



Center for Conflict Analysis
and Resolution

Working Paper 2

Group Violence in America

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Contents

About the Author	v
About the Center	vi
Foreword	vii
Group Violence in America	1
Consensus Scholarship and Historical Amnesia	1
Violence and Progress	5
The Structure of Particularized Rebellion	8
Responding to Particularized Rebellion	10
The Future of Domestic Rebellion	12
Some Implications for Conflict Resolution	18
Notes	23

About The Author: Richard E. Rubenstein

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Rubenstein was educated at Harvard College, Oxford University, and Harvard Law School. Before joining the faculty at George Mason University, he was successively a practicing lawyer, professor of political science at Roosevelt University in Chicago, and professor of law at Antioch School of Law in Washington, D.C. He has been an advisory consultant to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, assistant director of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, and visiting professor of American studies at the University of Provence in Aix-en-Provence, France.

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About The Center

The Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University has as its principal mission to advance the understanding and resolution of significant and persistent human conflicts among individuals, groups, communities, identity groups, and nations. To fulfill this mission, the center works in four areas: academic programs consisting of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a Master of Science (M.S.) in Conflict Management; research and publication; a clinical service program offered through the Conflict Clinic, Inc., center faculty, and senior associates; and public education.

Associated with the center are three major organizations that promote and apply conflict resolution principles. These are the Conflict Clinic, Inc., mentioned above; the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED), a network organization; and the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), offering conferences and workshops.

Major research interests include the study of deep-rooted conflicts and their resolution; the exploration of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in a range of community, national and international settings.

Outreach to the community is accomplished through the publication of books and articles, public lectures, conferences, and special briefings on the theory and practice of conflict resolution. As part of this effort, the center's Working Papers offer both the public at large and professionals in the field access to critical thinking flowing from faculty, staff, and students at the center. The Working Papers are presented to stimulate critical consideration and discussion of important questions in the study of human conflict.

Foreword

“Group Violence in America: The Fire Next Time?” is the second working paper of the Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.

Both writings will come as a surprise to those who think of conflict resolution as being essentially a process, a process by which parties to conflicts are brought together and helped to transform their relationships. In fact, conflict resolution, as defined by the center in its Mission Statement, is more than a process. It is an approach to social relationships at all levels of interaction, from the family to the international, that seeks to take into account inherent human aspirations and needs of development, and that seeks to isolate those environmental constraints, political, social, and economic, which frustrate the attainment of such development.

With such a perspective, conflict resolution is by definition a challenge to conventional approaches to public policies, in that its focus is on the person, not on institutions, except to the extent that institutions should be adapted to the needs of persons.

This raises the time-honored question of the individual and the social good. But that question has in the past been posed by those who have an interest in the preservation of institutions in order to justify their positions. Now the question is being posed more to tilt the balance in favor of the person.

It was for this reason that the first working paper posed the question whether conflict resolution was a political philosophy. Given that it is concerned with resolving deep-rooted conflicts, that is, conflicts over fundamental human needs for identity and recognition that emerge, for example, in ethnic and class struggles, and given that it recognizes that such resolution may be possible only through structural change and fundamental policy changes, it follows that conflict resolution is in the arena of political analysis and change.

Let it be noted that this does not make it “liberal” or “conservative,” “right” or “left.” These terms are meaningless when applied to conflict resolution. Conflict resolution is conservative in that it seeks to preserve and to promote those social values that make civilizations possible, but it also recognizes that unless certain human needs are met, there can be no social stability. Societies will be destroyed by their own inner violence.

This present working paper by Richard E. Rubenstein starts with the political realities: a historically violent America. He makes a deep analysis of the nature and sources of this violence. Groups seeking their identity, in a political-social environment that denies it to important sections of the population, evolve their own means. Since there is no way in which those seeking their identity can come together and organize at a national level, they adopt means which are within their grasp: local organization and, frequently, local violence.

There being no means of imposing law and order from the top, Rubenstein, having described the nature of the problem, explores means of dealing with it. He finally arrives at

the question posed in a theoretical framework in the first working paper: can analytical problem solving conflict resolution techniques cope with this group-dominated, violent America? Perhaps another paper can seek to answer this question by describing the institutionalization of conflict resolution that would be required, and how precisely the processes would be applied.

Provocative, yes. Important, yes. Pointing to the future, yes. An extension of the center's Mission Statement, yes. And for these reasons the center faculty, staff, and students appreciate the contribution made by Richard Rubenstein in this working paper.

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Group Violence in America

Contrary to the assumptions of "consensus scholarship," the United States has experienced frequent outbreaks of civil violence by and against domestic groups seeking satisfaction of their basic needs and interests. In form, out-group violence has tended to be spontaneous, collective, and of relatively low intensity; in content, it has generally aimed at securing group identity, recognition, and development. Rebellious groups in America often behave like nations seeking independence or local autonomy. Especially during periods of multi-group revolt, the response of the authorities has been to combine violent repression with political recognition in an effort to admit "responsible" group members to positions of influence.

Although out-group needs remain unsatisfied, a number of factors are presently inhibiting a revival of massive group rebellion. Nevertheless, particularly in view of the failure of traditional reform methods to alter the conditions of life of the growing American underclass, the prognosis is for further violence, perhaps of a less restrained type. This in turn poses the risk of greatly intensified repression. It therefore becomes essential to develop new methods of conflict resolution capable of exposing and dealing with the root causes of group violence in the United States.

Consensus Scholarship and Historical Amnesia

The tumultuous decade that began with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and ended with the resignation of President Richard Nixon took most Americans by surprise. Students of American history and society were, on the whole, as unprepared as any other group for the racial uprisings, student revolts, volatile antiwar demonstrations and state violence of the period. Social scientists—not ordinarily a reticent group—were rendered temporarily speechless by events that seemed to contradict fundamental, widely held and cherished assumptions about the nature of American society. In 1968, the year of the Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy assassinations, the Chicago and Washington racial uprisings, and the Democratic National Convention rioting, Clifford Geertz confessed that American social scientists did not understand the causes of domestic political violence. "Domestic disorder," he wrote, "is a product of a long sequence of particular events whose interconnections our received categories of self-understanding are not only inadequate to reveal but are designed to conceal."¹

Geertz's dismay reflected the failure of consensus scholarship, the dominant school of American social thought in the postwar period, to predict or explain the disorders of the sixties. For years, leading scholars had insisted that the United States was a pluralistic society characterized by shared social and political values and a "genius" for compromise.² American society, they held, was blessed by a blurring of divisions between a multiplicity of economic, social, political, and ethnic groups. For one reason or another—either because the land was

fertile and the people hard-working, or because no true aristocracy or proletariat ever developed on American soil, because the United States was a nation of immigrant groups, or because the two-party system worked so well—any sizeable domestic group could gain its share of power, prosperity, and respectability merely by playing the game according to the rules.³ In the process, the group itself would gradually lose coherence and be incorporated into the great middle class. The result, the scholars said, was a pattern of economic, social, and political mobility and stability unique in world history. In America, rising domestic groups had not been driven to violence, nor had the “ins” generally resorted to excessive force to keep them “out.” The conclusion drawn by many was that the United States, having mastered the art of peaceful change, could in good conscience presume to lead the world.⁴

Not surprisingly, the spectacles of ghetto areas aflame, policemen hunting down Black Panthers and mauling student protesters, and gunmen murdering popular leaders produced some reevaluation of the optimistic premises of consensus scholarship. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Report), published in 1967, was a major intellectual as well as political event of the period; it declared that the policies of racial integration pursued actively by the federal government since World War Two had failed, and that racial violence was a product of the division of America into “two societies,” one white and one black.⁵ Two years later, the more comprehensive staff reports of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Eisenhower Commission) documented the history of crime and political violence in the United States,⁶ and reflected on what now seemed endemic problems of racism,⁷ police brutality,⁸ abuse of and disrespect for legal procedures,⁹ political rigidity,¹⁰ popular propensity towards the use of firearms,¹¹ and political assassination.¹² With the tempo of violent conflict rising through the early 1970s, some injudicious scholars (myself among them) saw the social tremors of the period as heralding a major earthquake. They predicted the death of consensus, and a transition from conflict between segmented “out-groups” and local authorities to more massive, popularly based struggles between larger groupings (e.g., social classes) and the state.¹³ In all of this, there was a strong flavor of “anti-exceptionalism.” That is, it seemed that America had become as afflicted by historically rooted social problems as the Old World, and might as readily produce revolutionary or reactionary alternatives to the collapsed consensus.¹⁴

Yet even while talk of revolution filled the lecture halls, most of the serious scholarly work of the period focused in less apocalyptic fashion on what might, after all, prove only a temporary breakdown of civic norms. There was, in fact, little concerted effort to replace the consensus model of American society and politics with any other model. The most important theoretical contribution of the decade was the general theory of political violence put forward by Ted R. Gurr in 1970, which saw group violence as the predictable outcome of a widening gap between a group’s “value expectations” and the political system’s “value capabilities.”¹⁵

This theory of relative deprivation was well-documented on a trans-national basis.¹⁶ It was politically neutral, although its subtext, so to speak, was liberal in the broad sense that it could be interpreted as placing primary responsibility for disintegration on systems rather than on deviant groups. Having awakened legitimate expectations of group progress, those who failed to deliver the promised satisfactions could expect trouble.

As a predictor of group violence, relative deprivation seemed a useful theory. As a guide to action once violence had erupted, its utility was less apparent. What type or degree of reform or coercion (if any) would terminate a group rebellion? If the expanded American system could not satisfy lower-class expectations, could it simply lower them?¹⁷ Would American blacks be satisfied, for example, if new opportunities were offered to politicians, business people, and professionals of color? Would state coercion itself, applied with great intensity to selected groups of militants, have the effect of dampening the expectations of the less militant?¹⁸ In the 1970s such questions were answered affirmatively in practice. Like most of the other theoretical efforts of the era, then, relative deprivation left the consensus model, which assumed a high degree of popular malleability, systemic adaptability, and state control, still standing.

Indeed, the 15 years of relative social peace that followed the end of the Indochina War seemed to demonstrate precisely those characteristics. *Popular malleability*: the wave of racial protest peaked with the passage of civil rights and voting rights legislation and the opening up of new opportunities to the black middle class. *Systemic adaptability*: a Republican president ended the war in Southeast Asia, and with it the major manifestations of the "youth revolt." *State control*: the intelligence agencies and police proved quite capable of severing the connections between militant groups and the masses, and of co-opting, imprisoning, or killing their most volatile leaders. In fact, it seemed that the American consensus, like some giant amoeba, had simply reached out and engulfed the rebellious groups and their official adversaries alike. While Richard Nixon toasted Mao Tsetung in Peking and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, partisans of the New Left found their political ideas rejected by the same public that avidly consumed their cultural products. In 1972, the Democratic Party, having allowed itself to be taken over by the intruders, suffered a crushing defeat. By 1976 (after absorbing most of the newcomers), it had recrystallized around its old political axis and regained the presidency.

To be sure, American society since the early 1970s has been peaceful only in the sense that it has been relatively free of major riots, civil disorders, and assassinations. Anomic individual violence (particularly crime), state violence (particularly against the underclass), and what Johan Galtung calls "structural violence" have, if anything, intensified.¹⁹ Nevertheless, with the decline in violent or violence-provoking mass protest, the prevailing view in scholarly as well as popular circles is that, the period of disorder having ended, a "normal" state of consensus has been restored. Once again, it is considered realistic to assume that American society lacks the potential for serious internal conflict involving mass violence.

This assumption, it seems to me, is an example of historical amnesia.

Psychologists and biologists have taught us much about the individual capacity to “forget” painful experiences. Social thinkers might add, by analogy, that large groups—even whole societies—can alter or obliterate disturbing memories of violence and social disorder. American society, which has endured frequent outbursts of mass political violence, seems to have a high propensity for historical amnesia. Particularly when levels of group conflict have declined, stormier eras fade in the imagination; we are easily led to believe that the lull that surrounds us is the norm, and lightning flashes of violence the rare exception. Thus, in the late 1970s, the dramatic disorders of the recent past already seem frozen in time, stock footage for a television documentary on “The Turbulent Sixties.” Selective memory sanctifies the non-violent Martin Luther King, Jr., but “forgets” the martyrdom of more threatening figures. Who now celebrates the birthday of Malcolm X, or remembers that there was such a man as Fred Hampton of Illinois?²⁰

A variation on this theme is the tendency to remember only the most recent episodes of political violence. Since these have ended, one can then assume that the period of conflict was exceptional, and that a normal state of social peace has been restored. Similarly, in order to account for episodes of political violence without abandoning belief in a norm of peaceful progress, rebellious groups and individuals may be described as exceptions to the rule, that is, as deviant social formations and personalities. During the period of racial disorders, for example, conservatives attributed political violence involving blacks to peculiar mental or moral characteristics of that group, while liberals discussed the uniqueness of black history, the heritage of slavery, and the prevalence of racial discrimination.

In a study of racial and ethnic groups in New York City, published an embarrassingly short time before the outbreak of ghetto rioting, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued that urban blacks were basically similar to white ethnic groups that had risen from the social depths without resorting to intense or prolonged group violence or radical, antisystem politics. Following the occurrence of such violence and such politics, they reissued the book with a lengthy introduction explaining that their miscalculation was based on an understandable failure to predict that blacks would choose to act in a deviant manner, by following irresponsible “militants” rather than more realistic traditional leaders.²¹ Such reasoning, in essence, attributes serious social disorder to characteristics of the group rather than the social and political system. Like historical amnesia, it refuses to recognize that political violence in the United States has been frequent and widespread: as American, as H. Rap Brown put it, as cherry pie.

In what follows, I want to argue first that the attack on consensus theory has succeeded: the myth of peaceful progress has been buried and is beyond resurrection. Next, I want to explore some of the apparent structural limitations on American domestic violence. If these

limitations persist, domestic violence will remain particularized, and consensus theory can be restated in an expanded form. Under these circumstances, that is, political violence of a certain type can be considered part of the system, either playing an overall stabilizing role,²² or representing an acceptable cost of doing business and politics, American-style.²³ In conclusion, however, I will contend that prior structural restraints on the types and intensity of domestic rebellion are likely to prove ineffective in the future. Paradoxically, the very forces militating against a revival of low-intensity mass violence may be opening the door to rebellion of a less inhibited type.

Violence and Progress

Whether in academia or in the streets, reactions to modern outbreaks of political violence testify to a widely held belief that such episodes are “un-American”—rare occurrences in our national life bearing little significant relationship to the way domestic groups have succeeded in gaining political power, property, or prestige. The authorities frequently attribute such outbreaks to a few evil schemers (in President Lyndon Johnson’s words, “mean and willful men”), or to a lawless, anarchic mob run amok (the interpretation of the Watts uprising by the California Governor’s Commission). Not surprisingly, those most vociferous in denouncing the violent few are often those who believe that *their* ethnic, economic, or occupational groups “made it” in America without resorting to violence. This assumption is open to objection on two counts. First, historical study suggests that American society has experienced regular episodes of serious mass violence directly related to the social, political, and economic objectives of domestic out-groups and to the maintenance of their identities. Second, if “making it” means controlling capital and wielding significant political power, few domestic groups can be said to have reached this level despite their participation in violent rebellions.

In an earlier work,²⁴ I described a series of internal rebellions in which violence on a significant scale was resorted to or directed against domestic identity groups. The catalogue included Native American uprisings, white settler-Indian conflict, and state violence against American Indians;²⁵ farmer revolts, including the Wars of the Regulators, the War of the New Hampshire Grants, Shays Rebellion, and the Whiskey, Fries, and Green Corn Rebellions;²⁶ civil strife associated with the American Revolution;²⁷ slave revolts, white Southern rebellion, and civil disorders associated with the Civil War;²⁸ the successful campaign of terrorism waged by white supremacist groups in the Reconstruction South;²⁹ riots, lynchings, mob actions, and abuses of power connected with nativist-immigrant conflict;³⁰ 60 years of intense labor-management violence;³¹ a century of racial conflict, ranging from lynchings and pogroms to intercommunal riots and anti-authority uprisings;³² civil strife associated with

foreign wars;³³ and state violence directed against ethnic, racial, and political minorities.³⁴ The sheer quantity of civil violence associated with these movements of rebellion and repression is impressive (or, if you will, horrifying), but what is most striking about these conflicts is their relationship to the political goals of rebellious or repressive groups.

The episodes just referred to provide a data base against which one may evaluate the most important implication of the myth of peaceful progress: the notion that mass violence in the United States has been both unnecessary and useless. The proposition is false no matter how one interprets it. It is false if it means that the established machinery for political and economic advancement has permitted all major out-groups to move nonviolently up the sociopolitical ladder. On the contrary, most groups that have engaged in mass violence have done so only after a long period of fruitless, relatively nonviolent struggle in which established procedures were tried and were found unavailing. For reasons we will explore, American institutions seem far better designed to facilitate the assimilation of group leaders into existing political and economic structures than to liberate their constituents en masse.

Similarly, the proposition is false if it means that the established order is self-transforming, or that groups in positions of power will share power with outsiders without being threatened by actual or potential violence. The Appalachian farmer revolts, as well as urban rioting in sympathy with the French Revolution, were used by Jeffersonians to create a two-party system over the horrified protests (and attempted legal repression) of the Federalists. Northern violence ended the southern slave empire, and southern terrorism terminated Radical Reconstruction. Federal recognition of labor unions was granted in the midst of a depression, during a wave of violent strikes that provoked widespread fear of revolution. And urban blacks made their greatest legislative gains during the racial strife of the 1960s.

It is important, of course, not to misuse this information by asserting that group violence "works." This would be to create a new myth—a myth of violent progress—that could easily be refuted by citing examples of violence without progress, like the American Indian revolts, and progress with little violence, like enactment of federal farm legislation by the New Deal. The historical record suggests that some episodes of domestic rebellion have generated political reforms, but it also demonstrates that mass political violence in America has seldom been revolutionary in effect, although it has often seemed so to contemporary observers. Indeed, typical forms of domestic violence share many of the characteristics associated with what Eric Hobsbawm has termed "primitive rebellion."³⁵

While demanding changes in the distribution of goods, opportunities, or local power, domestic revolts have not generally threatened to transform the social system or to displace a ruling class. (The great exception to this rule, of course, was the Civil War, which Barrington Moore justly calls "the last capitalist revolution.")³⁶ On the contrary, in studying these outbreaks, one becomes conscious of a correspondence between the forms of power wielded

by America's rulers and the forms of rebellion resorted to by aggrieved groups seeking inclusion in the national consensus. The correspondence is symbolized, perhaps, by the chant of the antiwar demonstrators at the Democratic Party Convention of 1968 in Chicago: "The whole world is watching!" Like the Democratic leaders meeting in convention to nominate Hubert Humphrey for president, those involved in the convention riots addressed themselves to the television audience. Their goal was not to overthrow the government, but to expose it as violent in order to persuade a nation of passive onlookers of the necessity for reform.³⁷ How different was the student rebellion of May 1968 in Paris, which, coordinated with wildcat strikes, aimed at persuading workers to break with the Communist Party and to overthrow the government of Charles de Gaulle!³⁸

Discarding the myth of peaceful progress, then, one sees that violent politics have played a significant role in American political history. It is equally true, however, that much of this violence has been consistent, both in form and content, with established structures of national power. The "norm" in American politics has not been peaceful progress, but nonviolent *and* violent reformism. Perhaps this is why episodes of political disorder—even serious, long-lasting periods of strife—fade so quickly in the memory. When a violent era ends, scholars tend to celebrate both the reforms generated during the period and the restoration of consensus. The impression given is not that violent reformism is an American political tradition, but that the violence was secondary, historically insubstantial, so to speak, and ultimately unnecessary.

Thus, the resignation of President Richard Nixon, the prosecution of his confederates, and the accession of Vice-President Ford to the presidency in 1974 were widely held to vindicate the norm of peaceful progress. It would have been more accurate, however, to describe the Watergate episode as representative of a tradition of factional violence involving abuses of state power by cliques of politicians and businessmen. Since this sort of violence is seldom revolutionary either in intent or in effect, one easily forgets or ignores its normality, and remembers only that it was suppressed, and that the political system was "vindicated." But what an odd form of vindication! It is almost like asserting that the tenth or twentieth conviction of a habitual criminal vindicates the norm of legality. This reasoning effectively distracts attention not only from the quantity of domestic political violence, but from its persistence and regularity—its significance as an aspect of the political norm. Even now, many consider the Watergate debacle an anomaly in the context of American history, although the activities of the more recent Iran-Contra conspirators clearly bear comparison with those of the Nixon gang.³⁹ Focusing attention on "successful" system-responses to violence disables one from predicting its recurrence or anticipating the development of new forms of civil conflict. This may be one reason for our perennial astonishment at new outbreaks of group violence or factional criminality: consensus theory leads one to assume that the latest rebellion or abuse of

power was the last, and that the current consensus is permanent.

The Structure of Particularized Rebellion

Considering the sheer volume of political violence in American history, one of the most striking characteristics of out-group rebellion has been its predominant localism. Rarely have domestic groups in revolt attacked the powers-that-be at their source. Appalachian farmers mounted no Tet Offensive against eastern cities; they merely shut down local courts and drove tax collectors out of their territory. Southern terrorists did not attempt to overthrow the government in Washington (in fact, the 1868 Constitution of the KKK declared its allegiance to the U.S. government). They simply murdered, silenced, or expelled their enemies from the South, and reasserted by force their dominion over native blacks. Labor violence was usually aimed at strikebreakers and Pinkertons, company property and local police. Although class conflict tended to spread from locality to locality and from industry to industry, violent confrontations generally remained localized and uncoordinated. Similarly, most urban immigrant groups fighting each other or the cops, or looting some "outsider's" store, did not dream of establishing a Paris Commune in America. To establish control over their own territories seemed utopian enough. This pattern persisted through the 1960s. Although authorities feared a nationalization of black and student rebellion, ghetto and campus uprisings remained both internally and externally uncoordinated. Those resorting to more systematic and planned attacks on the system were a small minority, easily crushed by superior force, while mass violence was characteristically riotous, tending to "burn itself out" at the level of local protest rather than sparking a more general conflagration.

This does not mean that episodes of group violence have been evenly or randomly distributed over the course of American history. On the contrary, they seem to cluster during periods of rapid change and disorder like the 1790s, 1850s and 1860s, 1890s, 1930s, and 1960s—periods that also coincide with the breakup of one national governing coalition and the formation of another.⁴⁰ The fact that group rebellions, although particular, come in waves makes their occurrence especially shocking to contemporaries, and suggests dangerous coordination to their opponents. (The FBI's all-out offensive against Black Power and antiwar groups of the 1960s and early 1970s apparently proceeded on the basis of such a coordination theory.)⁴¹ Nevertheless, the rarity of coordinated group revolts suggests that much domestic violence expresses the interests and needs of specific identity groups rather than a more general interest in system-change. Indeed, rebellious groups in the United States more often conceive of themselves as nations within the nation, cultural entities struggling for some form of self-determination, than economic entities linked organically to some larger national or international group. It is as if, given the size and diversity of the United States, the domestic

political system operated like an international system, essentially anarchic and dominated by the norm of self-help.

Thus, the immediate causes of many domestic revolts are acts carried out by agents of central authority on an identity group's "territory." Mass violence, in such cases, is a spontaneous response to "foreign invasion" intended to expel the representatives of authority and their local collaborators from the territory. Typically, the rebel leadership aims at replacing locally dominant outsiders with indigenous leaders, a goal that leads more logically to decentralization (or, in extreme cases, secession) than to a struggle for power at the center.

For this reason, the ideology of domestic rebellion seldom includes plans for a transformation of politics or economics at a national level. The usual function of such ideology is to defend group identity, intensify group consciousness, and describe those changes necessary to maximize group dignity and power *within* the existing national framework. Moreover, ideological explanations and prescriptions generally follow rather than precede violent revolts. An illustration is the ideology of Black Power, created after the uprisings of 1964-1968 had occurred in northern ghettos.⁴² This style of political thinking, which attempts to mobilize a group's violent potential for essentially reformist ends, may become revolutionary in effect when diverse identity groups discover a common identity; in American history, this is illustrated by the secessionist movements of the 1770s and 1860s. Nevertheless, ideologies that intensify ethnic, racial, religious, or occupational group consciousness militate naturally against the formation of coalitions based on ties of class or ideology. Those seeking to discover why Americans have not developed revolutionary class consciousness will have to focus not merely on the American system's capacity for change, but on the forces driving the members of oppressed domestic groups desperately to assert and defend particularized cultural identities.

The traditional weapons of domestic revolt are similarly directed to the end of assertion and defense of group identity. Looting, arson, beating or intimidation of persons, threats and whisper campaigns (ostracism), as well as occasional use of arms, are generally aimed at ridding the community of group enemies and silencing "collaborators." Intimidation has always been a tactic of domestic insurgents. A man ridden out of town on a rail will seldom return; neither will a merchant burned out of a ghetto, nor a member of a despised political group denied employment and social contacts. Moreover, although central authority is seldom attacked directly, the use of such weapons sometimes forces the authorities to respond by "invading" the identity group's territory, thereby solidifying resistance and escalating the level of violence. The authorities often prefer a strategy of containment, attempting to seal off rebellion and to isolate rebel groups, to a more aggressive response. Where this strategy is not practicable, however, and an "occupation" of rebel territory occurs, the level of violence rises sharply. The presence of an occupying army may prove (as it did in the Reconstruction South) an invitation to more selective and aggressive acts of revolt.

Many domestic revolts, conceived as defensive responses to outside aggression, have retained their localistic, autonomy-oriented character even after serious escalation has taken place. The prerequisites for this type of revolt seem to be a fairly high level of group coherence, usually based on a shared cultural heritage, a tangible threat to group identity and perceived interests, and some territory that can be claimed for the group and protected against outside invasion. This sheds some light, perhaps, on the unusual history of the American labor movement, which remained for the most part nonrevolutionary despite participation in a long series of bloody battles with the authorities. Constantly replenished (and undermined) by waves of foreign immigration and domestic migration, the domestic working class lacked both cultural homogeneity and claimable territory—weaknesses consciously exploited by employers to keep the movement weak and divided. On the other hand, in the “Irish” anthracite fields of Pennsylvania, the “Italian” factory districts of New England, or the isolated timber and mining communities of the West, a stronger sense of group identity could emerge, and there was territory that could be protected, to some extent, against scab and police invasion. Here, in the years before the Great Depression, labor militancy was at its most intense, although, characteristically, militant labor leaders like “Big Bill” Haywood of the Western Federation of Miners leaned toward anarcho-syndicalism rather than toward socialism.

Responding to Particularized Rebellion

Once a local revolt has begun, a common question is whether state violence, reform, or some combination of force and reform will end it. Military suppression has terminated some rebellions like those of the Indian peoples; capitulation to the insurgents, as in the case of the Reconstruction Klan, has ended others. Ordinarily, however, authorities confronted by violent uprisings have responded more ambiguously, alternating the carrot of moderate (sometimes purely symbolic) reform with the stick of suppression. During the ghetto disorders of the 1960s, police and National Guards called in to suppress disorders often used excessive violence, but they stopped short of massacres. On the other hand, local police and federal authorities showed little hesitation in involving activists with revolutionary intentions, like leaders of the Black Panther party, in shootouts, frameups by *agents provocateurs*, and even assassinations. Our previous analysis suggests that a combination of selective coercion and moderate reform has been effective in ending many domestic revolts because they are reformist *ab initio*—that is, structured in such a way as to permit political bargaining to continue. This is clearly the case when group rebellion is aimed at securing local power rather than at overturning the established order nationally. Thus, the Black Panthers’ demand for “Black control of the Black community,” which seemed a revolutionary slogan in the 1960s, provided a rationale for traditional electoral activities in the 1970s, when blacks became

mayors in cities like Newark, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and Detroit.

In retrospect, we can see why so many domestic revolts were directed toward the defense of group identity and maximization of group autonomy. The control of territory was one way to break out of the cycle of dependence and group fragmentation afflicting those drawn into the vortex of American industrialism. Like infant industries established behind tariff walls, American culture groups attempted to develop behind ghetto walls the pride, skills, and resources needed to compete with more powerful outsiders. Community control permitted some group members to accumulate capital by providing services to each other, to establish their culture as part of the national mosaic, to train and elect politicians representing group interests, and to put the group into a position to bargain with outsiders. In an era in which economic and political institutions were relatively decentralized, local control seemed the *sine qua non* for group survival as well as a springboard for local leaders seeking inclusion in the decision-making process. Thus, even as late as the 1960s, minority and student militants demanded that their respective communities be considered political units, that they police themselves, that outside authority recognize new local leaders, and that their cultures be accorded respect. As Stokeley Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton pointed out, such demands were not inconsistent with a desire for integration of the community into the American "interest group" system.⁴³ One plays the game of coalition politics only when one has a stake to play with.

The difficulty that has now become apparent is that American institutions are continuously centralizing. In an era of continued technical development, capital concentration, and class stratification, "community control" (even if it were obtainable) is not an effective method of advancing the interests of oppressed groups.⁴⁴ Recognizing this, modern populist leaders, such as the Democrat Jesse Jackson, have preached the unification of disadvantaged identity groups under the banner of national reform. But this does not solve the problem. A "Rainbow Coalition" is simply a collection of colors; individuals whose primary political identification is with a particular cultural or occupational group cannot be grouped under any banner other than that of the identity group—or of a socially and politically incoherent "major" political party. Indeed, the structure of the two major American parties mirrors and reinforces that of the identity group. Each group resembles a small nation within the larger nation. Each has its own hierarchy of social classes. And each is led by a narrow stratum of businesspeople, professionals, and politicians claiming to represent the group's interests in the marketplace of interest-group bargaining. Much the same can be said of either of the major U.S. political parties. But if identity-group solidarity and community control no longer provide effective means of accumulating capital and political power for the mass of group members, national political parties that are simply collections of identity groups cannot do so either.

We see, then, a clear connection between the particularism of identity-group rebellions and their successful suppression or co-optation. Alliances entered into by such groups are essentially temporary expedients, although ideologues may attempt to give them a coloration of permanence. The New Left's "Maoism," to take an earlier example, was a tortured attempt to establish a basis for alliance between students, domestic minority groups, and Third World peasants. The massive American working class, which was considered to have been hopelessly corrupted by capitalism, was excluded.⁴⁵ Such alliances are easily shattered by exploiting the cultural and material differences separating rebellious groups, as well as the class differences existing within each group. The end of the Indochina War and of conscription therefore extinguished the student movement, notwithstanding that the problems of the students' erstwhile black allies continued to worsen in the 1970s. Meanwhile, militant black leaders were eliminated as a political force, and leaders considered "responsible" were permitted to enter the universe of political bargaining and office-holding. Particularistic identity groups in America are especially vulnerable to this combination of repression and co-optation, which offers group leaders a place in the sun provided that they renounce antisystem goals and practices.⁴⁶

Finally, it is worth reemphasizing what one might call the quantitative aspects of domestic revolt. Just as the structure of domestic group rebellion has generally been reformist, its methods (which constitute part of a violent "dialogue" with the authorities or with other groups) have been relatively restrained. The characteristic forms of identity-group political violence are spontaneous mass rioting, fighting on picket lines or in street demonstrations, vigilantism, and individual assassination. Destructive weapons have seldom been used by domestic rebels, and more intense and instrumental forms of violence like terrorism have played a relatively small role. A question of great interest is whether these limitations will continue to hold domestic rebellion within the boundaries of what I previously called an expanded consensus—a system that tacitly accepts and openly "manages" group violence through a combination of coercion and reform. Of course, this is a question to be asked not only of potentially rebellious groups, but also of the state. As Ted R. Gurr has pointed out, state violence generally tends to match rebel violence both in intensity and scope, sometimes by way of a response to violent challenge, and sometimes as a precipitator.⁴⁷ If innovations are to be made in established patterns of repression and revolt, it may well be the government that first alters the norms of "consensus violence."

The Future of Domestic Rebellion

Will there be further group rebellions in the United States? If so, are they likely to conform to the patterns previously described? Or will new violence, if it occurs, escape the

limitations that have held identity-group revolts within fairly well established boundaries? These are difficult questions to answer, since one's response necessarily hinges on an analysis of the nature and pace of social change in the United States, and the impact of such change on the structure and activities of domestic identity groups.

Earlier predictions of a dramatic departure from the historic norm seem now to have been based on an overly simple and "linear" view of social development. For example, in a previous study of American civil violence, I suggested that social change, by undermining the economic coherence of domestic identity groups, was opening the door to large-scale class conflict.⁴⁸ The premise of this proposition was correct; increasing class stratification in the United States is an observable (and, in my view, long-term) trend. The socioeconomic distance between the upper and upper-middle classes, on the one hand, and the working class and underclass, on the other, has continued to grow. But the premise was incomplete, thus generating a faulty conclusion. With the transition of the American economy from manufacturing to services, and from world dominance to "late imperial" status, stratification *within* social classes has also intensified. The result of these combined trends has not only been to undermine the coherence of particular identity groups, but to strengthen the need of hard-pressed individuals for a particularized group identity!

The thirst for identity, it has been surmised, is a basic human need whose non-satisfaction can be counted on to produce individual and social disintegration.⁴⁹ As we have seen, the authorities' failure to recognize the existence and interests of solitary identity groups in America has produced repeated episodes of group revolt, as well as instances of individual political violence. What happens, then, when cultural identity groups become increasingly stratified internally, as well as less efficient means of fulfilling the identity, security, and welfare needs of their members? National political parties of the American type, which are coalitions of interest groups dominated by their most successful strata, are unable to satisfy these needs. Class-based organizations have not yet proved capable of offering individuals a more universal identity or a practical means of defending their vital interests. The prognosis, I fear, is for multiple varieties of civil disorder, perhaps including new mass revolts as a last-ditch attempt to defend threatened group identities, but also including violence of a less coherent and more unrestrained type.

Rereading the voluminous literature on the racial uprisings of the 1960s, one is struck by the persistence into the present era of the factors described in virtually every study as causes of group rebellion: *de facto* segregation, exploitation or abandonment of the underclass, embittered relations between minority communities and the police, humiliating dependence upon paternalistic institutions, and unfulfilled hopes for opportunity and justice.⁵⁰ By most measures, these conditions have actually worsened for the majority of inner-city residents during the 1980s. The question thus presented is why, except for sporadic, widely separated

outbreaks, mass-based racial or ethnic violence has not been renewed. Three changed conditions seem primarily responsible:

First, African-Americans, Hispanics, and other oppressed minorities have gained at least symbolic access to the political machinery of major cities and some rural communities, electing mayors and other government officials in precisely those locales in which conditions have deteriorated most seriously. Thus, although the Philadelphia headquarters of the MOVE organization was firebombed by police in May 1985, setting off a conflagration that destroyed an entire black neighborhood, the presence in office of black mayor Wilson Goode probably helped to avert any mass-based response.⁵¹ Similarly, although police violence against persons of color appears to have intensified throughout America in recent years, the existence of minority-dominated political machines in the poorest cities has had the effect of siphoning off into administrative or government-related jobs a substantial number of minority leaders who might otherwise have furnished grassroots rebels with hope, ideology, and organization. Clearly, however, the elevation of some politicians and businesspeople of color to positions of relative power is not an efficient satisfier of their constituents' needs. Minority officeholders have not been able to lower minority unemployment, increase the availability of decent housing, upgrade the schools, end *de facto* segregation, or mitigate crime and police violence in their cities. Indeed, as symbols of progress and awakeners of hope, they could prove particularly vulnerable to the effects of mass disenchantment with their efforts.

Second, and probably more important, urban rebellion has been averted by the creation of a new industry that has poured billions of dollars and created tens of thousands of new jobs in the most depressed urban areas: the illegal drug trade. Few analysts seem to have considered that relatively cheap drugs (in particular, PCP and the cocaine-derivative called "crack"), which blight the lives of millions, have created unprecedented economic opportunities for a new generation of youthful entrepreneurs. The illegal drug trade has, in a sense, done what no government program since the War on Poverty has been able to do; it has created the largest retail business in American history operated by minority youth. At the same time, of course, it has increased violence within and against minority communities. While warfare between drug gangs rivals the criminal gang wars of the 1920s, the expansion of the trade provokes police interventions of increasing scope and intensity, inspires various forms of vigilantism, and generates a vast increase in anomic violence. Thus, the drug industry can hardly be said to have stabilized oppressed communities, or to serve as more than a temporary antidote to the conditions brewing violent rebellion among their members.

Third, the increase in immigration into the United States first noted in the 1970s became a flood of historical proportions in the 1980s, exceeding even the great inpouring of immigrants to this country in the decade 1900-1910. In city after city, as well as in many smaller towns and rural areas, the demographic map has been transformed by the arrival of

unprecedented numbers of immigrants from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Korea, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and, most recently, the Soviet Union. The effect of such massive immigrant arrivals in the past has been, at least initially, to discourage mass organization and to postpone out-group rebellion.⁵² Those participating in the migration are concerned principally with surviving in their new environment, and have not become integrated into the institutions of even their own identity group. Furthermore, their initial impulse (which time and experience often whittle away) is to be loyal to the regime that gave them sanctuary. The communities into which the newcomers migrate tend to become disorganized by the very fact of massive immigration; those most likely to participate in a mass mobilization are not the immigrants, but those groups that feel most threatened by them. The tradition of "nativist" rebellion therefore seems to be germinating again in the form of the "English Only" movement in California and the American Southwest, black attacks on Asian storekeepers in several large cities, and an increase in ethnic gang warfare nationwide.

Fourth, to an extent difficult to measure, the memory of previous uprisings may serve as an inhibitor of future revolts of the same type. The scars of the 1960s riots are still visible in many cities, and those who might contemplate similar activities today may be aware that they produced few lasting benefits for inner-city residents. Indeed, there seems far more readiness on the part of both minority and white ethnic youth to participate in an older form of communal violence: intergroup street fighting of the sort that afflicted many American cities in the era between the two world wars. Thus far, no large-scale rioting of this sort has erupted, but incidents like the lethal attack by young whites against black "intruders" in Howard Beach, New York (and retaliatory attacks against whites in other neighborhoods) are multiplying, with uncertain consequences for the future. Black nationalism, directed particularly against members of other minority groups, is clearly on the rise once again. These developments raise a disturbing possibility: it may be that the inefficacy of older forms of group rebellion, combined with the persistence of conditions that have generated group violence in the past, are leading us toward new forms of revolt.

An example may make this clearer. For most students of American society, working class violence is chiefly of antiquarian interest. Far greater significance is attributed to the settlement of labor-management conflict engineered by the New Deal, which pacified the trade unions and provided a political basis for the current economic "consensus." Hard-fought strikes still occur, of course, occasionally spilling over into striker-scab violence or inspiring police intervention. But the predominant development in labor-management relations in the 1980s has been the rapid decline of the leading labor organizations both in numbers and in militancy. Most analysts have therefore written *finis* to this traditional source of violent domestic conflict—an error that I fear will soon become apparent.

Our analysis has suggested, first, that the primary source of rebellion in America is the identity group: associated individuals defining themselves as a cultural, as well as an economic and political, unit. Second, it suggests that identity groups are apt to move outside traditional legal and moral boundaries either when their legitimate expectations are dashed or when their very existence is threatened. The labor movement has not only declined in strength during the past two decades, it has also been transformed socially to the point that in certain industries and locales (e.g., Detroit, Houston), the working class is close to having the character of a cultural identity group. The possibility of a race/class explosion in cities like Detroit has been averted, thus far, by the availability of jobs for laid-off workers in other regions, and by the success of "native" local political machines. The advantages provided by the latter, I argued earlier, are not substantial, while economic decline in formerly prosperous regions like the oil states has eliminated one escape valve after another. Should organized labor's decline continue to the point that vital identity and material needs are threatened, one can anticipate rebellion, perhaps of the traditional localized type, but possibly of a new form and intensity.

Terrorism, for example, is under these circumstances not an impossibility. In the United States, the sort of rebellion we expect (when we anticipate it at all) is spontaneous mass violence of relatively low intensity. Terrorism, on the other hand, which is highly instrumental and generally confined to small groups of militants, takes place when, under conditions of tangible group oppression, the group is unable or unwilling to mobilize en masse either for violent or nonviolent protest. In this situation, small groups of intellectuals or upwardly striving workers may decide that their only recourse is to "go it alone"—to attempt to give violent voice to the voiceless, and to awaken their sleeping brethren to the necessity for mass action.⁵³ Already, in America, we have seen deadly terrorism erupting on a small scale out of the depressed farming and lumbering communities of the West; members of neofascist organizations like the Aryan Nations, the Order, and the Posse Comitatus have recently been prosecuted for murder, bank robbery, and sedition.⁵⁴ One hopes that their example will not be followed by militants attempting to represent other groups, but the present situation gives serious cause for concern. If group rebellion of a certain type has, in a broad sense, been system-maintaining, the loss of hope in mass action (either violent or nonviolent) can open the door to "the politics of vengeance and despair."⁵⁵

Interestingly, it appears that the same factors that inhibit the renewal of identity-group rebellion are also blocking the development of mass-based political organizations with a program for significant change. If one were asked to summarize the overall effect of these factors in a few words, the phrase that comes most quickly to mind is "lowered expectations." We have seen that relative deprivation alone does not produce mass political violence. In the United States, at least, identity groups have rebelled only when, in addition to expecting improvement of their condition, they perceived themselves to be under attack by competitive

groups or by powerful outsiders. (Their motives, if you will, have tended to be more “defensive” than “offensive.”) Nevertheless, whether one looks today at the labor movement, at other hard-pressed economic groups, or at oppressed ethnic, racial, religious, and sexual communities, one sees that while threats to group identity and welfare have intensified, expectations are generally depressed. Anomic, intra-group violence is at an all-time high, but mass mobilization for any purpose seems thwarted by the absence of hope for significant improvement in the group’s condition.

Very likely, the low level of expectations on the part of individuals and groups hardest hit by social change is attributable, at least in part, to incorporation of their intelligentsias—so often the source of visions of a better future—into existing structures of power and privilege. Perhaps oppressed communities have become so crime- and drug-ridden, so dependent upon government largesse, or so fearful of losing scarce jobs that they are now incapable even of an expressive riot. Stagnant wage levels and a slow economic growth rate may also play a role in keeping expectations low. It seems to me, however, that at a certain point, the need to express and defend one’s individual identity and collective aspirations becomes overwhelming. At that point (whose timing, although not its occurrence, is unpredictable), need creates its own hope, and the stage is set for spontaneous revolt, organized protest, and unforeseen change.

The history of American rebellion suggests a number of preconditions for the revival of desperation and of hope among oppressed out-groups. First, the rate of immigration slows, enabling identity groups to incorporate the newcomers and to reorganize themselves on a basis reflecting their social weight.⁵⁶ Second, *local* rates of economic growth and employment, which are frequently higher than official rates would suggest because of the prevalence of illegal business activities, decline sharply without a corresponding increase in legal economic opportunities.⁵⁷ Third, local political leaders, whose elevation created expectations that the group’s overall position would be improved, fail to measure up, with the result that many are considered “traitors,” and power devolves to those claiming to represent lower-class strata.⁵⁸ Finally, the degree of outside pressure on the community intensifies, either through increased economic exploitation, new demands for cultural assimilation, an effective “war on crime,” conscription into the armed forces, or some other exercise of power that is seen from within as an assault on the group’s identity and a threat to its survival. When these conditions are present, almost any exercise of authority by the outsiders may trigger acts of rebellion.

We have not yet reached this point. The process of intra-group disaggregation, with its attendant hopelessness, continues; yet one senses that its limits could be reached in particular cases in the relatively near future. Seven million votes for Jesse Jackson in the Democratic Party presidential primary elections of 1988 do not in themselves represent a revival of hope, but they reflect a growing desperation on the part of out-groups that find themselves excluded once again from the benefits of an incomplete consensus. Developments generating a substan-

tial rise in such groups' expectations or a dramatic threat to their identities could therefore trigger rebellions of the "traditional" type. Depending upon the circumstances, such developments might also produce small-group outbursts more akin to communal warfare or terrorism.

One would like to be able to predict an alteration of these patterns, either because the American political system had developed the capacity to solve endemic social and economic problems, or because its subjects had developed the capacity to organize across identity-group lines to change that system. Current trends, however, provide little reason to suppose either that significant reform from above—an American *perestroika*—or mass mobilization from below is imminent. This being so, it seems likely that the suppressed or inner-directed anger of identity groups outside the current American consensus will again express itself (when hope and desperation rise) in more familiar and less constructive forms. The question we need now to discuss is whether the emerging field of conflict resolution offers any means of avoiding a repetition or intensification of identity-group violence in the United States.

Some Implications for Conflict Resolution

In a system in which collective violence is, to an extent, a part of the mechanism for adjustment of group interests, what is the potential role of conflict resolution? Depending upon one's evaluation of the effectiveness of this system in meeting group needs, and depending also upon one's definition of "conflict resolution," there appear to be four approaches to this question:

First, to the extent that the system works to empower formerly disadvantaged groups, it can be argued that conflict resolution is unnecessary. Second, as advocates of "alternative dispute resolution" contend, it may be that private mediation and conciliation can be used to eliminate certain immediate causes or "triggers" of civil violence. Third, it has been suggested that techniques of public, multiparty mediation originally designed to deal with environmental and developmental disputes can be adapted for use in resolving identity-group conflicts. Finally, partisans of the "problem-solving workshop" approach to conflict resolution maintain that the causes of group rebellion can be exposed and eliminated only by a process that is confidential, focused on the parties whose relationships are most severed, deeply analytical, and generative of system-restructuring options.

(1) If the effect of localized group violence in the context of the American political system is to fulfill the basic needs of previously excluded, impoverished, and powerless groups, there may be no necessity for further conflict resolution. That is, if "violent bargaining" is an efficacious method of satisfying fundamental human needs for identity, recognition, security, and development, such bargaining is in itself a form of conflict resolution, and little more need be said.

It seems clear, however, that this is not the case. Older groups whose collective position was substantially improved by "violent reform" now find themselves increasingly disadvantaged despite their formal inclusion in the American consensus. The successful rebels of the past, such as organized industrial workers, family farmers, and the members of various urban immigrant groups, reappear as the out-groups of the present. Meanwhile, the members of groups more recently granted rights and recognition—for example, African-Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, working women, and homosexuals—are discovering that the gains made by leadership strata do not, under modern conditions of social organization and production, "trickle down" to lower-class strata. Political reform as traditionally defined, that is, withdrawal of an out-group's pariah status, recognition of its legal interests, and elimination of obstacles to political and economic advancement of its upper strata, no longer satisfy the basic human needs of its mass membership. Thus, we cannot say that conflict resolution is taking place "through the system."

(2) Assuming that the causes of group rebellion are system-generated, it has been suggested that "alternative dispute resolution" techniques might be used in cases of potentially violent confrontation to avert both out-group violence and violent repression. For example, in their work on the MOVE crisis in Philadelphia, Paul Wahrhaftig and Hezekiah Assefiias argue that timely and efficient use of third-party intervention techniques might have permitted the city and its police department to settle their dispute with the black community organization, MOVE, without resorting to force.⁵⁹ Similarly, mediator Richard A. Salem has described the beneficial effects of intervention by the U.S. Department of Justice's Community Relations Service into a number of disputes that might otherwise have produced civil disorder, including the dispute between the city of Skokie, Illinois, and an organization of American Nazis planning to rally there.⁶⁰ Other CRS interventions have reportedly taken place off the record in cities where ethnic or race-based disputes threatened to generate riots or intercommunal fighting.

The methods of "alternative dispute resolution" may, indeed, be effective in averting particular violent confrontations. In most cases, however, this approach does not aim at solving the problems that generate group rebellion; its focus is on particular disputes rather than more generalized conflict, and its goal is the temporary *settlement* of such disputes rather than longer-term conflict *resolution*.⁶¹ As a result, the use of these techniques may avert violence in particular cases without reducing the prospects for further violence generated by the same conflict. The American Nazis prevented from demonstrating in Skokie, Illinois returned to their home base in Chicago, where they continue at present to mobilize fearful and embittered white workers to support their program of violent intimidation of black families seeking homes in white residential areas. In this case, conflict resolution can take place only if the causes of black desperation and white fear are thoroughly exposed and explored, and if

problem-solving options are generated. In the case of the MOVE organization, appropriate use of third-party intervention techniques might well have opened the door to conflict resolution. This could have taken place, however, only if the parties were brought to analyze the underlying factors generating both organizations like MOVE and the violent police reaction to such organizations.

(3) A third possibility, supported by certain literature in the conflict resolution field, is that mediation of multiparty public policy disputes may be used to eliminate some of the important causes of group rebellion. Through such mediation, it is contended, forums may be constructed that "empower" weaker parties to participate in decision making, and that permit development of a new consensus that satisfies their needs.⁶² Thus, in the case of race- and class-based disputes over such issues as the siting of public housing, the integration of public schools, or the behavior of police officers in disadvantaged communities, efforts have been made by third-party intervenors to create forums in which policy guidelines and decisions can be arrived at collaboratively, with the active participation of all interested parties. Since unresolved disputes of this sort are generally considered causes of group rebellion and civil violence, their successful resolution arguably eliminates at least some of the sources of group conflict. By implication, extension of these techniques to cover a broader field of disputes would, by democratizing decision making generally, move toward the creation of genuine consensus and the elimination of identity-group violence.

The advantages of this approach (as opposed to what I have called the "alternative dispute resolution" approach) are those of comprehensiveness and ambition. The dispute is defined in terms of public policy choices that relate more centrally to group conflict; the disputants include representatives of all interested parties; and the goal is to alter group relationships by creating new decision-making processes, not merely to avoid a specific threatened confrontation. Its disadvantages are, procedurally, those of the public or quasi-public forum and, substantively, those of system-constraint. It is difficult, to begin with, to induce the participants in a multiparty forum to participate in no-holds-barred analysis of the problems generating conflict. But even where this is possible, the problem-solving options generated in such a context may be explicitly or implicitly limited by the forum's terms of reference or by the intervenors' desire to obtain a settlement. Thus, intervenors are often asked to help resolve housing or school disputes without any commitment of significant new public resources for housing or schools, or to help resolve police-community disputes without any possibility that public authorities will agree to restructure the relationship between law enforcers and disadvantaged communities.

Worse yet, mediation may be employed by government agencies as a *substitute* for making such commitments—a method, as it were, to "manage" conflict *without* confronting its basic sources. These implicit limitations on the options available to the parties can feed

back into the dispute-resolving forum, with the result that third-party intervenors in public policy disputes focus more on improving communications and decision-making procedures than on discovering or dealing with the root causes of group conflict. They are often tempted to select both the dispute to be mediated and the representative parties with an eye out for the achievement of a "practicable" settlement, and to assist in the discovery of options that appeal to the moderates on both sides, while isolating the extremists. When this happens, the initial theoretical assumptions about the dispute's centrality, the parties' representative character, and the capability of the options agreed upon to resolve conflict may not be borne out in practice. Time and experience will tell whether these pitfalls can be overcome by intervenors and processes focused more on long-term problem solving than on short-term peacemaking.

(4) Finally, it has been suggested that methods of analytic problem-solving conflict resolution developed to deal with serious identity-group conflicts on an international level might be applied to the resolution of conflicts between domestic identity groups, and between these groups and government agencies.⁶³ The primary characteristics of this "problem-solving workshop" approach are, first, that it attempts to resolve conflict between the parties whose relationships are most exacerbated before bringing other parties to the table; second, that facilitated meetings are confidential rather than constituting a public or quasi-public forum; third, that the proceedings are single-mindedly analytical, aiming at exposure of the underlying causes of conflict; and, fourth, that their product is not an agreed-upon settlement, but a set of options that, having been "costed out" by the parties, may provide a basis for further negotiations and policymaking.

What prospects does the workshop method offer for the elimination of endemic group rebellion in nations like the United States? Since it has not yet been applied in connection with communal conflicts internal to the United States, one's answer is necessarily speculative. Nevertheless, certain advantages seem clear. Because the forum is confidential, restricted to immediately opposed parties, open to "extremists" as well as "moderates," and concerned more to discover the roots of group conflict than to settle a particular dispute, it can generate options that are genuinely conflict resolving. For the same reason, however, it may seem threatening to parties unconvinced that the costs of continuing to dispute violently outweigh the benefits of what they perceive as social stability. Problem-solving options do not always implicate substantial change in political or economic systems, but where the exclusion and oppression of identity groups is endemic, it seems likely that substantial change will be required. Therefore, so long as violence continues to take the form of sporadic, low-intensity group rebellion, anomic antisocial activity, and rare acts of "political crime," the authorities (or powerful groups) may be less inclined to participate with rebellious parties in analytical, problem-solving workshops than to utilize processes that hold out the promise of dispute resolution with a minimum of change.

On the international scene, problem-solving workshops have been used most effectively where prolonged, intense violence compels the parties to recognize that the costs of maintaining an illusory stability have become prohibitively high. Theorists and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution nurture the (perhaps unreasonable) hope that conflict resolution can become conflict prevention, that is, that modern states will assess the costs of endemic internal violence before "the fire next time" makes them all too obvious. In the case of the United States, such an assessment requires an appreciation of two fundamental truths. First, an out-group or underclass whose members' basic human needs remain unsatisfied *will* rebel. Second, where traditional modes of rebellion are unavailable or unavailing, other modes, almost certainly less manageable, will be adopted. That some still consider these principles controversial testifies to the peculiar distortion of vision that afflicts those comfortable with their power, a pathology we described at the very beginning of this essay: *historical amnesia*.

Notes

1. Clifford Geertz, "Is America By Nature A Violent Society?" *New York Times Magazine*, April 21, 1968, p. 25.
2. Daniel Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
3. See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963); Oscar Handlin, *Immigration as a Factor in American History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959); Robert Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1967).
4. The foreign policy implications of consensus theory are apparent in the work of certain modernization theorists, see, e.g., Samuel F. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
5. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p.1.
6. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969).
7. Jerome H. Skolnick, ed., *The Politics of Protest* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969).
8. Ibid. See also James S. Campbell, Joseph R. Sahid, and David P. Stang, eds., *Law and Order Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969).
9. James S. Campbell, Joseph R. Sahid, and David P. Stang, op. cit., pp. 285-426.
10. Jerome H. Skolnick, op. cit., esp. pp. 1-96.
11. George D. Newton and Franklin E. Zimring, eds., *Firearms and Violence in American Life* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969).
12. James F. Kirkham, Sheldon Levy, and William J. Crotty, eds., *Assassination and Political Violence* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969).
13. See Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *The New American Revolution* (New York: Free Press, 1971).
14. Ibid., but note the dissenting Introduction by Christopher Lasch. See also James Weinstein, *Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975); and Richard E. Rubenstein, *Left Turn: Origins of the Next American Revolution* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
15. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
16. Ted Robert Gurr with Charles Ruttenger, *Cross-National Studies of Civil Violence* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research on Social Systems, The American University, 1969).

17. This was the solution advocated by presidential adviser (now U.S. senator) Daniel P. Moynihan, and summarized by his famous phrase, "benign neglect."

18. The thesis that while promises of reform inflamed expectations, judicious coercion might lower them was applied in the context of the Vietnamese insurgency by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1969). Domestically, high-intensity coercion was directed against leaders of the Black Panther party. See Gene Marine, *The Black Panthers* (New York: New American Library, 1969); Gilbert Moore, *A Special Rage* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Nelson Blackstock, *COINTELPRO: The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom* (New York: Vintage, 1976).

19. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1964, no. 2:95-119.

20. Fred Hampton, the talented leader of the Black Panther Party of Illinois, and Mark Clark, a member of that organization, were shot and killed by Cook County sheriff's police in 1969 at Hampton's apartment on the West Side of Chicago. A floor plan of the apartment had been furnished to the police by an FBI informant. The incident was described as a "shootout" by police, although subsequent investigation failed to establish that any shots had been fired by residents of the apartment, and suggested instead that Hampton had been killed while asleep in his bed, perhaps in retaliation for the murder of a policeman that the sheriff's police believed he had organized. The Cook County Grand Jury failed to return an indictment of murder against state's attorney Edward J. Hanrahan, but a civil suit against Hanrahan and others by families of the slain Panthers resulted in a substantial settlement in plaintiffs' favor.

21. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond The Melting Pot* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2d ed., 1970).

22. See Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956).

23. This thesis is seldom stated so baldly, but it is implicit in studies like Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

24. Richard E. Rubenstein, *Rebels in Eden: Mass Political Violence in the United States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

25. John Tebbel, *The Compact History of the Indian Wars* (New York: Hawthorn Press, 1966); and Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1971).

26. Richard Maxwell Brown, *The South Carolina Regulators* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Marion L. Starkey, *A Little Rebellion* (New York: Knopf, 1955); W.W.H. David, *The Fries Rebellion, 1798-1799* (1899, reprinted by Arno/New York Times, 1969); and H.M. Breckinridge, *History of the Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania* (1859, reprinted by Arno/New York Times, 1969).

27. Jackson Turner Main, *The Social Structure of Revolutionary America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Richard B. Morris, *The American Revolution Reconsidered* (New York: Knopf, 1967). See also Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1966), Ch. 2.

28. Jesse T. Carpenter, *The South As A Conscious Minority, 1789-1861* (New York: New York University Press, 1930); Louis Filler, *The Crusade Against Slavery, 1830-1860* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960); Herbert Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts* (New

