Russian membership. “I do not rule out such a possibility... [Given that] Russia is a part of European culture, and I do

not consider my own country in isolation from Europe and from . . . the civilized world, . . . it is with difficulty that I view NATO as an enemy.”²⁰

NATO-FSU Polarity and “Togetherness”

The data in appendix B are further supportive of such a “complex” interpretation; i.e., idealpolitik-based cooperation co-existing with realpolitik-based conflict within a basically cooperative system. For each of the following four issues, for instance, NATO and the FSU are (for at least two of the three time points), polar (or nearly polar) opposites in terms of numerical distance between grand means and/or their rankings:

- (a) whether NATO should have intervened earlier in the Balkans (question no. 3);
- (b) whether NATO will have to continue liaising with its former Warsaw Pact adversaries in dealing with issues of common security (question no. 4);
- (c) whether the NATO-established NACC [EAPC]/PfP could develop into a post-Cold War security system inclusive of all former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned (question no. 5); and
- (d) whether there is a need to deal with the causes and conditions underlying violent conflict (question no. 8).

By contrast, for each of the following 11 issues, NATO and the FSU are (for at least two of the three time points) close together in terms of numerical distance between grand means and/or their rankings:

- (a) whether or not ethnic conflicts will be among the threats to future peace and security (question no. 1);
- (b) whether NATO can respond effectively to such conflicts (question no. 2);
- (c) whether a NATO (NACC [EAPC]/PfP)-based security system

could develop within the context of the CSCE/OSCE (question no. 6);

- (d) whether the withdrawal of SFOR would lead to a resumption of warfare in Bosnia (question no. 7);
- (e) whether *not* addressing the underlying causes and conditions of violent conflict would prevent conflict “resolution” (question no. 9);
- (f) whether coordination is possible between governmental and non-governmental actors in responding to violent ethnic conflict (question no. 10);
- (g) whether there is a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms (question no. 11);
- (h) whether or not the Cold War is over (question no. 12);
- (i) whether NATO enlargement will put East-West relations at risk (question no. 13); and
- (j) whether the developing world perceives (“validly”) that the end of the Cold War means only that East-West has been replaced by North-South as the main front of international conflict (questions no. 14 and 15).

Going further and examining *each* of the 15 questions at each of the three time periods for evidence of either (a) NATO-FSU polarity or (b) NATO-FSU “togetherness” in terms of numerical distance between grand means and/or their rankings, we find the following patterns:

Table 4
NATO-FSU Polarity vs. “Togetherness”

	NATO-FSU Polarity			NATO-FSU Togetherness		
	1993	1997	1999	1993	1997	1999
	Q.1				Q.1	Q.1
				Q.2	Q.2	Q.2
	Q.3		Q.3		Q.3	
	Q.4		Q.4		Q.4	
	Q.5	Q.5	Q.5			
			Q.6	Q.6	Q.6	
					Q.7	Q.7
	Q.8	Q.8	Q.8			
	Q.9				Q.9	Q.9
	Q.10				Q.10	Q.10
	Q.11				Q.11	Q.11
			Q.12	Q.12	Q.12	
		Q.14			Q.13	Q.13
				Q.14		Q.14
	—	—	Q.15	Q.15	Q.15	—
TOTAL	8	3	7	5	12	8

The more complete polarity-togetherness data in table 4 “triangulate” with, and reinforce, the partial polarity-togetherness findings discussed above. Hence, whether we look at partial or all grand means (and their rankings) as indicators of levels of polarity and togetherness between NATO and the FSU or at standard deviations as indicators of overall consensus,

could develop within the context of the CSCE/OSCE (question no. 6);

- (d) whether the withdrawal of SFOR would lead to a resumption of warfare in Bosnia (question no. 7);
- (e) whether *not* addressing the underlying causes and conditions of violent conflict would prevent conflict “resolution” (question no. 9);
- (f) whether coordination is possible between governmental and non-governmental actors in responding to violent ethnic conflict (question no. 10);
- (g) whether there is a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms (question no. 11);
- (h) whether or not the Cold War is over (question no. 12);
- (i) whether NATO enlargement will put East-West relations at risk (question no. 13); and
- (j) whether the developing world perceives (“validly”) that the end of the Cold War means only that East-West has been replaced by North-South as the main front of international conflict (questions no. 14 and 15).

Going further and examining *each* of the 15 questions at each of the three time periods for evidence of either (a) NATO-FSU polarity or (b) NATO-FSU “togetherness” in terms of numerical distance between grand means and/or their rankings, we find the following patterns:

Table 4
NATO-FSU Polarity vs. “Togetherness”

	NATO-FSU Polarity			NATO-FSU Togetherness		
	1993	1997	1999	1993	1997	1999
	Q.1				Q.1	Q.1
				Q.2	Q.2	Q.2
	Q.3		Q.3		Q.3	
	Q.4		Q.4		Q.4	
	Q.5	Q.5	Q.5			
			Q.6	Q.6	Q.6	
					Q.7	Q.7
	Q.8	Q.8	Q.8			
	Q.9				Q.9	Q.9
	Q.10				Q.10	Q.10
	Q.11				Q.11	Q.11
			Q.12	Q.12	Q.12	
					Q.13	Q.13
		Q.14		Q.14		Q.14
	—	—	Q.15	Q.15	Q.15	—
TOTAL	8	3	7	5	12	8

The more complete polarity-togetherness data in table 4 “triangulate” with, and reinforce, the partial polarity-togetherness findings discussed above. Hence, whether we look at partial or all grand means (and their rankings) as indicators of levels of polarity and togetherness between NATO and the FSU or at standard deviations as indicators of overall consensus,

- (a) overall consensus and NATO-FSU togetherness coexisted with dissensus and NATO-FSU polarity across all three time periods; but
- (b) there was, across the three time periods, more of a definite trend toward overall consensus and NATO-FSU togetherness than of overall dissensus and NATO-FSU polarity, thereby suggesting that this was dominant;
- (c) the lowest level of overall consensus *and* highest level of NATO-FSU polarity occurred in 1993 (although polarity and overall consensus were barely less in 1999 than they were in 1993); and
- (d) taken together with the observations that overall consensus was highest and NATO-FSU polarity lowest in 1997, the year of highest NATO-FSU togetherness, then again, it seems that the relatively more “neat” NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 may, in fact, have had a unifying or consensus-strengthening effect on OSCE negotiators, whereas the relatively more “messy” NATO intervention in Kosovo may have had a consensus-diminishing effect.

The Findings Combined

Looking at the various sets of findings together, we can conclude that

- the static portrait of peace and security in post–Cold War Europe, according to the views of CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled here, is interesting, but, again, “static.” Hence, the need for a dynamic picture, indicative of shifts and trends in shifts across the three time periods;
- according to that “dynamic” picture, there seems to have been an increasing “meeting of minds” on idealpolitik as well as realpolitik issues—e.g., a need to deal with the factors underlying violent expressions of conflict, but that if these were not dealt with, this would not necessarily undermine whatever “resolution” potential inheres in forceful (e.g., NATO) intervention alone;

- CSCE/OSCE negotiators seem to have a “love-hate” relationship with NATO and its various offshoots, with the Bosnia intervention in 1995 tilting the respondents toward more positive and the Kosovo intervention in 1999 toward less positive affect;
- there seems, nevertheless, to have been an increasing convergence on the issue of NATO autonomy to do what no other actor wants to or can do: forcefully stop genocidal conflict in post–Cold War Europe;
- there is a mixed picture on the locus of future threats to peace and security in Europe, whether it is Yugoslav-type (ethnic, genocidal) conflicts, East-West, or North-South, depending on whether CSCE/OSCE negotiators feel positive or not so positive about NATO;
- consensus and NATO-FSU togetherness coexisted with dissensus and NATO-FSU polarity across the three time periods, but overall trends were clearly in the direction of consensus and NATO-FSU togetherness, though these dipped a bit after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.²¹

Accordingly, a complex community of values seems to have been developing in the CSCE/OSCE, at least in the minds of some of its practitioners, with conflict (realpolitik = negative peace)²² and cooperation (idealpolitik = positive peace) coexisting in complex ways on various issues (or positions on issues) within a basically cooperative system.²³

An “Issue Paradigm”: Practice and Theory?

This suggests that an issue paradigm—an overarching *metaparadigm* comprising “positive-sum,” common [idealpolitik] security as well as “zero-sum” national [realpolitik] security, instead of a simpleminded expression of Cold War realpolitik—characterizes the CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled here. And what about those of us studying or otherwise interested in European peace and security? Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez made the case nearly 20 years ago:²⁴

Questions of actor agreement lead to the analysis of interaction patterns and the concepts of cooperation and conflict, which constitute [a] major topic of inquiry on the new [*issue paradigm*-based] research agenda. Of course, much of the study of international relations has featured these as central dependent variables, and the assumptions of *realism* reinforced this propensity. Such research has not been misguided, but it has been hampered by the assumption that cooperation and conflict constitute two ends of a single continuum and that behavior is unidimensional. Recent research suggests that this assumption is incorrect, and that *both* cooperation and conflict are *complex* and multifaceted variables...

More significantly from the perspective of an *issue paradigm*, relationships among actors *may vary by individual issue*, so that it is misleading to describe them in terms of any single mix of cooperation and conflict. The existence of separate issues with separate arenas of competition produces the possibility of cross-cutting effects as well as reinforcement of dominant patterns of behavior. A major task of the new research agenda is the analysis of the ways in which linkages among issues serve to dilute overall cooperation or conflict among actors, or produce spirals of one sort or another. Indeed, if issues are sufficiently encapsulated, several *apparently contradictory patterns of interaction may exist at one time among the same contending actors* (emphasis added).

If it is, indeed, the case that “the relations of actors are considerably more *complex* than *realists* had assumed, and [that] cooperation/conflict does not adequately describe this *complexity*” (emphasis added),²⁵ then, to the extent that a predominantly realpolitik worldview characterizes international relations theorists and researchers, reframing on their part may clearly be in order—just to keep up with the perceptions of OSCE practitioners to help them bridge the gap between OSCE image and reality.

Conclusion

An *issue paradigm* encourages scholars to give greater weight to the cognitive processes of elites within actors than has traditionally been the case under the assumptions of *realism*. Rejecting the assumptions that these processes are fixed or that interests are “self-evident,” the new [*issue*] *paradigm* encourages research into the *prospects for restructuring cognitive maps* and the possibility that such restructuring will *intrude upon existing patterns of relations*. Failure and success of existing cognitive maps, for instance, disturb or reinforce the elements of those maps, though in ways that have not been specified by political scientists. Cognitive maps provide actors with *prescriptions* concerning what they should do under different conditions. What processes are initiated if the maps in fact lead to unexpected destinations (e.g., the results of policies of the international community in the Balkans)? Under what conditions are existing maps altered or reinforced? (emphasis added).²⁶

The research undertaken as part of the CSCE/OSCE project reported here has been an attempt not only to explore with CSCE/OSCE negotiators their “cognitive maps,” but to encourage them to rethink them as well, perhaps offering them opportunities to reframe their maps and make them more relevant to “capturing the complexity of conflict” in the post-Cold War world. Gratifyingly, as indicated by the findings reported here and in other reports on the project, such reframing appears to be actually taking place.²⁷

The trick now is for all of us interested in preventing the violent expression of conflict—“future Yugoslavias”—to help translate the developing OSCE *community of values* into a corresponding OSCE *community of institutions*, beyond the otherwise impressive developments that have already taken place,²⁸ such that, to turn Rousseau on his head, “genocidal ethnic wars do not occur—or at least not so frequently—because there are mechanisms for preventing or otherwise dealing with them.”

Adopting the issue paradigm for analysis as well as practice would be one step in that direction. Then, speaking a common language, it would be easier for IR theorists and researchers to work together with OSCE practitioners in bridging the gap between image and reality. One way to do this might be to encourage the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna to establish working groups—comprising members of delegations, the Secretariat, other IGOs, universities, think tanks, and NGOs—to focus on certain issues, such as the often “zero-sum” relationship between self-determination and sovereignty that lies at the heart of many deep-rooted conflicts of the post–Cold War era.

Within such working groups, facilitators could help participants, via creative brainstorming, to conceptually integrate the *realpolitik* (conflict = negative peace) and *idealpolitik* (cooperation = positive peace) issues (or positions on issues) that otherwise coexist in complex ways, as an enhanced basis for operationally integrating the various components of early warning systems and, should they fail, peace operations—comprising state, IGO, NGO (humanitarian and conflict resolution), and other actors—to maximize the fit between OSCE institutions and values.

For the CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled here, the findings indicate that the spirit is willing, but the body is not quite there yet: a challenge not just for academic research but for professional practice as well.

Appendix A

Research Design Details for the 1993, 1997, and 1999 Surveys

CSCE 1993 Survey

During the first survey, conducted in Vienna during June–July 1993, I interviewed 32 (primarily) heads of delegation from 29 of the [then] 53 CSCE participating states:

- (a) *13 NATO states*: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom (*not included*: France, Luxembourg, and Spain);
- (b) *6 neutral and nonaligned states (NNA)*: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Switzerland (*not included*: Cyprus, Holy See, Malta, Monaco, and Sweden);
- (c) *3 former Yugoslav republics (FYug)*: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia (*not included*: Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]);²⁹
- (d) *5 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP)*: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (*not included*: Romania); and
- (e) *2 former Soviet republics (FSU)*: Russian Federation and Ukraine (*not included*: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).³⁰

For a variety of reasons, I was unable to interview individuals from all 53 participating states. Instead, I interviewed persons from *convenience samples*³¹ of the five main groupings, with some samples being more representative than others:

- (a) NSWP: 5/6 (83 percent);
- (b) NATO: 13/16 (81 percent);
- (c) FYug: 3/4 (75 percent);³²
- (d) NNA: 6/11 (55 percent); and
- (e) FSU: 2/15 (13 percent)—the least representative of all.³³

Interviews comprised 15 *closed-ended* and 12 *open-ended* questions.³⁴ The closed-ended questions reflected *Likert scale*-type responses: e.g., SA (strongly agree), A (agree), MF (mixed feelings), D (disagree), and SD (strongly disagree), where SA=5, A=4, MF=3, D=2, and SD=1.³⁵ Hence, the higher an interviewee's score on a particular item, the more in agreement she or he was with that item. To facilitate comparisons between the five groupings, *group mean scores* were computed for each of the 15 closed-ended questions.

The interview schedule or questionnaire reflected basically the *schedule-structured* format, where all interviewees were asked the same questions, with the same wording, and in the same order,³⁶ with the one exception that, on occasion, additional information was provided to some subjects to make a question clearer.³⁷ The interviews were conducted usually in delegation offices and lasted between one and three hours.

OSCE 1997 Survey

During the second survey, conducted in Vienna during May-August 1997, I interviewed 47 (primarily) heads of delegation from 46 of the 55 participating OSCE states:

- (a) *15 NATO states*: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States (*not included*: Iceland);
- (b) *9 neutral and nonaligned states (NNA)*: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Holy See, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Sweden, and Switzerland (*not included*: Monaco, San Marino);

- (c) *4 former Yugoslav republics (FYug)*: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia (*not included*: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY: Serbia and Montenegro]);³⁸
- (d) *6 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP)*: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia; and
- (e) *12 former Soviet republics (FSU)*: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine (*not included*: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).³⁹

Clearly, in terms of representativeness, I did better in 1997 than in 1993:

- (a) NSWP: 6/6 (100 percent);
- (b) NATO: 15/16 (94 percent);
- (c) NNA: 9/11 (82 percent);
- (d) FYug: 4/5 (80 percent); and
- (e) FSU: 12/15 (80 percent).

Although still a convenience sample, 46 interviewed delegations out of 55 OSCE participating states nevertheless represented 84 percent of that population, which was frustratingly close to being a "population sample."⁴⁰

Again, basically schedule-structured interviews, comprising closed- and open-ended questions, were conducted, usually in delegation offices, with interviews running between one and three hours. The closed-ended questions, with some exceptions, were basically the same as those for 1993 (including the Likert-type response structure)—the exceptions dealing with updated revisions of text and recent and future developments such as NATO enlargement and the withdrawal of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) from Bosnia, then planned for June 1998.

OSCE 1999 Survey

During the third survey, conducted in Vienna during June-August 1999, I interviewed 47 (primarily) heads of delegation from 47 of the 55 OSCE participating states:

- (a) *15 NATO states*: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States (*not included*: Iceland);
- (b) *8 neutral and nonaligned states (NNA)*: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Sweden, and Switzerland (*not included*: Holy See, Monaco, San Marino);
- (c) *4 former Yugoslav republics (FYug)*: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia (*not included*: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY: Serbia and Montenegro]);⁴¹
- (d) *6 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP)*: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia;⁴²
- (e) *13 former Soviet republics (FSU)*: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (*not included*: Belarus, Kyrgyzstan); and
- (f) *1 Other*: Albania.⁴³

In terms of representativeness, I did about the same in 1999 as in 1997:

- (a) NSWP: 6/6 (100 percent);
- (b) NATO: 15/16 (94 percent);
- (c) NNA: 8/11 (73 percent);
- (d) FYug: 4/5 (80 percent);
- (e) FSU: 13/15 (87 percent); plus
- (f) on this occasion, I finally succeeded in getting Albania!

Although still a convenience sample, 47 interviewed delegations out of 55 OSCE participating states was 85 percent of that population (a slight improvement over 1997)—again, frustratingly close to being a “population sample.”⁴⁴

Appendix B

The 15 Closed-Ended Questions and Data Specific to Each: Individual Means, "Grand Means," and Standard Deviations

Question 1: "Violent ethnic conflicts, such as those in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, will be among the major threats to international peace and security in the post-Cold War world."

Table B1:
Mean Responses to Question 1

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	4.50 [5]	4.31 [1]	4.40 [1]
NNA	4.67 [3]	3.94 [5]	4.00 [5]
FYug	5.00 [1.5]	4.00 [3.5]	4.25 [3.5]
NSWP	4.60 [4]	4.00 [3.5]	4.25 [3.5]
FSU	5.00 [1.5]	4.17 [2]	4.27 [2]
Grand Mean	4.75	4.08	4.23
StanDev.	.2326	.1527	.1450

NOTE: For Questions 1-15, the *higher the grand mean*, the *more in agreement* respondents were with a question, and the *lower the standard deviation*, the *more consensus* there was among respondents on a question. *Italicized numbers in brackets* refer to rankings for *individual means* for each of the five groupings for each question at each time period (read *vertically* as columns).

Question 2: "NATO can play an effective role in responding to some of these conflicts by providing peacekeeping forces."

Table B2:
Mean Responses to Question 2

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	3.875 [3]	3.90 [5]	4.00 [4]
NNA	3.60 [4]	4.22 [3]	3.625 [5]
FYug	4.33 [2]	4.75 [1]	4.75 [1]
NSWP	4.60 [1]	4.33 [2]	4.50 [2]
FSU	3.50 [5]	4.21 [4]	4.08 [3]
Grand Mean	3.98	4.28	4.19
StanDev.	.4724	.3067	.4408

Question 3: "NATO should have been used earlier in a peacekeeping role in Croatia, Bosnia [and Kosovo]."

Table B3:
Mean Responses to Question 3

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	3.75 [3]	3.94 [2]	3.00 [5]
NNA	3.60 [4]	3.55 [5]	3.375 [4]
FYug	5.00 [1]	5.00 [1]	5.00 [1]
NSWP	3.80 [2]	3.83 [3]	3.50 [3]
FSU	2.50 [5]	3.75 [4]	3.85 [2]
Grand Mean	3.73	4.01	3.75
StanDev.	.8871	.5693	.7645

Question 4: "Whatever peacekeeping role NATO plays in the future, it will have to continue to include its former Warsaw Pact adversaries in dealing with issues of common security."

Table B4:
Mean Responses to Question 4

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	4.50 [2]	3.94 [4]	4.33 [2]
NNA	4.40 [3]	4.44 [2]	4.375 [1]
FYug	4.33 [4]	4.00 [3]	4.00 [3.5]
NSWP	4.60 [1]	4.50 [1]	4.00 [3.5]
FSU	3.00 [5]	3.92 [5]	3.85 [5]
Grand Mean	4.17	4.16	4.11
StanDev.	.6598	.2853	.2294

Question 5: "The Partnership for Peace (PfP) and North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC; replaced later by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC]), established by NATO, could develop into a post-Cold War security system for Europe, inclusive of all the former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned."

Table B5:
Mean Responses to Question 5

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	3.375 [4]	3.09 [5]	2.97 [5]
NNA	3.80 [2]	3.67 [3]	3.875 [1]
FYug	4.00 [1]	3.62 [4]	3.50 [3]
NSWP	3.40 [3]	4.00 [1]	3.33 [4]
FSU	2.50 [5]	3.71 [2]	3.615 [2]
Grand Mean	3.42	3.62	3.46
StanDev.	.5765	.3301	.3372

Question 6: "If the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC; later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC]) do develop into a post-Cold War security system, they should do so within the context of the CSCE [OSCE]."

Table B6:
Mean Responses to Question 6

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	3.94 [2]	3.31 [4]	2.33 [5]
NNA	3.60 [5]	3.55 [2]	3.56 [1]
FYug	3.67 [4]	3.25 [5]	2.50 [4]
NSWP	3.80 [3]	3.67 [1]	3.17 [3]
FSU	4.00 [1]	3.33 [3]	3.23 [2]
Grand Mean	3.80	3.42	2.96
StanDev.	.1706	.1792	.5209

Question 7: "If NATO, PfP, and others participating in SFOR in Bosnia start to withdraw their forces in the near future, then warfare is likely to resume between the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims."

Table B7:
Mean Responses to Question 7

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	—	3.91 [1]	3.47 [4]
NNA	—	3.28 [4]	3.31 [5]
FYug	—	3.25 [5]	3.75 [2]
NSWP	—	3.67 [2]	4.17 [1]
FSU	—	3.58 [3]	3.69 [3]
Grand Mean	—	3.54	3.68
StanDev.	—	.2771	.3264

Question 8: "Beyond the threatened or actual use of force to 'keep the peace,' there is a need to deal with the issues underlying the violent expression of conflict in former Yugoslavia."

Table B8:
Mean Responses to Question 8

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	4.67 [3]	4.75 [2]	4.67 [4]
NNA	4.83 [2]	4.78 [1]	4.75 [2.5]
FYug	4.33 [4]	4.50 [4]	4.75 [2.5]
NSWP	5.00 [1]	4.67 [3]	4.83 [1]
FSU	4.00 [5]	4.17 [5]	4.23 [5]
Grand Mean	4.566	4.574	4.65
StanDev.	.4015	.2507	.2393

Question 9: "Without successfully dealing with the issues underlying the use of violence, external intervention to forcibly keep the warring factions apart will not, by itself, lead to a resolution of the conflict."

Table B9:
Mean Responses to Question 9

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	4.53 [2]	4.25 [2.5]	4.40 [1]
NNA	4.33 [3.5]	4.33 [1]	4.00 [4.5]
FYug	4.33 [3.5]	4.25 [2.5]	4.25 [2]
NSWP	4.60 [1]	4.00 [5]	4.00 [4.5]
FSU	4.00 [5]	4.17 [4]	4.15 [3]
Grand Mean	4.36	4.20	4.16
StanDev.	.2334	.1253	.1710

Question 10: "In the violent (often ethnic-based) conflicts of the post-Cold War world, states and international governmental organizations should, to the extent possible, work together with humanitarian and conflict-resolution NGOs as part of an integrated whole."

Table B10:
Mean Responses to Question 10

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	4.27 [2]	4.06 [2]	4.33 [4]
NNA	3.67 [4]	3.89 [5]	4.375 [3]
FYug	4.33 [1]	4.00 [3.5]	4.50 [2]
NSWP	4.20 [3]	4.00 [3.5]	4.67 [1]
FSU	3.00 [5]	4.33 [1]	4.23 [5]
Grand Mean	3.89	4.06	4.42
StanDev.	.5645	.1650	.1696

Question 11: "While there are many peacekeeping mechanisms, there is a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms."

Table B11:
Mean Responses to Question 11

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	3.73 [3]	3.875 [3]	3.73 [4]
NNA	3.00 [4.5]	3.55 [5]	4.125 [1]
FYug	4.67 [1]	4.75 [1]	4.00 [2.5]
NSWP	4.20 [2]	3.83 [4]	3.33 [5]
FSU	3.00 [4.5]	4.00 [2]	4.00 [2.5]
Grand Mean	3.72	4.00	3.84
StanDev.	.7365	.4499	.3180

Question 12: "Basically, despite the problems faced by President Yeltsin and others in the former Soviet Union, the Cold War is over."

Table B12:
Mean Responses to Question 12

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	4.33 [1.3]	4.00 [1.5]	4.27 [1]
NNA	4.33 [1.3]	4.00 [1.5]	4.00 [3.5]
FYug	4.33 [1.3]	3.75 [5]	4.00 [3.5]
NSWP	4.20 [4]	3.83 [3]	4.17 [2]
FSU	4.00 [5]	3.79 [4]	3.46 [5]
Grand Mean	4.24	3.87	3.98
StanDev.	.1445	.1184	.3128

Question 13: "The issue of NATO enlargement could put at risk the post-Cold War peace that has developed between East and West."

Table B13:
Mean Responses to Question 13

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	—	2.50 [3]	3.00 [1.5]
NNA	—	2.67 [2]	2.875 [3]
FYug	—	2.25 [4]	2.00 [4]
NSWP	—	2.00 [5]	1.50 [5]
FSU	—	2.83 [1]	3.00 [1.5]
Grand Mean	—	2.45	2.48
StanDev.	—	.3308	.6869

Question 14: "There is a perception in the developing world that the 'New World Order' means nothing more than that East-West has been replaced by North-South as the dominant axis of international conflict."

Table B14:
Mean Responses to Question 14

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	4.07 [1]	3.44 [3]	3.53 [3]
NNA	3.67 [4]	3.17 [4]	3.625 [2]
FYug	4.00 [2.5]	3.75 [1]	3.50 [4]
NSWP	3.60 [5]	3.67 [2]	3.67 [1]
FSU	4.00 [2.5]	2.71 [5]	3.23 [5]
Grand Mean	3.87	3.35	3.51
StanDev.	.2160	.4220	.1716

Question 15: "The view that East-West has been replaced by North-South as the dominant axis of international conflict, is an accurate perception."

Table B15:
Mean Responses to Question 15

	1993	1997	1999
NATO	2.40 [3]	2.59 [2]	2.73 [1]
NNA	2.83 [1]	2.55 [3]	2.50 [2]
FYug	2.00 [4.5]	3.00 [1]	2.00 [5]
NSWP	2.00 [4.5]	2.17 [5]	2.17 [4]
FSU	2.50 [2]	2.42 [4]	2.31 [3]
Grand Mean	2.35	2.55	2.34
StanDev.	.3537	.3022	.2842

Notes

1. The CSCE became the OSCE on January 1, 1995. See *CSCE Budapest Document 1994: Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era* (Budapest: December 6, 1994).
2. Previous reports on the project include
 - (a) Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Changing Ideologies in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," in "Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation," special issue of *THE ANNALS* of The American Academy of Political and Social Science 542, (1995): 131–147 (Daniel Druckman and Christopher R. Mitchell, eds.);
 - (b) Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Peace and Security in Post-Cold War Europe: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997," paper presented at the 39th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minn., March 17–21, 1998;
 - (c) Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Toward a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997," paper presented at the 3d Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with the International Studies Association, Vienna, Austria, September 16–19, 1998;
 - (d) Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Preventing Future Yugoslavias: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997," paper presented at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999;
 - (e) Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Peace and Security in Post-Cold War Europe: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 20, no. 2, (2000): 103–129.

3. See *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (Helsinki: August 1, 1975).

4. For an insider's account of the development of the CSCE during the Cold War, see John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973–1975* (Durham, N.C., and London: Duke University Press, 1985). For an "extensive analysis of the origin, development and basic features of the Helsinki process," from 1972 until 1993, see Arie Bloed, ed., *The Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972–1993* (Dordrecht [Netherlands], Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). For an update to 1995, with accompanying official documents, see Arie Bloed's *The Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Basic Documents, 1993–1995* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997). For an analysis of "some features of the emerging security framework [that puts them] into a political, institutional and legal (normative) perspective," with the OSCE as the primary point of departure, see Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas, eds., *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes* (The Hague, London, and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997). For the OSCE's own voice in this regard, see Walter Kemp, Michal Olejarnik, Victor-Yves Ghebali, and Andrei Androsov, eds., *OSCE Handbook*, 3d ed. (Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, March 1999; updated June 2000). For this and other documentation, including the monthly *OSCE Newsletter* and *Secretary General's Annual Report*, contact the OSCE Secretariat (e-mail: info@osce.org; website: <http://www.osce.org>). For other periodic reports on the OSCE, see the *OSCE Review* (published by the Finnish Committee for European Security [STETE]; e-mail: stete@kaapeli.fi) and the *Helsinki Monitor: Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (published by the Netherlands Helsinki Committee [NHC]; FAX: +31-30-30-25-24). Also, see the *OSCE Yearbook* (published since 1995 by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, and in the future by the newly created Centre for OSCE Research [CORE], at the University of Hamburg; e-mail: Schlichting@public.uni-hamburg.de).

5. Among others on this point, see Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956); Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3d ed. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996); and Anatol Rapoport, *Conflict in Man-Made Environment* (Harmondsworth [Middlesex, England] and Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1974).

6. See P. Terrence Hopmann, "Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Peaceworks*, no. 31 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, September 1999) and "The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Its Contribution to Conflict Prevention and Resolution," in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds., *International Conflict Resolution: After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000).

7. In this regard, see, for instance, the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* (Paris: November 21, 1990); *CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change* (Helsinki: July 10, 1992); *OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, 18–19 November '99* (Istanbul: OSCE, November 19, 1999); and *OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18–19 November '99: Charter for European Security* (Istanbul: OSCE, November 19, 1999).

8. Further *research design* information on the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys can be found in appendix A.

9. The five CSCE/OSCE groupings are (1) NATO; (2) neutral and nonaligned (NNA); (3) former Yugoslavia (FYug); (4) Eastern and Central European, or "Non-Soviet Members of the Warsaw Pact" (NSWP); and (5) former Soviet Union (FSU).

10. See Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191.

11. See Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science* (Scranton [Penn.]: Chandler, 1964), 164–165. These changes could also be viewed as profound discontinuities, catastrophic

shifts, or as "benchmarks." See Kalevi J. Holsti, "The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory," *Working Paper No. 26* (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, December 1998).

12. See Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 371.

13. See *ibid.*

14. The 15 closed-ended questions and results specific to each are presented in appendix B.

15. See John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 27 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 264, 268, 308.

16. Cited in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the state and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 232.

17. See Vasquez, 1993, *op cit.*, 308.

18. See Dennis J.D. Sandole, *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era* (London and New York: Pinter [Cassell/Continuum International], 1999), p. 134.

19. Whenever a researcher talks about the *micro* (or "disaggregated") level—in our case, the five groupings of CSCE/OSCE membership *taken individually*—on the basis of *macro* (or "aggregated") data—i.e., our "grand means" across the five groupings *taken together*—there may be some probability that the *ecological fallacy* has been committed (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, *op cit.*, 54–55). This fallacy would occur in our case if I assumed, *erroneously*, that shifts in the "grand means" corresponded to shifts in the *individual means*. This may, indeed, be the case in our study, but only for questions no. 5 and 10 for 1993–1997

where, for each question, three of the five *individual means decreased*, whereas the “grand mean” *increased*, from 1993 to 1997.

20. See David Hoffman, “Putin Says ‘Why Not?’ to Russia Joining NATO,” *Washington Post*, March 6, 2000, A16.

21. The overall trend continues as of this writing, with the apparent NATO-FSU “togetherness” in response to former President Clinton’s decision not to deploy a contentious missile defense system. See Paisley Dodds, “Putin, NATO Allies Praise Missile Defense Decision,” *Washington Post*, September 2, 2000, A15.

22. While *negative peace* deals with the absence—either through prevention or cessation—of violent conflict, *positive peace* deals with the elimination of the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict that can be, or have been, expressed violently (see Galtung, 1969, op cit.).

23. As I have discussed elsewhere, such “complexity” is not about realpolitik or idealpolitik, but about *both*. See Sandole, *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict*, op cit., ch. 8. On *complexity theory*, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York and London: Simon and Schuster, 1992).

24. See Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 77–78.

25. See *ibid.*, 80.

26. See *ibid.*, 79.

27. For example, the findings generated by the project’s initial analyses of responses to the *open-ended* questions for 1993 and 1997 indicate an *increasing need* for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, and for complementarity and coordination among actors involved in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, in order to prevent “fu-

ture Yugoslavias.” See Sandole, “Preventing Future Yugoslavias: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997,” op cit.

28. Among others in this regard, see Bothe, et al. (1997), *OSCE Handbook* (1999/2000), and other items in note 4, plus Terrence Hopmann (1999, 2000) in note 6.

29. Although a member of the CSCE, the “rump” Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro) was banned from attending all meetings of the CSCE at the end of the 4th CSCE review conference in Helsinki, on July 8, 1992, because of its (particularly Serbia’s) responsibility for fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia.

30. Germany, Italy, and the United States each made two representatives available for interview. Among the remaining states in the sample, one representative from each was interviewed. Hence, 29 CSCE participating states in the sample plus 3 additional interviewees = a total of 32 interviewees. Twenty-three of these (72 percent) were heads of delegation).

31. See Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, op cit., 183-184.

32. The remaining successor republic of the former Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although not yet a member of the CSCE, had “observer” status by the summer of 1993.

33. Many of the successor states of the former Soviet Union did not have CSCE delegations in Vienna by summer 1993 or, if they did, they were usually “one-man shows” representing their governments at various levels (e.g., to the state of Austria and the United Nations in Vienna as well as to the CSCE), and therefore, their representatives were generally unavailable for interview. This was also the case with other CSCE participating states that were not represented in Vienna (e.g., Malta) or, if they were, their busy representatives were not available for interview (e.g., Albania). (Albania, incidentally, does not belong to any of the five main groupings.)

34. See Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, op cit., 253–255).

35. See *ibid.*, 465–467.

36. See *ibid.*, 232–237.

37. All interviews were conducted in English. With the exception of the American, British, and Canadian representatives, for whom English was their native tongue, the representatives spoke English as *one* of their foreign languages. Some of these individuals requested additional information “in English” for a particular question to be made clearer to them. On the assumption that this provision of additional information on an ad hoc basis could have contaminated and undermined the *comparability* of responses between individuals to the same item, as partial checks interviewees were invited to explain their SA-SD answers in an open-ended fashion—“in the margin,” so to speak—as well as to respond to the 12 open-ended questions, many of which overlapped with the closed-ended ones.

38. The FRY remained banned from attending all meetings of the OSCE because of its (particularly Serbia’s) role in fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia, a situation that continued with the brutal Serbian repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

39. I interviewed one person from each participating state in the overall sample, with the exception that the U.S. delegation had two persons available for interview (hence, 47 persons from 46 participating states). Thirty-seven (79 percent) of the interviewees were heads of delegation. *Two persons in the 1997 sample were present in the 1993 sample.*

40. As in 1993, I was unable to reach certain participating states, because they either were not represented in Vienna (e.g., Andorra, the newest OSCE member) or, if they were, were represented by busy delegations (e.g., Kazakhstan). I succeeded in contacting some delegations, even talking with their ambassadors, but for a variety of reasons, was

unable to conduct interviews (e.g., Albania, Tajikistan). (Andorra, like Albania, is not a member of any of the five main groupings.)

41. The FRY remained banned from attending all meetings of the OSCE because of its (particularly Serbia’s) role in fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia, a situation that, again, continued with the brutal Serbian repression of Kosovar Albanians.

42. Although the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had been admitted to NATO in April 1999, for purposes of comparison with the observations generated by the 1993 and 1997 surveys, I retained them in the NSWP category.

43. I interviewed one person from each participating state in the overall sample (hence, 47 persons from 47 participating states). Thirty-eight (81 percent) of the interviewees were heads of delegation. *Nineteen persons in the 1999 sample (40 percent) were present in the 1997 sample.*

44. As in 1993 and 1997, I was unable to reach certain participating states, because they either were not represented in Vienna (e.g., Andorra and Iceland) or, if they were, were represented by busy delegations (e.g., Belarus).