

# **From Fear to Sanctuary**

A Typology of Zones of Peace

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## Introduction

Many a times, in a protracted, intractable and violent conflict, it is more useful to initiate measures to mitigate the conflict – short term violence reduction -than to resolve or transform the conflict. One of the most important methods of conflict mitigation is through what is called institutionalizing conflict, that is, allowing conflict to continue within rules. A concrete example of this is through the establishment of Zones of Peace (ZoPs). (Mitchell and Allen-Nan 1997)

Zones of Peace are usually territorially defined (although there are instances where the concept is more abstract such as a whole community of people) in which by an agreement certain acts are prohibited and/or some other acts encouraged. It is important to mention here that while ZoPs are visualized in many different contexts such as inter-state border zones (such as the one between Peru and Ecuador), maritime trade zones, and nuclear free zones; the zones that our project is studying are those that are created within states in areas where there is or has been an ongoing armed violent conflict. This excludes the intra-state contexts of urban intermittent violence (such as gang-violence, riots) and where the purpose is something other than a way out of the violence. Examples of this are schools that are declared drug free.

In this context of intra-state violent conflict, it is possible to create a typology of ZoPs on various dimensions such as by whom they have been initiated, degree of formalization of the zone, the geographical extent of zone or other criteria. We believe that another useful unit of classification is to examine zones of peace in a temporal context. This means we examine the creation, implementation and sustainability of these zones in reference to their relationship to the level of peace or conflict in the surrounding society.

And while this classification does not cover all instances of peace zone existence, it does provide a broad overview through which most instances can be categorized to some extent.

## **ZoPs, Before, During and After Peace**

If we think about a zone of peace in a temporal fashion, it seems reasonable to examine three different time frames within which a zone might be created:

A zone of peace created or maintained during a period of violent conflict. The primary purpose of this type of zone is to ameliorate or remove the effects of the conflict on the local population. The characteristics of this type of zone are, in general, characterized by the goals of protecting non-combatants, attempting to establish policies and practices of neutrality with regards to both (or all) sides in a conflict, and seeking to prevent or restrict the types of violent activities taking place within the zone. Short-term versions of this type of zone may be established for the purpose of delivering aid or conducting humanitarian operations, such as administering vaccines.

The second temporal type of zone is one that is established either during a peace process or its implementation. This type of zone may often be used as a safe area for one or more of the combatant groups. It may also serve as a safe zone for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of formerly combatant forces. This type of temporal zone is often limited in duration, either to the period of peace talks or to the demobilization of forces period. One example that lasted for some time was the zone turned over to the FARC in Columbia during their negotiations with the Pastrana regime.

The third temporal type of zone is one that is established in the post-conflict environment. This type of zone attempts to address a number of issues, including those

affected by ongoing civil violence short of the types of civil conflicts that engender the first temporal type of zone. Some of the issues that can be addressed by a post-conflict zone of peace include continuing human rights violations, criminal and gang related activities and a lack of economic and social development. The Local Zone of Peace in El Salvador described below is a prime example of this temporal type of zone.

And finally we turn to examine those zones which do not clearly fit into the three categories described above. While most of these ‘special’ zones do take place during violent conflicts, we have chosen to place them in a separate section due to their focus on specific elements and individuals affected by conflict, such as children, sacred spaces, or temporally limited zones used for aid distribution or provision of healthcare to affected populations.

## **Safe Havens & Zones during Conflict**

Zones of peace during violent conflicts and civil wars are the main focus of the ICAR zones of peace project. This is primarily due to the incongruity of having a location or zone of non-participation in the midst of a modern inter-state or civil conflict. This section focuses on the structure and some of the experiences, both in terms of success and failure, of attempts to create these zones in recent conflicts.

### ***The Failure at Bosnia: UN Safe Havens***

The third Balkan war, which swept the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s provides our first example of a type of zone of peace instituted during a conflict for the primary purpose of protecting civilian populations from the scourge of armed conflict. Although several safe zones were set up in both Bosnia and Croatia, this typology will

concentrate upon the former as being both indicative of the UN zones in the region and exemplary in terms of the structural and temporal characteristics that led to their failure.

### **Establishment of the Bosnian Safe Zones**

The UN declaration of a number of 'safe zones' in Bosnia-Herzegovina came about largely as a result of efforts by Bosnian-Serb forces to 'ethnically cleanse' Muslims from the Drina Valley as a part of their strategy of eliminating all such communities from Eastern Bosnia. The first safe zone was authorized for Srebrenica on April 16, 1993 (UNSCR 819), demanding that "all parties and other concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act". Subsequent safe zones were created for Tuzla, Sarajevo, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac on May 6 1993.

The UN safe zones were designed to be protected areas for civilian populations, largely Muslim, where they would be safe from attacks and "acts of genocide" by Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces. Unfortunately, like their counterparts in Croatia, the safe zones in Bosnia provided limited safety for their inhabitants and, in the case of Srebrenica, failed to prevent the massacre of nearly 7,000 Muslim males in 1995. Another main failure of the safe zones was their inability to protect the inhabitants from the actions of Serb paramilitaries, who often shelled the zones from nearby hills or stationed snipers to shoot at civilians. The UN attempted to address the former problem by declaring 'weapons exclusion zones' around each of the safe zones and by interning some heavy weaponry around Sarajevo. UN forces were generally far less successful in curbing the actions of Serb snipers, with the singular exception of one UN commander in

Gorazde; who used counter-sniper teams to discourage local Serb paramilitaries from firing into the town.

### **Safe Zone Activities**

Essentially the activities that the UN were supposed to engage in included making sure that armed paramilitaries did not enter the safe zones to kill civilians. They further attempted to make sure that those same civilians were not themselves armed; an action that may have contributed to the massacre at Srebrenica. Unfortunately the UN forces, known by their acronym UNPROFOR, were limited in their ability to carry out their duties by a number of factors. Chief among these was the unwillingness or inability of the international community to provide enough troops for completion of the mission.

In addition the UN forces were hampered by a set of rules of engagement that could be described as overly complicated and restrictive. More importantly the rules specifically forbade UN forces from engaging in offensive actions without specific approval and required them to use the minimum force necessary, use their weapons only as a last resort, and to cease firing when their opponents cease firing (Berkowitz 1994, 636). This early article by Berkowitz argued presciently that UN forces could be held hostage by hostile forces willing to ratchet up the violence to a level that would leave the blue helmets vulnerable; possibly forcing them to choose between protecting their own lives and the lives of those they were sent to protect.

Even UN documents detailing the background and history of the UNPROFOR mission note the inordinately long time it took for the UN to respond to the shelling of Sarajevo and the other safe havens; having to first determine the need to discuss the question of air strikes, discussions within the security council, seeking authorization for

their use, setting a ten-day warning period, and preparing for air strikes (UN 1996).

During the long period required to gather its forces, the Serbs finally withdrew most of their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, averting the danger from NATO warplanes for the time being.

The final and most notable failure of the UN safe havens started with Serb retaliation for NATO air strikes designed to force Serbs to return heavy weapons removed from their internment areas. In retaliation Serb paramilitaries took UN peacekeepers hostage, in effect nullifying their ability to protect civilians from Serb forces. Following this the UN and NATO refused to reinforce the peacekeepers and, within weeks, Serb forces stepped up attacks on the safe areas. These attacks culminated with the July 1995 capture of Srebrenica by the forces of Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladić, who rightly believed that NATO would not use air attacks to stop him from brushing aside Srebrenica's Dutch UN peacekeepers. This action resulted in the disappearance and assumed massacre of more than 5,000 Muslim men and boys.

Following this several of the other safe zones fell before the UN and NATO vowed to draw the line, protecting Sarajevo and Gorazde with more troops and air power.

### ***The Philippines***

The Philippines has been torn by armed internal conflict; the roots of which go back to the exploitative policies of the colonial powers. Since its independence, successive governments have been guilty of alienating entire populations of people by failing to respond to their needs. The result of which has been that the poor have gotten poorer while wealth and power continued to be held by the privileged few. Economic and social discontent exploded into full-scale armed warfare in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The

government proceeded to crush the counter-insurgency with force. While the insurgency was crushed, the roots of the conflict were not addressed and in the 1970s the conflict was once again revived. In 1972 martial law was imposed in the Philippines. The economic deprivation of the majority continued. In 1986, the dictatorship under Marcos was brought down by a non-violent people's revolution. Since then the country has been making a difficult and painful transition to democracy. The new government initiated peace initiatives but there were many hurdles to cross on the way.(Garcia 1989)

It is however in this people's power experience that one can trace the beginning of the idea of "zones of peace" in the Philippines. In September 1988, the first such zone of peace was declared in Naga city. Later, in 1992, it was the Sangguniang Panlungsod itself which passed Resolution No. 92-169 declaring the City of Naga as a Peace Zone. This was followed by a series of peace zones being declared from the north to the south of the country. Some of the better known ones are those in Tulunán, Maladeg, Barangay Bituan, and North Cotabato.

The Filipino experience is a pioneering experience in the concept of zones of peace. In the Philippines the concept of ZoPs has always been that of a geographical area that community residents themselves declare to be "off limits to war and other forms of armed hostility" (Garcia 1997). In most of the initial ZoPs created, the church had a major role to play in initiating and maintaining the ZoPs. The church was powerful in standing up to the government and the AFP. While the peace zones succeeding in creating a space for dialogue and in keeping the violence out, most importantly they achieved some success in being a link between local and national peace efforts. This was especially made possible with the support that the peace zones achieved during the time of President Ramos.

However, over a period of time these peace zones (known as the First Wave ZoPs) became more distanced from the peace process at the national level between the government and the NPA. (Arguillas 1999)

In the fresh wave of violence witnessed in 2000 with President Estrada's all out war against the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), the peace zones had to stand the test of how sustainable they were in the face of such violence. Additionally, in the subsequent period there was also the move by the Government to hijack the concept of zones of peace. In many areas, the government declared new zones of peace or took over some of the more established ones and used force to get the MILF out of these areas. They then forcibly tried to relocate people back into the areas. In Pikit, one of the community peace zones that was declared in 2002, the government was accused of even arming the local communities to fight the MILF. The government forces remained stationed in these peace zones defeating the very purpose for which they were set up. (Ferrer 2003)

The local community has stood up strongly against these government moves and have now re-declared themselves as spaces for peace just to distinguish themselves from the government's peace zones. These spaces of peace go back to what was originally behind creating zones of peace. The community had greater control over the area and for which they sought the commitment of all the warring factions.

The peace zone in Tulunan recently celebrated 14 years of its existence. The church in Tulunan was actively involved in its creation and is active till today. There are other peace zones in the Philippines that have been sustained by the community for such long periods of time.(Elusfa 2004) Clearly the Filipino experience is definitely more of a success in terms of how communities can negotiate peace for themselves and thus make

an important contribution in achieving durable peace through the establishment of the peace zones. But this experience has shown that care must be taken to ensure that the zones remain the property of their local inhabitants and not the government or other forces who would use them for strategic or tactical gains.

### ***Columbia: Zones, Associations & National Movements***

Like the Philippines, Columbia has been held hostage, so to speak, by more than thirty years of civil violence, or *la violencia* as it is called. Also like the Philippines, one of the responses of ordinary Columbians living in the countryside to the constant civil war and the endemic corruption that always seems to follow, has been a movement to withdraw from the conflict by creating a host of zones of peace, municipalities of peace and even one or two communities of peace that focus more on the people than on their geographic location. In fact the use of peace zones in Columbia has become so extensive that it is possible to discern and describe them on two levels. The first being a traditional zone that is confined to one locality and serves one community's population. The second is an outgrowth of the first, namely the creation of associations of zones, who then use their combined power to attempt to educate one another and influence the process of the conflict and peacemaking on a larger scale. And at the third level are nation-wide organizations that provide support to municipalities and zones to enable their creation and communication with each other.

### **Local Zones & Municipalities**

At the first level, individual zones or municipalities, Columbia has over a hundred, with more being formed. Two of the most notable examples of individual or local ZoPs for our study are the Samaniego Territorio of Peace established in 1994 and the Mogotes

Municipal Constituent Assembly established in 1997. Although these two zones are more recent than others, their uniqueness for this section stems from their association with a group known as REDEPAZ (the Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against War); which will be discussed below.

The Samaniego Territorio of Peace came about as a result of a confluence of events. In 1998 the town of Samaniego was holding both mayoral elections and participating in a national voting process by which citizens could register their preference for a negotiated solution to Columbia's armed conflict; the Citizen Mandate for Peace. The newly elected mayor was captured by the ELN, one of the leftist guerilla groups, causing an outcry among the town's residents and forcing his release. Following this the mayor invited the citizens to participate in the creation of a zone of peace and contacted REDEPAZ for organizational assistance (Rojas 2000, 16).

Some of the strategies for implementing 'active neutrality' by the new zone of peace included the symbolic gesture of the open hand (by which the inhabitants could remind themselves of their commitment to remove their territory from the influence of the conflict) radio campaigns, training and educational materials promoting the respect for human rights and conflict management principles, a high school for peace, a boys and girls club for peace, family programs, programs to mediate and transform violence in families and, essentially, programs to change the existing culture from one geared towards war and violence to one geared towards peace (Ramirez 2003, 8-9).

Like Samaniego, the triggering event for the creation of a zone of peace in Mogotes was the invasion of the town by leftist guerillas, with the intention of judging the town's mayor with charges of corruption. In response some two hundred people from the town

and surrounding area gathered together to form a constituent assembly and requested that the guerillas release the mayor so he could be judged by the citizens. The mayor was subsequently dismissed and the new mayor, José Angel Guadrón, implemented a series of communal reforms suggested by the Constituent Assembly (Rojas 2000, 13).

The Constituent Assembly, like the territorio of Samaniego, has created a number of mechanisms to implement its goals of creating an environment of peace and social justice along with addressing issues like local corruption, civil violence and economic and social development. Some of the commissions created by the Assembly include those addressing the communal development plan, a truth commission, human rights commission and health, education, and oversight commissions (Ramirez 2003, 6-7).

The creation of the Constituent Assembly in Mogotes and its plan for peace was considered innovative and successful enough that the community received a number of awards and some level of international recognition. In addition, the success of Mogotes inspired REDEPAZ to propose an initiative entitled “100 Municipalities of Peace in Columbia” a project funded by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. This initiative was designed to expand the number of different types of zones of peace experiences across Columbia as a method for combating the long-running civil war.<sup>1</sup>

## **Associations and National Movements**

In addition to the many local zones of peace, both those created before and after the REDEPAZ initiative, there are a few areas on Columbia where groups of local zones have banded together to create associations to share information, generate moral support,

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<sup>1</sup> For more detail on the “100 Municipalities” project please see (Rojas 2000).

and address issues on a province-wide basis. One zone, the Association de Municipios de Alta Ariari, was established close to the Zona de Disstencion and consisted of the municipalities of Castillo, Dorado, Guamal, Frente de Oro, Lejana, Cubarral and San Martin. Another is the Association de Municios de Antioquia Oriente, consisting of 23 municipalities including those of Sonson, San Luis, Carmen, and El Retiro. This association has held a number of meetings with representatives of FARC and the ELN to discuss issues like the release of the governor of Antioquia and allowing safe passage of peasants through roadblocks to get their produce through to markets in Medellin.

At the national level in addition to REDEPAZ, formed in 1993 to coordinate peace efforts throughout Columbia, a number of groups exist that promote the use of peace zones. These include Justice Y Pas (justice and peace) and a government sponsored initiative known as REDPRODPAZ (the National Network of Development and Peace Programs). With the exception of REDPRODPAZ these regional and national initiatives are groups that respond to the wishes of localities that either want to establish zones of peace or request assistance with coordination or other peace zone related activities; ensuring that the peace zone movement in Columbia remains rooted in the principles of citizen based peacemaking.

## **Peace Implementation: DDR Zones**

The creation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration zones may not seem at first to be a part of the focus of our original project. However, we felt that many of the characteristics of a typical zone of peace created during a conflict also served to describe these ‘cantonment’ zones designed for military or ‘rebel’ personnel.

## ***El Salvador's PAZs***

There is very little evidence to suggest that safe havens or full zones of peace were established during the implementation of the Chapultepec peace agreement, however, some actions taken by the UN monitoring force did constitute something similar to the creation of safe zones for disarmament and demobilization of FMLN combatants. These zones were known as Designated Assembly Zones (DAZs) and were monitored by UN observers and members of El Salvador's military forces (Fishel and Corr 1998).

## **Establishment of DDR Zones**

The DAZs were established as a part of the Chapultepec accords, which were signed on July 20, 1992. Fifteen DAZs were established to oversee DDR activities by FMLN forces and were matched by a number of UN observers being assigned to monitor the cantonment and demobilization of a number of the Salvadoran military units.<sup>2</sup>

## **DDR Activities**

The activities performed by the military component of ONUSAL included the monitoring and verification of the 1992 cease-fire, monitoring the creation of the 'designated zones' where FMLN forces would canton, monitoring the troops in these zones, inventory the weapons in each location and accompany troops when necessary (UN).

The DDR component was envisioned as a complete reintegration of the FMLN into civic life. Some successful aspects were the induction of former FMLN members into the new National Police of which they would make up 20% of the total (de Soto and del

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<sup>2</sup> All references to the Chapultepec accords are to the electronic English version at the United States Institute of Peace website. Located at [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/el\\_salvador/pa\\_es\\_01161992\\_toc.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/el_salvador/pa_es_01161992_toc.html)

Castillo 1995). However, the slowness of the land reform program, designed to redistribute land to former combatants, seriously endangered the DDR scheme aimed at the FMLN. By September 1992 the failure of land reform had caused the FMLN to suspend its implementation of the demobilization agreement.

### **Other Activities**

Commensurate with its activities in monitoring FMLN forces in their designated safe zones, ONUSAL personnel were responsible for monitoring and verifying the presence of Salvadoran troops in their barracks and for overseeing the demobilization of selected military units. In some sense, although these functions did not take place within a designated 'safe zone' they were commensurate with the types of oversight activities that the UN monitors undertook in the DAZs, demobilizing and monitoring FMLN members.

Additionally, the small size of the UN military contingent, 380 observers, meant that they could only act with the support and compliance of the forces of both sides. Typically a DAZ would have only two UN observers and possibly one or more members of the Salvadoran military to monitor hundreds or thousands of FMLN members.

Although this type of monitoring and DAZ zones for DDR are not the principal focus of the ZoPs investigation, it is worth noting the different uses of safe areas, havens and zones of peace and development used to promote peaceful solutions, implement peace agreements, or as we shall see next, support some of the long-term peace-building necessary to ensure the survival of peace agreements.

### ***Aceh: PZ's before Peace***

The violent separatist conflict in Aceh has been going on for over twenty seven years. The roots of the conflict go back to the colonial period. When Indonesia achieved

Independence, Aceh was mortified over the fact that they received the status of a special province of the country. They demanded Independence and this was the birth of the separatist movement. The movement intensified and developed into an armed struggle in the mid-1970s when the discontent over sharing revenues from its oil resources with the center grew. (Iyer 2003)

The concept of Peace Zones in Aceh<sup>3</sup> is uniquely positioned on the temporal scale. They were established during the period of peace process and as part of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)<sup>4</sup> and the Indonesian Government on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2002. COHA however was mainly an agreement for ceasefire and provided a framework for further negotiations and hence it was less of a peace agreement. The peace agreement was brokered by the Henry Dunant Center (HDC)<sup>5</sup>.

It has been our observation that in other cases where the main goal of establishing a Peace Zone has been disarming, demilitarization and demobilization, ceasefire precedes


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<sup>3</sup> Aceh is located on the northernmost tip of the Sumatra islands of Indonesia and is the westernmost point of the country.

<sup>4</sup> Also known as Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF). Hasan di Tiro (the last scion of the pre-colonial sultanate and currently in exile in Sweden) founded GAM, or what is known more commonly in English as the Free Aceh Movement, in 1976 on political, religious, and economic issues with the Indonesian government.

<sup>5</sup> The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) was revamped in 1999. Formerly known as the Henry Dunant Institute (HDI), it was set up in 1965 by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Swiss Red Cross. The main objective of the Institute is to make available ways and means of carrying out studies, research, training in all branches of the Red Cross thus contributing to the strengthening of the universality of the Red Cross. In 1995, the General Assembly of the HDI began a discussion on the future of the Institute with a view to redefining its role and activities. The study was concluded in 1998 and in 1999 the organisation was launched with a new name and a mission to strengthen intercultural and multi-disciplinary dialogue and to promote sustainable solutions to humanitarian problems. The centre is currently involved in Aceh and Myanmar/ Burma. Refer to their web-site for more information on past projects ([www.hdcentre.org](http://www.hdcentre.org))

the establishment of the peace zone. In Aceh, the peace zones were to go together with the ceasefire but its goal was demilitarisation and demobilization. This process may be represented as:



The PZs would therefore be a prelude to disarming, demilitarization, demobilization and reconstruction for all of these activities were to take place after the actual establishment of the PZs but within those zones before they were to occur elsewhere in the Province<sup>6</sup>.

The COHA contained a whole section on the establishment and maintenance of the PZs in Aceh. Special committees comprising of GAM, the Indonesian Government and HDC representatives were appointed to monitor and administer sanctions should either party break any of the provisions of the agreement.(Iyer 2003)

It was agreed by all parties that in the PZs:

- a) they will not carry weapons within the peace zones outside of their respective posts and bases
- b) if they are unarmed they can move freely within the peace zones
- c) no political or clandestine activities will take place within the peace zone
- d) neither of them will engage in provocative acts
- e) no military posts will be allowed within the zones of peace
- f) neither side can move more forces into any existing peace zones

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<sup>6</sup> For a detailed analysis of the Peace Zones and their failure in Aceh, refer to : Peace Zones in Aceh: A Prelude to Demilitarisation by Pushpa Iyer and The Collapse of Peace Zones in Aceh by Pushpa Iyer and Christopher Mitchell. Both these papers are available at: [www.gmu.edu/departments/icar/activities/localzonesofpeace](http://www.gmu.edu/departments/icar/activities/localzonesofpeace)

g) POLRI (Polisi Republik Indonesia - Indonesian Police) are to investigate criminal activities in these areas in consultation with JSC

In the period between the signing of the COHA and 9<sup>th</sup> February, 2003 when GAM was supposed to begin a phased disarmament process, seven PZs were established. The PZs were announced with great fanfare (some more than others) and in the beginning it seemed they had served the primary purpose for which they had been set up. The violence in the PZs dramatically decreased. In the meantime, international donors pledged that they would contribute to reconstruction and development in the PZs first. In some sense therefore there was every motivation to get the parties committed to maintaining the PZs. However, closer to the day when disarmament of GAM was to begin, violence once again erupted on a large scale. In the following months and leading upto May 2003, the ceasefire and every other agreement between the parties was broken. Neither side showed any commitment to COHA. The HDC was attacked and international peace monitors were hounded out of Aceh. COHA had failed and the PZ had collapsed.(Iyer and Mitchell 2004)

### ***Zimbabwe/Rhodesia's Assembly Points***

The Assembly Points (APs) in Rhodesia were geographically concentrated small areas whose main goal was containment of armed forces leading to a ceasefire and disarmament and demobilization.

Towards the end of 1979, the British who governed over Rhodesia chaired the negotiations with the Patriotic Front<sup>7</sup> and the Rhodesian Front<sup>8</sup>. Independence for

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<sup>7</sup> The two main groups that led an armed struggle against the Government was Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) – its military wing the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) – its military wing the

Rhodesia was the chief objective together with the movement of power from the Rhodesian Front to the Patriotic Front. Accordingly the first two phases of talks were devoted to the issue of Independence and transition of power. The third phase of negotiations was around the issue of cease-fire. As part of the cease-fire agreement was the decision to create APs. (Ginifer 1995)

APs (also known as the Rendezvous Points (RPs))<sup>9</sup> were to be the concentration points for all guerrilla groups. In the meantime the security forces would withdraw to the bases. A period of one week was to be given to the forces to assemble after which the ceasefire would come into effect.

Sixteen APs were agreed upon (a few of them located in the heart of Rhodesia) and the Patriotic forces began to assemble at these locations. The Rhodesian security forces in the meantime began to gather at 40 different bases spread all over the country. The ceasefire was to be monitored by the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) and which comprised of British, Australian, New Zealand, Kenyan and Fijian troops. (Davidow 1984)

There were of course some minor skirmishes in the APs (the troops were never asked to disarm in the APs), the ceasefire was broken a few times and ZANLA seemed to have moved some of their troops to Mozambique and were suspected of burying arms and walking into the APs with just a handful. However, the establishment of APs, the containment of troops within the APs and the declaration of ceasefire all went according

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Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). In 1976, ZANU and ZAPU came together to form a strategic alliance called the Patriotic Front.

<sup>8</sup> The alliance between the whites and the elite blacks in Rhodesia came to be called the Rhodesian Front.

<sup>9</sup> The RPs were temporary places, the APs were the permanent ones

to plans. The goal of containment before cease-fire was relatively a success.(Renwick 1997)

The process of ceasefire and demilitarization in the context of setting up of APs in Rhodesia can be represented as follows:

Peace Agreement → Assembly Points → Containment → Ceasefire → Demilitarisation → Elections

Thus in Rhodesia, the success of the APs is to be evaluated against the fact that they were a short term, localized zone of peace with very specific objectives. Most importantly the fact that unlike Aceh, demilitarization and demobilization were not included in the implementation of the APs. In short, the APs in Rhodesia unlike the PZs in Aceh were not meant to be a part of the confidence building measures.

## **Post-Conflict Peacebuilding & Development**

Overall there are very few examples of post conflict peacebuilding efforts that explicitly call for the creation of a ‘zone of peace.’ The one example we have found is the Local Zone of Peace in El Salvador. We will treat this example briefly as it is covered more in depth by one of our colleagues elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> However, we felt that the uniqueness of this zone holds promise for other areas attempting to recover from the ravages of conflict or, perhaps with some modifications, zones of poverty and crime in advanced industrialized states.

### ***El Salvador & the LZP***

In the arena of post-conflict peace and economic development the Local Zone of Peace centered on the southern coast of El Salvador. This zone of peace was declared in

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<sup>10</sup> See (Chupp 2003) for a more complete treatment of the LZP

August of 1998 by a group known as the Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America and a campesino movement known as La Coordinadora, which works in 86 Salvadorian communities to address poverty, violence and other social issues.

### **Reason for Establishment**

The Local Zone of Peace (LZP) was established as a part of the development activities of La Coordinadora. Post-conflict El Salvador still faces a number of difficulties. These include the failure of land reform to redress historical inequalities, a poor distribution system and endemic violence. While La Coordinadora was created to address economic and social development issues, it soon became clear that criminal violence, especially violence conducted by gang members repatriated from the US, was seriously hampering efforts to rebuild the local economy and attain a level of economic and social self-sufficiency.

According to Chupp the LZP was developed based on a United Nations concept derived from the 1971 UNESCO declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the subsequent 1990 declaration of Latin America as a zone of peace by several of the region's presidents. (Chupp 2003, 4-5)

The creation of the LZP was assisted by Ramón López-Reyes, the director of the International Center for the Study and Promotion of Zones of Peace in the World, based in Hawaii. Unlike its predecessors the general idea flowing from López-Reyes' experience was that in order to be successful a zone of peace needed to be instituted from the grass-roots up, rather than from the governmental or top-level down as the Indian Ocean and Latin American zones had been. (Hayes 1998)

The LZP is territorially defined in its founding principles as “a territory occupied by a community” seeking to define their own goals and aspirations to live peacefully, using the LZP to create a foundation for “the free and full expression of rights, be they economic, social and cultural, as well as...civil and political rights”. (Hayes 1998) This passage taken from the declaration of the LZP indicates that the members see the establishment of a zone of peace as part and precursor for the creation and maintenance of a whole series of rights, economic and political, necessary for a stable civil society.

### **Peace-Building Activities**

The overarching goal of the LZP was to create a Culture of Peace throughout the zone. In order to do this the organizers of the LZP developed a comprehensive program aimed at 1) restoring human rights, 2) promoting peace and indigenous methods of conflict resolution and 3) fostering the transformation of the organizational culture to reflect the aims of peace and democracy. (Chupp 2003, 2)

According to both Mark Chupp and LZP publications there are two primary peace-building activities that take place within the LZP. The first consists primarily of training to create a culture of peace. Using elicitive models of conflict intervention the culture of peace program has held a large number of workshops, providing training in conflict mediation, transformation and prevention to local community leaders, women’s groups and others. (Chupp 2003, 6; Hernandez 2001)

The Culture of Peace program has also been involved in a number of direct conflict interventions. Most notable were a series of interventions with members of two local gangs, whose members had repatriated from Los Angeles. These interventions, conducted by Chencho Alas, resulted in an end to violent conflicts between the two gangs,

community projects involving gang members and a redefinition by those members as ‘youths’ instead of ‘gang members’. (Alas 2000)

## **Economic Development Activities**

As an entity itself the LZP does not appear to engage in any economic development activities. However, one of the main rationales behind the creation of the LZP was the difficulty of implementing effective economic development activities in the post-conflict environment of continued violence and gang-related or criminal activities.

Some of the economic development activities undertaken or started by La Coordinadora includes the creation of community organic farms, shrimp farms, cottage chicken raising businesses and providing ‘green’ agriculture training to campesinos. (Coordinadora 2000) Other activities include home construction, disaster prevention and limited forays into computer and technology training. (Coordinadora 2000)

Economic development activities appear to be one of the main foci of La Coordinadora’s efforts, with the LZP having been created to foster the conditions in which economic and social development can take place. However, it also seems clear that the Culture of Peace program instituted as a component part of the LZP has had an effect on the types of development engaged in by La Coordinadora. In some sense the focus on ‘green’ technologies and sustainable development may be seen as complimentary to the grass-roots, elicitive focus of the peace-building initiative.

Overall the complimentary nature of the peace-building initiatives and the economic development initiatives may serve to strengthen each process. Primarily a peaceful environment allows for economic development to take place, and the ability of La Coordinadora to provide resources for economic development may assist in bringing

parties to the table for peace-building and to encourage ‘buy-in’ to the Culture of Peace program.

## **Role of Human Rights**

Human rights are considered an integral part of the Local Zone of Peace. Paragraph four of the LZP’s declaration indicates that they believe “it is absolutely necessary that they form a society...which has human rights promoters”. (Hayes 1998) Furthermore, as described by Chupp the Culture of Peace program outlined above had as its first goal the restoration of human rights and responsibilities. (Chupp 2003, 2)

## **Specialized & Limited Zones**

In addition to what might be described as ‘traditional’ zones of peace designed to ameliorate the conditions of conflict for a particular geographic community or to assist in the implementation of a peace or post-conflict reconstruction, there are a number of peace zone types of activities that have nontraditional foci. Although we cannot cover all of these areas in this paper, three that are interesting for our purposes include the ideas of personal zones of peace, centered on particular persons or categories of persons; site specific zones of peace that seek to protect particular geographic locations rather than the communities that inhabit them; and zones of peace that have particular goals and have a limited duration, usually considered operative just long enough to meet those goals.

### ***Personal Zones: UNICEF & Children***

The phrase ‘Children as Zones of Peace’ is over two decades old and the concept extends to providing for a variety of child rights and protection for children. However, these rights assume a special meaning in the context of a war situation. So on our

temporal scale, we would tend to locate these personal zones as an usual occurrence in the before peace phase.

There are many institutions, programmes, activities and campaigns that are organised for protecting the rights of the child, and in ensuring that conditions for the development of the child are created and sustained.

One such effort is the concept of declaring children as zones of peace. While the concept was initiated (and is still largely so) to cover those children and their issues during war, it has been extended to cover other issues like child labour and health care.

The idea of children as a 'conflict-free zone' emerged in the 1980s. This concept was first formulated by Nils Thedin of Sweden in a proposal to UNICEF. Even if the idea seemed idealistic in the beginning, it caught on and the idea of protecting children from harm and providing them with humanitarian assistance became part of negotiations in many bloody conflicts. (UNICEF-Global March).

Subsequently UNICEF appointed a special commission to investigate the situation of children in armed conflict. Graca Machel headed this special commission. As a result of the report published by this special commission, in February 2002, UNICEF's optional protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict came into force. This protocol was an amendment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The optional protocol address the issue of forced conscription in two ways:(UNICEF-Australia 2001)

- Prohibiting armies and armed opposition forces from involving children under 18 years of age in armed conflict;
- Banning the compulsory military recruitment of children under 18

While the 1996 report and the Optional Protocol has initiated many programs all over the world for dealing with the issues of children in armed conflict, but the way it gets translated into action is different. Broadly there are four different ways in which the concept Children as Zones of Peace is executed; as an abstract or general statement supporting the idea of protecting children during armed conflict, as a part of short-term or temporary zones of peace, as a type of activity or process designed to protect children during conflict and through the creation of physical sanctuaries for children during conflict.

Two examples of abstract statements come from Sri Lanka and Nepal. Sri Lanka ratified the convention on the rights of the child in 1991. The UNICEF office in Colombo initiated this idea in Sri Lanka. Initially the idea of a initiative – Children as Zones of Peace – was discussed with a wide range of actors (LTTE, Ministry of Defense, Religious leaders, teachers, NGOs and people affected by conflict) and a coalition of NGOs and individuals was formed. This coalition decided that the initiative should be promoted as a concept and not as a program. After five months of consultation with civil society and political representatives a best practices booklet was created to explain the concept. Published in English, Tamil and Sinhala the booklet was widely circulated and in 1998, when the UN Special Representative on Children in armed conflict visited Sri Lanka, the initiative was launched. Since then there have been many advocacy campaigns including media campaigns to promote the concept. The Australian Government and UNICEF Australia supported children as Zones of Peace in a project. The objectives of this program are very noble and have been good but their activities have largely been limited to advocacy and dissemination of information.(UNICEF-Australia 2001)

Another such initiative is that of CWIN – Nepal. They too have a long list of objectives, of do's and don'ts where children and child-related institutions are concerned. Their activities include information dissemination, campaigning for consensus among all warring parties, negotiating days of tranquility and promoting peace education in schools. Again, their concept of a zone of peace for children remains quite vague and there have been no concrete actions.(CWIN)

Their biggest problem is in translating the concept of Zones of Peace into action. But since it was not even part of their original plan it seems to have done what it set out to do. However, on careful evaluation, the initiative has not been very successful in getting the commitment of all actors. Those who support the idea cannot articulate it for it is still abstract. Many others have not heard of the concept. The best practices booklet is distributed to parents, children and teachers who are in no way supposed to be the recipients of the booklets.

While most temporary zones of peace are created for humanitarian aid or for health initiatives—and are covered below—a few have been designed specifically to benefit children and will be briefly covered here. As with the temporary zones, most of these zones have been negotiated by UNICEF or some other international third party.

UNICEF's first experience was in El Salvador in 1985. Extended negotiations with the government and the rebels resulted in securing three days of tranquillity – where both sides agreed to a ceasefire – during which time a campaign was run for immunization. More than 20,000 health workers immunized 250,000 small children. This three days of tranquillity became a regular feature in consecutive months and was repeated every year until the end of war six years later.

This form of temporary zone benefiting children was replicated in Afghanistan during its civil war; in Uganda during the conflict between the government and the National Resistance Army and in Sudan as a part of Operation Lifeline Sudan (covered below).

Two instances of activities for children, described as zones of peace, took place in the Philippines and in Sri Lanka. The general idea behind these activities is to provide for recreation and safe spaces where children can express their feelings about the conflict and, hopefully, achieve some measure of healing.

Workshops in a camp in Davos city in the Philippines were held providing many of these opportunities for children. In addition, UNICEF supports a programme in Colombia known as the Return of Happiness programme. In this program more than 400 institutions supported and provided access to communications media so that the children could voice their ideas directly. Through recreation and play they help children express their feelings and analyze events.

The final type of zone for children, the creation of sanctuaries is best exemplified by the Butterfly Garden project located in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka. This project, initiated from the University of Manitoba developed a space (an actual land area which they called Butterfly garden) in which the children could come and indulge in a variety of activities but where they were safe and would not be attacked. A bus (known as the “Butterfly Bus”) would pick up the children from the school and take them to the Butterfly garden. The organizers of the project garnered support from all of the warring parties; who allowed the bus to travel free from harassment and security checks. This helped to make the project a success in terms of the sheer relief and enjoyment it brought to the children of Batticaloa and the surrounding area. (Senanayake 2001)

Ironically, perhaps the most successful and massive campaign of children in war speaking for peace comes from Colombia. The Children's Peace Movement was founded by Juan Uribe<sup>11</sup> together with support from UNICEF and other organizations. This movement got its start in October of 1996 as the result of a special election known as the Children's Mandate for Peace and Rights. . Some 2.7 million children voted for rights they considered very important. An overwhelming majority voted for the right to life and peace. On the day of the elections, many of the warring factions adhered to a ceasefire – unprecedented in Colombia history of election days which were probably the most violent.

The highlight of this Movement is that children have developed their own rules for areas declared as Zones of Peace where children are not allowed to be targeted and where there can be no violence of any kind.

In some sense therefore, the children's initiative in Colombia is the "true" form of declaring children as zones of peace. It is only directly in this form that the children are given a voice to air their opinion of the political situation in their country and also can demand they should not be touched because they are zones of peace.(McDonald 2002)

However, we have to say that the concept of children as zones of peace is still a very abstract concept. Many a times it ends up comprising of activities that are ensuring the rights of the child and not specifically dealing with the context, that is of children at war. There are very few cases where commitment has been generated from the warring parties to respect children as zones of peace. We strongly feel that this cannot just remain an

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<sup>11</sup> He founded the movement when he was a child and after he had witnessed his father and cousin being brutally murdered

emotional issue; it is the real issue of an entire future generation that will be maimed physically and mentally by war.

### ***Sacred Sites & Localities***

A second type of specialized peace zone stems from efforts by various groups, both local and international; to protect sites considered to be of significant cultural or religious value. As argued by members of these movements, conflict and civil war take their tolls not only on the people in the region, but upon religious and spiritual places which have historic value and cannot easily be rebuilt or replaced.

One such group advocating these types of zones is the Zones of Peace International Foundation (ZOPIF). The ZOPIF is a non-profit organization with the vision of an evolving global culture of peace and is located in Washington state, USA. Their strategy is to work closely with the local people and in partnership with religious and spiritual leaders and government authorities all of whom recognize the importance of preserving these sites for the future. The ZOPIF have been successful in promoting the creation of protected sites in Bosnia and have proposed creating others in Sri Lanka.(Foundation)

Another interesting case is that of the Madhu sanctuary in Mannar district of northern Sri Lanka. The Catholic Church in Madhu was a place of refuge and sanctuary for the Tamils displaced from their villages. For a long time this church became the symbol of safety for the residents of northern Sri Lanka. Interestingly, the church was considered sacred not just by Catholics but by people of all religious faiths for its historical and spiritual significance. During a fresh outbreak of violence, in December 1999, the church was attacked and destroyed. The LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government blamed each another for the attack. Over 40 people who had taken refuge in the church were killed and

many others were injured. This is an interesting case where all the warring parties and the local people had an unwritten commitment to maintaining the church in Madhu as zone of peace; unfortunately that unwritten commitment proved inadequate.(Rajendran 1999)

### ***Limited Duration or Purpose: Operation Lifeline Sudan***

One of the most prominent examples of a conditional or limited zone of peace are the “days of tranquility” fostered by the UN sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan. This program, created in 1989 has focused on the use of two types of limited peace zones; “corridors of peace” and “days of tranquility” to attempt to provide humanitarian relief supplies and health services to refugee populations affected by the civil war.

The first of these conditional cease-fires, the “corridors of peace” was established for one month to facilitate the unhindered delivery of relief supplies to needy areas. Initially the UN had asked for a month-long cease-fire for the entire conflict, but this was rejected by the SPLA, who allowed for the creation of eight ‘corridors’ through which humanitarian aid and food relief supplies could move unhindered. This effort was successful enough to be followed by another initiative in 1994 to establish new corridors to transport vaccines and medical supplies to children following an outbreak of polio and measles (Galli 2001, 67). These were modeled on earlier efforts during the El Salvadoran civil war designed to create periods of peace wherein children could be vaccinated for disease (Shankar 1998, 32-33). As such, their aims and goals were very limited to ameliorating existing conditions in Sudan leading to famine or outbreaks of disease, especially in children. Although many of these conditions were no doubt exaggerated by the thirty years of civil war between the north and south, it does not appear that the goals of these “days of tranquility” extended beyond efforts to address immediate needs.

These temporary zones were created essentially by pressure from the UN and the international community; but were not ‘forced’ on the local political actors. Instead these groups were persuaded by the focus of the zones on purely humanitarian purposes, especially the later initiative targeting the health of children, and by the limited scope and duration of the zones themselves. Although some have thought that these zones might prove useful in promoting more peace-making activities, the evidence to date is that no such transference has taken place (Galli 2001; Shankar 1998). Indeed one critic of OLS has labeled the effort an inadvertent accomplice to the conflict, stating that both the Sudanese government and the SPLA have manipulated the flow of supplies to enhance their own strategic objectives (Martin 2002). The context of this argument is mostly moral and is faced by humanitarian aid organizations the world over. Essentially the choice being whether to persist in the delivery of aid to relieve suffering in a war zone or to accept that lives will be lost and hope that the burden of caring for the civilian population will force embattled parties to the table. It is not the role of this article to advocate one position over the other, but simply to recognize that in terms of its own mission goals and objectives, Operation Lifeline Sudan has been moderately successful in reducing the number of deaths that would have otherwise taken place.

## **Factors of Success or Failure**

In looking at each of these different types of zones it is possible to begin to discern some of the factors that contributed to their successes—limited in most cases—or their glaring failures.

## **Zones During Conflict**

In terms of failure the UN safe zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina are notable and rather unique for a number of reasons. The fact that they were instituted by international political authorities rather than by the inhabitants of the zones themselves is notable, but the fact that the warring parties to the conflict; most especially the Bosnian Serb forces, were uninvolved in the decision to institute the zones most likely contributed to their instability and eventual failure.

An additional problem with the UN safe zones was, especially considering the lack of buy-in by the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, the fact that UN troops were neither numerous enough to stop military incursions, nor for the most part were they willing to take casualties in order to ensure that the Muslim civilians were protected from sniper or mortar attacks carried out by Serb forces.

The creation of the UN safe havens was an admirable proposition brought to fruition by the concern of the international community. However, if there are any lessons to be learned from the failure of these zones to provide the promised safety it must be that a zone of peace in a conflict area may have either a lack of will on the part of the outside implementer or a lack of respect on the part of the local combatants, but it cannot survive for long without either.

By contrast the peace zones established in the Philippines and in Columbia were largely, if not wholly, driven by grass-roots processes with essentially logistical support from national and international NGOs and funding organizations. The key focus on grass-roots support and ownership as opposed to the mandated zones in Bosnia and the examples from disarmament and limited zones below is remarkable in terms of success.

The second major issue of difference is the level of ‘buy-in’ the organizers of these zones obtained from various warring parties. It is clear that the lack of buy-in in Bosnia is a key factor that contributed to the failure of these zones, while the limited degrees of buy-in obtained in the Philippines and Columbia contributed to their success in terms of being able to create the zone and maintain it over a period of time. While the buy-in for these ‘citizen-based’ zones was neither complete, nor durable for all the zones it is clearly a key element that the parties worked to achieve.

### **Disarmament Zones**

Some of the same issues that affect zones during conflict also had an impact on the disarmament zones examined in Aceh, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and El Salvador. Most importantly the issue of buy-in by the affected warring parties was a key component that differentiated the failure in Aceh from the successes of the other two. The reasoning behind this key component may be traced to two factors, the first of which was the degree of completeness of the peace plan created before the implementation of the zones and the second was the degree to which the zones attempted to fulfill their main functions of disarmament and reintegration before the overall political settlement was achieved.

This is particularly notable in Aceh where the cantonment zones were created at the early stages of the peace negotiations. In this instance the negotiations were barely started when the Henry Dunant Centre agreed to monitor the creation of cantonment zones for GAM. Unlike El Salvador and Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, the Indonesian military was not required to canton their forces as well. In addition there was pressure from the Indonesian government for GAM forces to begin disarmament immediately, rather than as a part of a larger political settlement. In addition the zones created in Aceh seemed to ‘overreach’ in

the sense that the intent was not just to create cantonment zones for demobilization, but to in some sense attempt to create a functional peace zone along the lines of those in Columbia and the Philippines. Therefore, the failure to include some, or perhaps any, local participation in the decision to create or manage these zones stands out as a major factor in their failure.

Behind this issue of a complete settlement lies the realization that such a settlement indicates whether the parties to the conflict are in fact willing to contemplate a negotiated peace, or if they are merely trying to gain a tactical advantage before continuing the conflict. This is part of what is known as subjective ripeness, the perception that the conflict cannot be won militarily, and perhaps signals that the negotiations were at too early a stage for the successful cantonment of forces (Hancock 2001). It seems clear that there were elements of the Indonesian military who believed that a military victory was still possible; unlike the conditions in the other two cases, where it was clear that there would be a negotiated end to the conflict.

Therefore one thing we can say is that these types of zones, unlike zones during conflict appear to require the fully engaged efforts of the parties to the conflict, rather than the limited buy-in required to maintain the sanctity of the citizen-based peace zones in the Philippines and Columbia. Given that the main goal is to affect the armed forces of each party to the conflict, this is not surprising

### **Specialized Zones: Buy-in and Limitations**

In each of our cases of the specialized zones the two main elements appear to be the ubiquitous need for buy in by the warring parties and, perhaps driving this, the notion that each of these zones did not present a threat due to their limited nature or duration.

It seems that the ability of the zone's sponsors to acquire the buy-in of the warring parties is dependent upon a number of factors. The first of which is the level of indigenous participation in the creation of the zone. In the case of the Children's zone in Sri Lanka and some of the zones centered around religious sites, the impetus seems to stem from local sources addressing local needs and values that are held by the parties to the conflict.

It is difficult to say, therefore, why there have been different levels of success for efforts to immunize children in El Salvador and in Sudan. While one can clearly say at some level that OLS has been a success, recent efforts have at times been stymied by both government and rebel forces. We are unable to determine why either party to this conflict would see a benefit in stopping this aid or redirecting, except for the possibility that each side might want the aid to benefit its military force rather than the civilian population. Unfortunately this is a difficulty encountered by all aid groups that work in conflict zones and the choice to continue to work in these situations is more a matter of morals and principles than determining whether some aid reaching impacted civilian populations is better or worse than no aid at all.

## **Conclusion**

We have attempted to identify some common characteristics for zones of peace depending on their temporal context and in relation to the existence of any peace process. If one returns to our argument that zones of peace are one attempt to mitigate violence in existing conflicts or assist in the process of ending conflicts than one can clearly see that the cases mentioned above have had varying degrees of success. Some of the zones have

managed to mitigate the effects of the conflict over a short period, and others over a longer period.

However, it is also apparent that many of these zones have aimed to achieve more than just ‘withdrawal’ or ‘mitigation’ of existing conflicts. Some of the more intensive efforts in places like Columbia, the Philippines and Aceh attempted to create social change, social justice and to expand the principles of positive peace beyond their limited borders. It is in connection to these types of issues that we believe another set of questions becomes important for study. Namely the questions of who initiated the creation of the zone, who participated in this creation and maintenance and what were the governance structures and leaders of these zones.

In addition we feel that these factors of creation, structure and direction play different roles depending on the temporal context of the zone of peace. It seems clear that in zones during conflict a high level of participation and ownership is required by the local population while it appears much less important to have government support or direction. In fact government involvement may prove detrimental to the zone’s goals of maintaining neutrality among the warring parties. The situation for disarmament zones is quite different, with these creations requiring active governmental and/or rebel support and, perhaps less support from the local population. Finally in our single example of a post-conflict peace zone it appears that a coalition of governmental and local actors was required to make the zone viable and allow it to conduct its activities.

So what we would like to propose is a combination of factors like the ownership, leadership and goals of a peace zone combined with the temporal position of that zone in relation to conflict and peace processes. The temporal position would help to determine

the extent to which one factor might be more important than another in determining possibilities for success; while recognizing that each situation is likely to be different.

In closing, we believe that the idea of a zone of peace where ordinary people can stand up against the violence that affects their lives is an idea whose time has come. From the earliest days of sanctuary we have understood and yearned for places where we may be free from violence. Hopefully our analysis of these zones can assist in some small way towards creating some sense of that sanctuary in every place.

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